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3A b s t r a c t
Chance, and its representation in literature, has a long and problematic history. 
Our human instinct to rationalize chance, and thereby to impose order on the disorder of 
life, is threatened by the m eaninglessness implied by pure randomness. And yet chance 
is also evocative of rationality: if we can order life into mathematical probabilities, then 
uncertainty itself becomes that which mediates experience, rationalizes it, and offers an 
explanation for events. In this sense, our distrust of randomness finds its best expression 
in the artistic impulse: the human need to impose order on disorder, and form on reality, 
thus always speaks o f the desire to suppress contingency.
This paradox, which lies at the heart of literary representations of chance, forms 
the basis o f this study, which addresses questions of chance and the aleatory in novels 
by four m id-twentieth century writers: Samuel Beckett, Henry Green, B. S. Johnson and 
Iris Murdoch. I argue that chance’s significance for the novel o f this period (1945-1978) 
is closely connected with other developments in the culture o f the time: existential 
philosophy’s preoccupation with questions of chance and possibility, the avant-garde’s 
increasing elision o f chance and randomness with formal experim entation, and an 
increasing m ovem ent, am ongst writers such as Samuel Beckett and Henry Green, away 
from authorial om niscience and omnipotence and towards an acceptance of the 
contingent and the partial. The growth of the aleatory technique in art in the sixties, 
influenced by the Dadaists, in part grew from this new idea o f chance, and the way that 
writers reconfigured their engagem ent with related concepts. In this way, chance 
became allied with attempts to reinvigorate the novel form.
C hance’s representation in narrative manifests itself variously as a concern with 
causality, contingency, and as a formal engagement with randomness. Throughout the 
thesis I address the complex ways these ideas become encoded into the construction of 
texts. The saturation o f the literary culture with depictions of, and anxieties about, 
chance at this time, eventually represents an age-old battle between freedom and 
determ ination, recast as a mid-twentieth century refiguring o f the relationship between 
author and narrative.
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Pr e f a c e
Human arrangements are nothing but loose ends and hazy reckoning, whatever art may 
pretend otherwise in order to console us.
Iris M urdoch1
Our m odernity...w as constructed upon the systemic denial o f  chance.
Thom as Kavanagh2
The idea o f chance bears a unique, and contradictory, relationship to modernity.
It represents reason, as an acknowledgement of chance as the organising principle of
events denies superstition, and the possibility that events are fated or known by a higher
power. And yet it also represents the rebuttal of reason: chance is incom prehensible and
unpredictable, by definition, and as such it is allied to the rebellious, the whimsical, the
nonsensical, and the subversive. Between these two paradoxical understandings stands
the modern self: defined, to some extent, by chance. That we are uncertain, fitful,
inconsequential, aware o f our own insignificance in a random universe, is the twentieth-
century realisation par excellence. As Richard Rorty argues in Contingency, Irony and
Solidarity  (1989), the m odem  individual is modem precisely because o f the impress of
chance; he m ust make ‘an effort to achieve self-creation by the recognition of
contingency’.3 In fact, this recognition of our essential contingency has perhaps altered
our very mode o f perception, as Gerda Reith states:
Chance infiltrates and suffuses modern life; not only as 
gambling and games of chance but, far more generally, as an 
‘orientation’ to reality or, rather, as the fundamental category
1 Iris Murdoch, The Sea, the Sea (London: Vintage, 1999), 477.
2 Thomas Kavanagh, Enlightenment and the Shadows o f Chance: The Novel and the Culture o f Gambling 
in Eighteenth Century France (The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London: 1993), 249.
3 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (London: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 25.
7of reality to which we must orientate ourselves...social life 
has become increasingly and openly randomised.4
The overw helm ing variety and unpredictability of modern life, otherwise characterised 
as its contingency, and the recalibration of our place in relation to this that took place in 
the twentieth century, inculcates a sense of man as no longer the lightning rod of 
meaning, but ju st another contingent cog in the wheel. We are not, in any sense at all, 
necessary. We are now products of chance as well as experiencers of it.
This apprehension o f chance as a uniquely modern epistemological category 
brings with it an association with a sense of permissive, limitless possibility. Chance in 
this way works as an eroticized channel of the imagination -  literally, anything might 
happen. And yet the cultural history of chance in the twentieth century has also been the 
story o f a slow sm othering o f the unpredictable, rebellious, incomprehensible aspect of 
chance beneath the new sciences that sprung up to categorise and to classify it. The new 
m athematics o f statistics and probability theory, were, by the beginning o f the period 
under discussion here, the dom inant modes with which chance was allowed into rational 
discourse. They tamed chance, in Ian Hacking’s excellent phrase, and this taming can 
be understood as the absorption o f chance into a dull taxonomy of experience that 
recasts all human endeavour as examples of or deviations from the average. The 
beginnings o f the ‘tam ing’ o f chance, commentators such as Hacking and Kavanagh 
suggest, had originally happened in tandem with the birth o f the modem  novel in the 
eighteenth century, which similarly circumscribed the boundaries o f chance’s 
operations by the introduction of larger causal explanations o f why things happened. 
This co-nascency contributed to the marginalization of chance throughout the novel’s 
history. The resulting eccentricity of the position of chance in relation to the novel, 
illuminated by analysis o f one specific period in literary history, is the subject of this 
thesis.
1 Cerda Rciili, The Ageof Chance: Carnh/ingin Western Culture (London: Routlcdge, 1999), xvi.
8As such, I am interested in one specific type of chance. Attitudes to chance
throughout its modern history could, very broadly, be said to fall into two categories,
and, to delim it such a vast area, 1 am only going to look at one of them. Although it is
inevitable that this will sometimes bleed into the other, it will remain my main focus.
Firstly, simply put, there is ‘true’ chance, otherwise referred to as randomness.
Secondly, there is fate masquerading as chance. Many, indeed most, writers use
‘coincidence’ to portend a hidden order or knowledge within the plot. Chance is
usually, in narrative, revealed as or assimilated into spots of determinism. Creating a
story in the very sim plest sense turns the unpredictable stuff of life into a determined
order, and it is this basic problem, chance’s inimicality to narrative, that transforms
most seeming instances of chance in the novel into their opposite: what appears at first
to be pure chance is revealed to be, as it is assimilated into, fate. As a corollary to this
narratological tension, the inherent discomfort in the relation between chance and
narrative finds an echo in the wider human relation to chance: chance would, given full
rein, render a life into a meaningless concatenation o f random, disconnected events.
Therefore an unavoidable corollary to the human urge to tell stories is the extinguishing
within those stories o f chance’s true operations. Iris Murdoch, who will form the subject
o f my fifth chapter, describes this primary and often overlooked problem eloquently, as
‘our tendency to conceal death and chance by the invention of forms. Any story which
we tell about ourselves consoles us since it imposes pattern upon something which
might otherwise seem intolerably chancy and incomplete. However, human life is
chancy and incom plete.’5 O f all the works on chance that I have studied during the
research for this thesis, Leland M onk’s Standard Deviations perhaps bears the greatest
sim ilarity to my project, although we differ in our conclusions. He comments:
the novel has always been of (at least) two minds, evidencing 
in its realist mandate a fidelity to experience in all of its 
contingency and, at the same time, being a generic 
imperative to structure its material in an aesthetically
5 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignly o f Cood (London: Rot u ledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), 85.
9autonomous and unified representation. A novelistic concern 
with chance is then always engaged in a simultaneous 
affirmation and denial of its existence/’
The tension between our attraction to forms that seek to counter life’s meaninglessness 
with narratives, and our contradictory desire for art to be as close to reality as possible, 
and therefore to tell us something about this, the most central aspect of reality as it is 
experienced, am ounts to chance’s ‘unrepresentability’ in narrative.
This thesis exam ines the ways in which selected writers represented chance in 
the m id-part o f the twentieth century, and seeks to discover the forces and motives that 
inspired and shaped these representations. With this in mind, then, I have chosen 
instead to seek out texts that, in differing ways, show signs of strain at the fault-line that 
chance offers to the critic. The thesis posits that chance bears a particularly pressing 
relationship to the mid-twentieth century, and that this is manifested in some of the 
novels o f the period in Britain and Ireland. The attraction to disorder was perhaps 
greater during the age o f possibility that followed the Second World War, and therefore 
this period is the one I will examine. I suggest that this tension became pressing in the 
mid-part o f the twentieth century for various reasons: chance had secured its dominion, 
scientifically, by the 1940s, and, philosophically, once the existentialists’ ideas had 
become comm on currency in intellectual and literary circles o f Britain and Europe. 
These developm ents, o f course, coincided with the Second W orld W ar, and all of my 
writers are in this sense ‘post-war’, although the later ones would perhaps not have 
defined them selves as such.
The structure o f the thesis is broadly chronological, though there are, 
inevitably, some m om ents where the careers of the writers I discuss overlap with each
6 Leland Monk, Standard Deviation*: Chance and the Modern British Novel (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1993), 153. Monk’s study is closest to mine in terms of argument and approach, though we differ in time 
period and in conclusion. Monk argues jnirsuasively that James Joyce’s Ulysses represents the eut-olf |X)int in terms 
ol'ehanee’s [xissihlc accommodation within narrative, and that sul>se<|uent, ‘|x>st-modern’ attempts to deal with pure 
chance are doomed to failure. In some ways the argument I make in this thesis picks up where Monk’s leaves oil; 
where Monk argues that the modernist novel is the a|x>gee of the fictional representation of chance. I seek to 
demonstrate that it is in the liction o f the mid-twentieth century, and the attempts of certain writers of this later 
ix't iod to assimilate pure chance to the novel form, that we see chance’s most successful representations.
other. My first chapter examines the idea o f chance, the intellectual, theological and 
philosophical history of the idea, and the associations it sustains. I have taken the long 
historical view in this chapter in an attempt to provide a solid historical base for my 
later discussions o f the changes that take place in the twentieth century. Chance, as we 
understand it, still rests upon the definitions first established in the eighteenth century. 
Throughout its pre twentieth-century history though, I argue, it has been associated with 
ignorance, passivity, and evil, and it was not until the twentieth century that the final 
break with determ inism  occurred and afforded chance a neutral status. Although 
neutered by its absorption into statistical mathematics and probability theory, chance in 
the m id-twentieth century was still associated with negative ideas, as I go on to argue in 
my third chapter. My second chapter centres on the post-war novels o f Henry Green, 
and argues that the Second World War had a contributory effect to the obsession with 
chance in my period. The fragmentation, disorder, and uncertainty o f the time created a 
fecund environm ent in which anxieties about chance were able to flourish. Life itself, 
for many people, seem ed more sensitive to possibility: people were essentially living 
under the rule o f probability, where the chances of dying were hastily calculated and 
recalculated according to whatever limited information was available. Green echoed 
this cultural preoccupation with chance and dealt with it as a question o f the author’s 
ability to represent freedom in the novel, and thus to represent a world ruled by chance. 
To this end Green was interested in the retreat of authorial om niscience and I will 
exam ine both his stated aim s, and his success -  or otherwise -  in achieving his desire to 
act as a recorder, rather than controller, of his material.
My third chapter exam ines Samuel Beckett’s 1953 novel Watt, the legacy of 
Existentialism , and its effect on chance. Beckett was writing in an intellectual climate in 
which the existentialists on the continent had drawn new associations between chance 
and existential freedom. In Watt though, as I argue, the horror o f infinite possibility 
typically meant that chance remained a negative force: the sentences o f Watt are
infected and paralysed by possibility, and an inability to decide on any one course of 
action becomes both a critique of the traditional limitations of the novel and of the 
negative aspects o f a world suddenly open to pure chance. My fourth chapter looks at 
the liberation of chance in the fifties and sixties by the rediscovery of the Dadaist trope 
of radical aleatorism , and I argue that this is a serious response to the recognition o f the 
problems presented by chance in relation to narrative; indeed, perhaps the only way to 
let a work be experienced as ‘chancy’. I use B. S. Johnson as the paradigmatic, and 
perhaps only, exam ple of a truly aleatorical novelist in Britain in my period. My fifth 
and final chapter looks at the ways in which the idea of chance was rehabilitated after 
the radical experim ental ism of the sixties, identifying and discussing its transmutation 
into a philosophical and literary preoccupation with contingency. The writer, I suggest, 
who best expresses this transformation, and who takes it most seriously, is Iris 
M urdoch, and I exam ine some of her novels of the 1970s to glean an understanding of 
how this philosophical belief in contingency is able to sit happily with the novel form. I 
suggest that it is her insistence on the importance of the contingency o f character, and 
the belief that lies at the heart o f her novels that contingency is related to goodness, that 
eventually saves chance, in M urdoch’s oeuvre, from its age-old associations with 
ignorance and paralysed passivity. In M urdoch’s writing an acceptance o f contingency, 
and an accom m odation between free characters and the ‘crystalline’ perfection o f form, 
finally transform  the workings of chance in the novel into an analogy for the operation 
of grace in a secular world.
Chance, as we shall see, manifests itself in the novel in various ways. In an 
essay on that other great unknowable and unrepresentable literary obsession, death, 
Elisabeth Bronfen points out that the unknowability o f death means that ‘every 
representation o f death is a misrepresentation’.7 1 would argue something approxim ating 
this for my own topic, that ‘every representation of chance is a m isrepresentation’.
7 ‘Introduction’ to Sarah Webster Coodwin and flisalxnh Bronfen, cds.. Death and Representation (Baltimore, MA: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 4.
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Monk makes a sim ilar point in his study of chance and the modern novel, when he 
suggests that ‘Chance is the unrepresentable Other of narrative’.8 W here my project 
differs from existing studies of chance is that, in contrast to Monk and others, 1 suggest 
that chance has managed to be represented at various junctures, usually by writers who 
seek to disturb the form  that is such a representation’s greatest hurdle. Bernard 
Bergonzi said in 1970, ‘Art must essentially be the impression of form on flux ’.9 There 
is, I contend, an alternative artistic tradition, one that has tried to let the flux, in all its 
haphazard glory, represent itself. And so chance is not a discrete object, but an 
endlessly variable subject that sheds light upon the motivations o f writers according to 
how they use it; it is ambiguous and shifting. When one writes about chance, one is 
never really writing about chance itself, but what chance can tell us through its 
refracting, paradoxical light. I will attempt to keep this in mind during the thesis, while 
all the time trying to give chance its due: not mistaking it for something else, or wishing 
it away, or effacing or marginalizing its operations. As Henry James fam ously points 
out in his preface to the New York edition of Roderick Hudson, ‘Really, universally, 
relations stop nowhere, and the exquisite problem of the artist is eternally but to draw, 
by a geometry of his own, the circle within which they should happily appear  to do 
so ’.10 The writers I have chosen to study in this thesis all believed that the proper role of 
the novelist, to a greater or lesser degree, was to lever open this neat Jam esian circle, so 
that the contingency o f the universe could be allowed to impose a geom etry o f its own.
H Monk, Standard Deviations-, 10.
9 Bernard Bergonzi, The Situation ofthe Novel (London: Macmillan, 1970), 210.
10 Henry James, "The Art o f the Novel: Critical Prefaces," (New York: Scribner, 1934), 5.
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C h a p t e r  O n e  
A  Fine Thing: A History o f Chance
Lo! thy dread empire, Chaos! is restor'd;
Light dies before thy uncreating word;
Thy hand, great Anarch! lets the curtain fall.
And universal darkness buries all.
Alexander Pope'
[T]he details, whether good or bad, [are] left to what we may call chance. Not that this 
notion at all satisfies me.
Charles Darwin to Asa Gray, May 22, I8602
Blaise Pascal, it can be argued, gave us the modem concept of chance in a 1654 
bar-room debate that changed our understanding o f the world.3 Along with the writers 
Cardano and Pacioli, he was involved in a card game that was brought to an abrupt end. 
The question arose: how should the players divide the winnings? The others argued that 
the spoils should be divided according to whichever of them was winning at the time 
the game ended. How the game had gone so far, they reasoned, was the best basis from 
which to predict how it would continue. They had no reason to believe that what was 
currently happening would stop happening in the future -  in other words, they
1 Alexander Po|>e, The Danciad in Four Books, cd. Valeric Rumlxdd (Harlow: Longman, 1999), IV, 1.649.
2 Charles Darwin, On the Origin of/he S/jet ie.s by Means ofNatural‘Selection (London: Broadview Press, 2003),
492.
1 Though mentioned in most lx>oks that examine the history of the concept of chance, I owe my s|)ecilie 
understanding o f the signilieanee o f this incident to Reith’s seminal work The Age o f Chance. Reitli, The Age o f 
Chance: Camhlingin Western Cn/tnre. See p. 25 for her commentary on Pascal’s wager.
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contended that life is essentially consistent from one moment to the next. Pascal, 
however, disagreed, and argued that past events, no matter how consistent they had 
been up until the present moment, had no bearing whatever on predicting future events.
This was radical. From this initial observation, Pascal was able to deduce that 
questions about uncertain phenomena in general could be treated rationally, and that 
there existed indices o f probabilities of how a thing would behave. Each event 
happened in isolation, with no knowledge of anything, and beholden to nothing. Only 
the laws of probability could, on a very large scale, tell us anything. Pascal’s famous 
wager about the divine demonstrates, and was made possible by, this new, rational 
approach to the prediction o f outcomes, and reflects an unspoken acceptance of an 
encroaching atheistic atm osphere that sustained and paralleled the rise o f rational 
perspectives in the new science of probability.4 The foundations o f belief in a deity, 
Pascal proclaim ed, could be reduced to two possible premises: either God exists or he 
does not. From this, he determined that belief was preferable to unbelief, given the 
uncertain situation in which man finds himself, and taking into account an appraisal of 
the possible benefits and/or punishments given either o f the two possible outcomes. If 
there is no God, neither belief nor unbelief will have any effect on us; but if there is a 
God, then the consequences are infinite. These consequences are either eternal 
dam nation, if God exists and we have chosen not to believe, or salvation, the best 
possible outcom e, if we are right. The possible benefits of being right about God’s non­
existence, then, are negligible compared to the catastrophic consequences if we are 
wrong about his non-existence. Similarly, the potential benefits if we are right that God
4 The parallel Ix-tween games o f chance and religious lxdief has lx:en widely recognised, and |xrhaj)s the most 
complete discussion o f the parallels can Ix,* found in M. and S. Bcnnet Csikszenimihalyi, "An Exploratory Model of 
Play," American Anihro/xdogist 73, no. 1 (1971), F.N. David, Carnes, Cods and Catnb/ing: A History' o f 
Hm/xdniuy and Statistical Ideas (London: Criflin, 1969). Both of these texts argue that games of chance are 
exercises in relationship with the supm atural, which is an analysis that is also pursued by Cerda Reith, who argues 
that the ‘coincidental or unlikely was interpreted for a more profound meaning from the realm of the sacred through 
divination or augury in the classical, ancient and “primitive” worlds.’ (Reith, The Age o f Chance: Catnb/ing in 
Western Culture, 13.) The subsequent link Ixawcen prohabilism and atheism is often implied by the condemnation 
from the religious that the new attitude to chance inspired.
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does exist are so great that they would outweigh the potential consequences of being 
wrong, even / / th e  chances of G od’s existence are microscopically small.
The significance of this was two-fold: not only was Pascal blithely reducing the 
question o f w hether or not to believe to a logistical tactic, which itself was an ironically 
atheistic m anoeuvre, but his decision-making process also accords a radically new 
status to probability and chance. Before the eighteenth century, as we shall see, chance 
had amounted to an index of wickedness, occasionally, and of ignorance -  a stance that 
could be summ arised thus: we do not understand why a particular thing has happened, 
but, since everything is determined by God, that which we don’t understand must result 
from our ignorance o f his purposes. With Pascal’s wager, belief, for the first time, was 
made to adapt to an understanding of the world based on contingency. We are prepared 
to believe, but only if an analysis of the possible outcomes, based on chance, dictates 
that it is the right course o f action. This, for us, is a recognisable response. In the early 
twenty-first century chance is understood as an integral and codified part o f the world; 
it is inscribed in our understanding of the universe, as demonstrated by the widespread 
dissemination o f the distinctively modem scientific fields o f probability theory, 
quantum  m echanics and chaos theory.
It was not so until relatively recently. Most commentators suggest that there 
was literally no such thing as chance until the eighteenth century, often using Pascal as 
a decisive turning point: from  then on as Gerda Reith puts it, chance ‘had become 
radically autonom ous, an ontological category in its own right’.5 Our specific 
understanding o f chance is certainly a recent development, scientifically informed and 
dating from the early twentieth century, and as M onk comments, ‘the history of 
thinking about chance is in general a history of its m arginalization’.6 Nevertheless, the
5 Reith, The Age o f Chance: Gambling in Western Culture, 14. Reiili argues that it was not until the nineteenth 
century that chance shed its last vestiges of religious meaning, when it Itecame thoroughly secularised into a 
‘meaningless’ determinism. 1 would jxniiapsadd that there were still shadows of deterministic thought up until the 
mid-twentieth century, and that it was nor until then that chance’s meaning Itccamc fully random.
6 Monk. Standard Deviations, 13.
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definition of chance throughout the ages has not been straightforwardly inseparable 
from fate and providence, as some comm entators have argued. Rather, the 
condemnatory attitudes towards chance throughout history show a subsumed, yet very 
human, desire for the random , and that this might be interpreted as an index of 
scepticism, doubt, and d isbelief throughout the supposedly pious ages. In the mid­
twentieth century, Edm und Bergler, an influential thinker on gambling, described the 
impulse to engage with chance as the ‘old childish fantasy of grandeur and 
megalomania. M ore im portant, it activates the latent rebellion against logic, 
intelligence, m oderation, m orality, and renunciation...the one exceptional situation in 
life where the reality principle has no advantage over the pleasure principle. There blind 
chance ru les.’7 C hance’s existence, while consistently m arginalized and frequently 
denied throughout h istory, has nevertheless perhaps always had a foothold on the 
human imagination, if only  as an idea that represented a seditious form of freedom -  
freedom from God, from  the economic strictures of society (as chance perhaps uniquely 
has the potential to redistribute wealth not according to traditional channels), and thus 
from hierarchy. C han ce’s subversive powers remain, although perhaps somewhat 
dimmed: in the late tw entieth  century and the beginnings o f the twenty-first there exists 
still an air of moral, rather than merely fiscal, unsavouriness around gambling, and 
those with a belief in superstition or coincidence (often referred to as ‘synchronicity’) 
are routinely castigated fo r their stupidity. Similarly, aleatorical art has become 
established as a shortcut to rebellion from prescribed ideas of artistic authority. Perhaps 
in the twentieth century we have not yet entirely moved on from the routine denial and 
vitriolic condem nation o f chance that was common in the past, as this characteristic 
eighteenth-century view by the determinist scientist Abraham de Moivre typifies:
Chance, in atheistical writings or discourse, is a sound utterly
insignificant...it can neither be defined nor understood: nor
' Quoted in Thomas Kavanagh, Enlightenment andthe Shadowsof Chance: The Novel and the Culture o f Gambling 
in Eighteenth Century' France (Balt imore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 18.
can any Proposition concerning it be either affirmed or 
denied, excepting this one, ‘That it is a mere word’.8
The Origins of Chance and the Manifestations ofFortuna
Chance occupied this awkw ard, liminal space for centuries. If, on the one hand, 
it was a ‘mere word’, which was denied existence by the pious, and subsumed entirely 
by the concept of Providence (Fortuna), it still hovered in the ontological background, 
real enough to threaten those who sought to deny it. The word itself had a 
fundam entally different meaning to the one it has for us: it existed mainly as a sacred 
channel for divine knowledge, and events were thus interpreted for what advice or 
judgem ent they may hold for humans. Hence for large portions of history the word has 
been inseparable from Fortuna, which is an obvious linguistic antecedent o f fortune in 
English. The basic meaning o f this has remained the same; fortune is in rough 
accordance with luck, as both chance, and as a piece of the universe’s good will that has 
been apportioned out, presumably by some intelligent and decisive being. All events, in 
early Christian culture, and certainly for the Ancient Greeks and Romans, were 
underpinned by a rigorous and totalizing determinism -  G od’s, or the gods’, 
om nipotence. Everything happened for a reason, if as yet undisclosed, so any unlikely 
event was therefore not a coincidence, but soaked in meaning as a direct augury of 
G od’s will. This fact is apparent in the earliest recordings of the concept of chance: in 
Greek, the figure o^fortuna)represents destiny as well as chance, and the determinism 
of the Greek theological system  tells us that every aspect of life has been mapped out 
for us before birth. The Greek preoccupation with destiny underpins all questions of
8 Abraham de Moivre, The Doctrine o f Chf/mev, .'3rd ed. (London: 1756), 253.
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causality and aetiology, and highlights an instability in the meaning of Fortuna that 
leaves as its legacy an intertw ining of chance and destiny, the traces o f which still exist.
The word chance itse lf is derived from cadere , the Latin for ‘to fall’, so chance 
is what ‘befalls’ us, or how the dice fall for us, a meaning that has survived intact.9 
Hasard  in French has also bequeathed us an echo o f its meaning, which has leaked into 
the m odern understanding o f hazardous. Shakespeare’s Richard III was able to say: ‘I 
have set my life upon a cast, / And I will stand the hazard o f the d ie’,10 which carries the 
full weight of the French, im plying as it does both risk and danger; anything, indeed, 
beyond our control, which o f course uncertainty and chance always are. However, the 
unpredictable outcome o f the dice, or of the casting of lots, is not subject to chance as 
we understand it, but to a version o f ‘chance’ at best subordinate to discussions of the 
limits o f fate and free will.
Chance originated in the Greek idea o f the primeval disorder, or chaos, which 
existed before the world, and therefore order, were brought into being. Chaos was not 
mere nothingness, but had dark  powers of destruction o f its own, as Plato tells us that 
God feared ‘all might be dissolved in the storm and disappear in an infinite chaos’.11 As 
Brenner points out, in fact, chaos was brought to order through an engagem ent with 
chance, as Poseidon, Zeus and Hades divided the world between them in a dice game: 
Zeus got the sky, Poseidon the sea, and the loser, Hades, the underw orld.12 The origins 
o f chance are thus inextricable with those of gambling, and also, initially, strike us as 
oddly modem: chance here is operating as an aspect o f the rational world, and 
randomness is presented, in the myth, as a fair and ju st method of distribution, 
completely without agency. In fact, the reality of the Greek attitude to chance was very 
different, explicable perhaps by the oddly unique circumstances of that first completely
9 For discussions of the linguistic roots o f chance, sec Kavanagh, Enlightemeni and the Shadows o f Chance, 4. See 
also Reith, The Age o f Chance: Cam!ding in Western Culture.
10 William Shakes|)care, "Richard III," in The Complete Works (Oxford: flic Clarendon Press, 1988), V. vii, 9 -1 0 .
11 Plato, "The Statesman," in The Dialogues o f Plato (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 588.
12 Rcuvcn Brenner and Cabriellc A. Brenner, Camh/ingamlS/jeadation: A Theory', a History', and a Future o f Some 
Human Decisions(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 4.
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random gamble: since these three were the / bunding beings of the world, there was no 
higher god to whom they could appeal. Chance exists, then, for the Greeks, as an 
absence, not just o f agency, but also of existence. Chaos represents absolute anarchy, 
but it ceases to exist once being itself is brought into existence, and is therefore 
analogous to nothingness.
Sim ilarly, gam bling, as the most characteristic and pure engagement with 
chance, was seen prim arily in Greek society as a means to determine what the gods 
willed a m an’s fate to be. A preoccupation with gambling in Greek society was 
certainly evident. Bolen tells us that the Greeks believed that Palamedes invented dice 
and played with his fellow soldiers to relieve the boredom at T roy.13 A few centuries 
later, at the Circus in Rome, there was seemingly a sort o f raffle where the winning 
numbers could claim  vases, or horses.14 In The Iliad, Zeus uses a sacred balance to 
decide whether the Trojans or the Greeks will win the battle (Book viii) and to 
determ ine whether Hector or Achilles will die (Book xxii), and Hector puts lots into his 
helmet and casts them to decide who strikes the first blow in the duel between Paris and 
M enelaus.15 A ristotle identifies two different kinds of chance, tyche and automaton, 
which much later form  the basis o f an influential discussion of the narrative uses of 
chance by Jacques Lacan,16 and which are both part o f natural chains of causation. 
Tyche is chance as experienced by the mind, and automaton is chance as incorporated 
into the natural w orld .17 In a discussion of chance in his examination o f final causes in 
the Physics, A ristotle makes clear that his idea of chance is fully subordinate to his
13 See Darrell W Bolen, "Gambling: Historical Highlights and Trends and Their Implication for Contemporary 
Society," in Gambling andSocien', cd. William Eadington (Springfield, IL: Thomas, 1976), 7 -3 8 .
14 See Alex Rubner, The Economicsof Gambling (London: Macmillan, 1966), 5.
15 for  further elaboration on the origins of gambling, see see David, Games, Gods and Gambling: A His/on' o f 
Pmlxtbilitv and Statistical Ideas, ft may also lie worth mentioning here the Cos|>d story of the Roman soldiers 
casting lots for Christ’s clothes at the foot of the cross following the crucifixion. Not only does this cast some more 
light on the |X)pularity o f gambling in the Ancient world, it also further emphasises the traditional association 
Ixnwcen gamblingund immorality, sinfulness and an ignorance of God’s divine plans
16 Jacques Lacan, "Seminar on the Purloined Letter," in French Trend: Stnnfund Studies in Psychoanalysis, ed. J. 
Mehlman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972). He concludes ‘A letter always arrives at its destination’ (p. 72) 
denying chance a meaningful role.
17 For a useful discussion o f Aristotle’s definitions of chance, see Monk, Standard Deviations, 16-18 .
20
teleological explanation, rigorously delimiting chance’s operation by using it as a 
synonym  for ‘coincidence’, or the impetus for a ‘coincidental cause’ (which, as the 
intersection o f two separate causes, is not, as Sharpies points out, incompatible with 
determ inism ).18 The interm ingling of the ideas of chance and coincidence is another, 
perhaps more rational, way to infect the subversive idea of chance with the religiously 
coded obsession with meaning and purpose: coincidence is, in one sense after all, just 
random ness that has been brought to our attention.19
Further evidence for the elision of the sometimes contradictory concepts 
surrounding chance comes from Huizinger, whose Homo Ludens (1938) is a seminal 
analysis o f the psychology of play. He notes that on Greek coins the figure of Dike, the 
goddess o f justice, blends with the figure of Nemesis (vengeance) and with that of 
Tyche.20 Huizinger remarks that for the Ancients the concept o f ‘how the dice falls for 
u s’ can mean not only ‘how the gods want the dice to fall for us’, but also, ‘how the 
dice should fall for us, if our enemies have their way’. This domination o f aetiology by 
determ inism  is borne out by literary treatments of teleology, with Sophocles’ Oedipus 
run/)oS em blem atic o f the Greek attitude towards m an’s fate. Oedipus is an examination of 
how closely our actions, which we believe are performed under our own volition, are 
intertwined with our destiny, even when we vainly try to act in opposition to that fate. 
The crushing wheel of destiny, as it was so often limned, was inescapable.
The clash between the creation myth of Greek society, which relied on chance 
for its very existence, and the utter impossibility of chance’s coexisting with a system 
where even free will was a hotly contested concept, subject at the very least to strict 
lim itations, is mirrored in other early societies. An early fascination with games of
18 R.W. Sharpies, Alexander oJ\4phmdiMMu>n Fate (\j.nvkm: Duckworth, 1983).
19 Interestingly, coincidence’s elision wiih, rather than op|M)sition to, causality has continued into the jieriod that 1 
will i)o concentrating on. As Arthur Koestler argues, ‘the simultaneous occurrence of two meaningfully, but not 
causally connected events or alternatively as a coincidence in lime of two or more causally unrelated events which 
have the same or similar meanings...equal in rank to causality as a principle of explanation’ (Arthur Koestler, The 
Roots o f Coincident e {Hew York: Random House, 1972), 94.)
20 Johan Huizinger, Homo Ijtdetts: A Study o f the Play Element in Culture (London: Routledge, 1998), 94.
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chance in the Bible seemed to sit happily with the early Christian belief in 
predestination. The history of lotteries suggests a sim ilar ability to elide the divine will 
with chance events. The word ‘lot’ comes from the Teutonic hleut, which was the 
pebble cast to settle property disagreements and other legal squabbles.21 From this root 
we also get the French terms lotterie, and the Italian lotteria , but in both English and 
Dutch the word ‘lo t’ carries with it a suggestion of destiny: one’s lot in life is equivalent 
to one’s fate. ‘How the dice fell* for people was therefore not only indistinguishable 
from their destiny; it could also be used as a supposedly accurate instrument of augury, 
a practice em ployed to determine God’s position on any number o f subjects, and was so 
widespread in western culture that traces of this practice, and the resulting systematic 
suppression o f chance, survived in Britain into the nineteenth century.
The divine sanction for the casting of lots in early Christian society is Biblical, 
and Brenner cites various examples, including the election of a king (1 Sam. 10:20-1), 
the picking o f a scapegoat for an atonement ritual (Lev. 16:8-10), and an instance in 
which lots were em ployed as a tool for the meting out of divine justice, and to name the 
guilty (Josh. 7:10-26). Exodus 28:30, for instance, relates how high priest Aaron was 
ordered to wear lots ‘Urim and Thummim’, thought to be two dice, one for a positive 
answer one for the negative, when going before the Lord. In such a wholly theocratic 
culture, gam bling was not blasphemous, but was used purely as an instrument of 
knowledge, or in R eith’s terms, it was not yet an epistemological category, but merely 
an epistem ological tool.22 In contrast, gambling was also widespread in pre-Islamic 
Arabia, but in this case it was seen as running contrary to the proper worship of God in 
Islam. The popularity o f gambling (maysir) was such that critics such as Brenner
21 Brenner’s first chapter “The History of Lotteries’ has a useful list of Biblical and historical sources, and also see 
Bolen, "Gambling: Historical Highlights and Trends and Their Implication for Coniein|x>rary Society," 7 -3 8 .
22 ‘|C|hance came to indicate, not the favour of the gods, hut an absence o f knowledge. From IxMnga.ir/rm/, it now 
l>ecamc an epistemologicalcategory.’ Reith argues that this represents the major shift in our understanding chance, 
as it Ixxomes detached from its religious/magical signiliers. She identifies the second half of the seventeenth 
century its the crucial |x*riod for this transformation. See Reith, The Age o f Chance: Gambling in Western Culture, 
13.
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suggest that its Q ur’anic condemnation was specifically intended to stem its flow, 
which suggests that chance may have had an ontological status that we might recognise.
Sim ilarly, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, and others condemned gambling
on the grounds that it reflected an interest in material things, in being a ‘partner with the
w orld’.23 This suggests an interesting awareness o f the rational aspect of chance, a
perception o f it as dealing not merely with divine wishes, but as actually being in
opposition to them. It might even be argued that this implies a conflict between the
world of hum anity and the world of the gods, with chance firmly on the side of man,
although the m ateriality of the objections suggest that it may have been the fiscal side-
benefits o f an engagem ent with chance that were actually meeting with disapproval. In
fact, a shift had occurred in Greece when pious belief in the Olympian system started to
dissolve; a parallel shift occurred in the perception o f Fortuna, and the active worship of
fortune and fate began. Although Fortuna was still a confused concept -  sometimes
interchangeable with chance, and sometimes starkly contrasted with it -  this represented
a significant evolution. Brenner cites an observation made by Pliny the Elder, which
contains characterizations of chance that are strongly evocative today -  chance is
‘b lind’, ‘fick le’, and most gallingly, as always, ‘friend o f the unw orthy’:
Throughout the whole world, at every place and hour, by 
every voice, Fortune alone is invoked and her name is 
spoken: she is the one dependent, the one culprit, the one 
thought in men’s minds, the one object of praise, the one 
cause. She is worshipped with insults, counted as fickle and 
often as blind, wandering, inconsistent, elusive, changeful, 
and friend of the unworthy....We are so much at the mercy 
of chance that Chance is our god.24
23 Quoted by Brenner and Brenner, Catnb/ing andS/tecn/ation: A Theor\', a llistor\\ and a Future o f Some Unman 
Decisions, 52.
21 Ibid.
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Medieval Chance and the example of Boethius’s Consolations o f  
Philosophy
St. A ugustine, Reith notes, anticipated the dom inant medieval attitude to chance 
in the fifth century, when he explained that it was the ignorance of man and not the 
nature of the events them selves that caused the latter to appear random .25 Reith’s stress 
on the importance o f knowledge in her argument about the history o f chance is 
therefore highly relevant: originally a tool for discovering G od’s will through lots or 
dice, chance was acknow ledged, but primarily as an indicator of a lack o f information. 
A chance event was therefore an event that had not yet revealed its reasons, but whose 
determination, and fatedness, was nonetheless unquestionable. This attitude prevailed in 
medieval texts, even as games of chance survived fitfully as entertainment. Lots were 
still used in the seventeenth century to determine outcomes, but gambling for pleasure 
was still seen as a blasphem ous misuse of what was essentially an instrum ent for and 
means of augury.
Brenner tells us that borough officers were chosen by lot in the sixteenth 
century, and the practice o f compelling condemned men to choose by lot which of them 
should die was still a com m on tool of military discipline during the English civil war. 
This should not be understood, however, as a  humane randomising of the decision, to 
take away agency and thus culpability for condemning their fellow men -  the equivalent 
of an eeny meeny miny mo; rather, the ticket was branded ‘life given by G od’, and was 
thus a clear indication o f the individual’s destiny. Further examples given by Brenner 
include an occasion in 1649 when the council of the army prayed and then cast lots to
25 Reith, T/te Ageof 'C/ian< e: Catnbliuftin Western Culture, 19.
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determine which regim ents be sent to Ireland, and a decision of 1665 that allowed juries 
to cast lots to resolve their different opinions when agreement could not be reached. The 
practice continued into the eighteenth century, with John Wesley still using lots to 
determine G od’s will, arguing that they could be used in exceptional circumstances as 
‘the whole disposal thereof is o f the Lord’.26
Lots, therefore, were acceptable as long as this belief in total predestination 
survived; and yet, even as such extreme religious beliefs began to die out, a belief in 
randomness continued to be associated with blasphemy or atheistic leanings. 
G am bling’s subversive pow er comes partly from this connection to a magical or 
religious world-view, though there exist other possible reasons for the vehemence with 
which it has always been discouraged by the ruling classes (irrespective, o f course, of 
the enthusiasm with which they may have indulged in it themselves). Brenner makes a 
persuasive and coherent argum ent that behind the condemnation of gambling has lurked 
a resistance to the idea that chance, rather than divine will or talent, can have a 
significant effect on the reallocation of property. The rise of a secular appreciation of 
chance mirrored the rise o f m ercantile capitalism, which led the aristocracy and others 
with an interest in m aintaining economic and social hierarchies to determine that 
people’s hopes would not become ritualised around the idea o f chance; rather, they 
should embrace the idea o f work as the proper route to economic satisfaction, and thus 
natural and moral well-being.
The condem nation o f chance became more vitriolic through the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries, and, as Keith Thomas remarks, if there was a common theme 
through theological protestant writing of the time, it was an absolute denial of accident 
or chance.27 Calvin condem ned it in Institutes o f  the Christian Religion (1559), 
following Aquinas, Boethius and Dante, who all make the point that all aetiological
26 John Wesley, The Works o f John Weshy, vol. 8 (Abingdon: The Abingdon Press, 1989), 451.
27 Quoted in Brenner and Brenner, Camh/ing and S/tecula/ion: A Theor\', a Histor}', and a Future o f Some Unman 
Decisions, 52.
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considerations are subordinate to divine providence. Boethius in particular paid close
attention to the question, and while he concludes in favour of providence, he shows a
questioning, rigorous attention that betrays an awareness of different possible
interpretations. In Consolations o f Philosophy, he states:
It is because you men are in no position to contemplate this 
order that everything seems confused and upset...the order 
which issues from the supreme good at the centre of the 
universe cannot deflect anyone from his beginning.28
So Boethius begins from the conventional medieval view of chance; it is a deficit: a 
corner around which we cannot see. He also emphasises the totality of predestination; 
no one can be deflected from his beginning, bringing to mind a Calvinist system of the 
elect and the preterite. Boethius seems troubled by this simple view, and interrogates it 
further:
But you just said now that the question of Providence was 
bound up with many others, and I want to put it to the test. I 
want to know whether you think there is such a thing as 
chance, and what it is....If chance is defined as an event 
produced by random motion without any causal nexus, I 
would say there is no such thing as chance...it is a 
completely meaningless word. If God imposes order on all 
things, there is no opportunity for random events....‘Well 
then,’ I asked, ‘isn’t there anything that can properly be 
called chance or accidental? Isn’t there something for which 
these words are appropriate, even though ordinary people 
don’t recognise it?’....‘Whenever something is done for 
some purpose, and for certain reasons something other than 
what was intended happens, it is called chance. For example, 
if someone began to dig the ground in order to cultivate a 
field and found a cache of buried gold. This is believed to 
have happened fortuitously, but it does not happen as a result 
of nothing; it has its own causes, the unforeseen and 
unexpected conjunction of which have clearly affected the 
chance event.29
In keeping with his tim e, Boethius relies on an Aristotelian elision of causality with 
chance: the separate causes which work together to create the chance event are thus 
inextricable from chance. Chance still has no coherent being, existing, as it does here, 
only in the margins o f Boethius’s understanding of causality. However, as we saw with
28 Boethius, Con.w/ariom-of Philo wp/iy, trails. V.E. Warts (London: Penguin, 1969), 137.
29 Ibid., 147.
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Aristotle, while this definition of causality is not exactly incompatible with 
determinism, it certainly makes an unlikely bedfellow. In similarly Aristotelian terms, 
they are final, and not first, causes -  the hows and not the whys that we have been 
dealing exclusively with until now. Nevertheless, the meaning that is perhaps being 
edged out here is not m aking a permanent exit -  Boethius remains a believer in God’s 
will and fate, even if his understanding of the intricacies of them shows us a subtext of 
ambiguity. The debate at the time was centred on the possibility o f the coexistence of 
G od’s foreknowledge, and predestination, and free-will: as Kavanagh states, ‘divine 
providence fashioned Christian theology as the dominant science o f a determinism 
looking to the dialectic o f free-will and determinism as the antithesis o f chance’.30 As 
Boethius puts it: ‘if from  eternity Providence foreknows not only m en’s actions but also 
their thoughts and desires, there will be no freedom of w ill’.31 This shows the 
limitations o f such a system , and the codifications within it that are tantamount to 
human bondage under God.
The Rabbit of Our Ignorance: the Birth of Probability Theory
Probability theory has in fa c t carried off an enormously seductive sleight o f hand, 
making the embarrassingly visible rabbit o f our ignorance vanish into the decidedly 
thick air o f  complex equations.. .the calculus o f probabilities offers a demanding and 
rigorously mathematized discourse bristling with apparent proofs o f  our mastery over a 
situation that in fa c t escapes us completely?2
As Kavanagh show s, the study of probability and the explosion of statistics in 
the late-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, rather than conquering chance, merely
30 Kavanagh, Enlightemcnt and the Shadom ofChance, 251.
31 Boel hi us. Consolations o f Philosophy, 150.
12 Kavanagh, Eiilighiemeiit andthe Shadows ofChance, 16.
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revealed a whole new range of possibilities for computing our ignorance. Before the 
sudden growth of this new mathematical field, our ignorance of why things happened 
merely masked an intelligent, divinely run world order that not only understood why 
things happened but controlled and determined everything that did; probability theory, 
on the other hand, allowed for the possibility that the universe was reasonless. That 
chance is an ontological lack or deficit is, as w e’ve seen, an idea that crops up 
frequently in the history o f chance, both before and after the Enlightenment. Probability 
theory represented a significant evolution from this: our ignorance was now a fig leaf 
over an abyss, or a growing awareness that ignorance or uncertainty may be the 
defining mode of the universe. The recognition of this was a fact only made palatable, 
or even possible, by the growing and parallel sense in the mathematical comm unity that 
we may be able to predict what very large groups of people or numbers are likely to do. 
The realisation that the world may not, in fact, be knowable, was an awareness that 
could stand as a definition for scepticism -  a vital epistemological premise for the 
Enlightenment. Descartes had suggested that doubt could be the basis and the 
instrument for philosophical enquiry, and Reith argues persuasively that this new 
weight and validity accorded to the principle of uncertainty, coupled with the gradual 
expansion of speculative m ercantile capitalism, effectively gave us the birth o f modem 
society.
The shift that occurred at some point in the eighteenth century, according to 
two of the most influential commentators on the history of chance, Kavanagh and 
Hacking,33 was influenced by the fact that the birth of probability theory effected a 
change in human consciousness. A space for the secular comprehension of the aleatory, 
they argue, opened up where previously there had been nothing; it was, in fact, that rare 
occurrence, a wholly new idea. This emergence and growth of the nascent probability 
theory in the Enlightenment period achieved the taming o f chance, a rationalising and
33 Ian Hacking, The Tamingof Chance (dambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
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normalising of it. For Kavanagh it made possible the birth of the modern novel, and for 
Reith it initiated what she describes as ‘the age of chance’, which runs from the mid­
seventeenth century to the nineteenth century. As Reith states, ‘chance came to indicate, 
not the favour o f the gods, but an absence of knowledge. From being a sacred, it now 
became an epistem ological category’,34 a view which shares much with Hacking’s 
opinion:
Throughout the Age of Reason, chance has been called the 
superstition of the vulgar. Chance, superstition, vulgarity, 
unreason were of one piece. The rational man, averting his 
eyes from such things, could cover chaos with a veil of 
inexorable laws.35
The rational man acknowledges the existence of chaos, but like the rabbit of our 
ignorance that has been m ade to vanish, he hides it behind a superficial understanding 
o f probability, or rather, ‘inexorable laws’. Pierre Simon Laplace was perhaps the most 
instrumental o f the theorists in bringing the new science to the wider world. Frequently 
working in conjunction with Cardano, Huygens, Bernoulli, Pascal, Fermat and others, a 
group known as the ‘c lassical’ European probabilists, Laplace wrote his authoritative 
examination o f what he cam e to call the ‘calculus of probabilities’ in his classic work A 
Philosophical Essay on Probabilities (1814).36 Here, through scrutiny of gambling, or 
what Reith calls ‘the paradigm atic aleatory contract’,37 Laplace established the 
mathematical bases o f probability. That they used gambling as the premise o f their 
calculations is instructive: it represented not merely a forum for uncertainty, but an 
action actually regulated  by chance. As Reith comments: ‘In this development, 
probability theory, which began as a pure “geometry o f chance” (Pascal), became 
increasingly remote from  the direct experience of the wager. It emerged, indeed, as the
34 Reith, The Age o f Chance: (.'ambling in Western Culture, 13.
35 Hacking, The Tatninfiqf Chance, 1.
36 Pierre Simon de Laplace, A Phi/as-ophical Em ty on Pmfxtbi/itie.s-, trails. F.W. Truseoit and K.L. Kmory (New 
York: Dover Publications, 1951), 11.
37 Reith, The Age o f Chance: Cntnh/ingin Western Culture, 29.
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antithesis of the gam bler’s “plunge” into the unknown.’38 Science, by means of 
calculable ratios rather than the divine, was now the voice that spoke to us through 
gambling. This is crucial, as it represents the shift from the study of uncertainty to the 
calculation o f probability or, potentially, predictability. These scientific developments 
were paralleled by a society increasingly inured to the perceived dangers of gambling; 
risk was becoming an elem ent of life in a sense in which we would understand it.
Laplace originally believed that ‘All events, even those which on account of 
their significance do not seem  to follow the great laws of nature, are a result of it just as 
necessarily as the revolutions o f the sun.’39 Most of the European probabilists had a 
similarly determinist, and usually religious, world-view. The implied problematization 
o f their conception of chance, therefore, meant a rigorous and subjective limiting of the 
parameters o f their investigation. They held that ‘all events were in principle predictable 
and that probabilities were therefore relative to our knowledge’.40 The very radicalism 
o f probability as an idea seem s to have encouraged a sort o f self-censorship; the 
fam iliar concept of chance as having a negative status, of existing as a sort of 
ontological lack, still pervaded Enlightenment discussions on the subject. Spinoza, 
writing in the m id-seventeenth century, was a determinist, as was Leibniz, and de 
M ontmort, writing in the early eighteenth century, defined chance as an index o f human 
ignorance. Pope’s Essay on Man (1732-34) includes the line ‘All Nature is but Art, 
unknown to thee;/ All Chance, Direction which thou canst not see;/ All Discord, 
Harmony not understood.’41
However, this uncom fortable liaison between religious determinism and the 
rationally figured calculus o f probability that was gaining influence could survive only 
fitfully. De M ontmort wrote in 1731:
“‘ Ibid., 15.
39 Laplace,// Philosophical Essay on Pro!m i hi lilies. 3.
40 Cerd Cigcrenzcr et al.. The Empire o f Chance: How Probability Changed Science and Even day Ufe (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 11.
41 Alexander Po|x\ "Essay on Man," ed. Maynard Maek (London: Methuen, 1950), 50.
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It is especially in games of chance that the weakness of the 
human mind and its tendency towards superstition manifest 
themselves....And it is much the same for people’s behaviour 
in all those areas of life where chance plays a role. The same 
prejudices govern them, and imagination dictates their 
conduct, blindly giving birth to fears and hopes.42
This seems to represent a shift in eighteenth-century thinking. The weakness of the
human mind is not, here, demonstrated by its attraction to chance, as in the medieval
form ulation, but is present in those who would deny chance. Prejudices, imagination,
hopes, fears -  none should play a role in determining what will happen, as it is purely,
now, a m atter for chance. Superstition, or the attachment of meaning to what will
happen, has adopted the appearance that it retains to this day -  that o f a primitive
prejudice, coloured by ignorance:
I thus thought it would be useful, not only for gamblers, but 
for mankind in general, to show that chance does obey 
knowable rules and that, for not knowing those rules, we 
make mistakes every day whose unhappy consequences 
should far more reasonably be attributed to us than to the 
destiny we lament.43
Chance does not yet have the air of blank neutrality that it acquires in the twentieth
century, and yet it does, here, ‘obey knowable rules’. It is this sudden association of the
aleatory with knowledge that is striking: as I have shown, chance and ignorance have
previously been aligned together where chance existed at all. Fate may still exist, but it
is now an internalised force, coming, humanistically enough, from our selves, rather
than from God. Kavanagh comments on this:
De Montmort’s analysis of card games, his contribution to 
the development of probability theory, is philosophically 
conceived as a demonstration that there exists no capricious 
superior power, no Fortuna or hasard, determining the fall of 
the cards. The only divinities at work in what the 
superstitious mistakenly persist in seeing as a brush with 
fortune are the mathematically calculable ratios between the 
chances for the card we want and the chances for other 
possible outcomes.44
42 Pierre Re mow I de Montmort, Em// D'tmalyse Sur Ixjeux De Hu.sard (Paris: 1713), vi-vii. Cited in Kavanagh, 
Eiiliyliieiiieni andthe Shatlom o f Chance, 12 -13 . The translation is Kavanagh’s own.
13 Montmort, Em//D'a/i/ifyseSurIxJez/x De Hmanl vii.
M Kavanagh. Eiiliff/i/eii/eiu and/he Shadows o f Chance, 13.
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Hacking describes what happened between 1730 and the mid-nineteenth century as an 
‘avalanche o f...n u m b ers’,45 and certainly, the battle between the coldly calculable and 
the mysterious and unknowable was, at least in the scientific realm, being won, if not 
yet decisively, by the former. The development of scientific/mathematical probability 
is, however, a philosophical evolution as well as a mathematical one, and this is a 
crucial point if we are to accept that the onset of probability theory represents ‘the most 
important mutation in human thought since A ristotle’.46 That this is so is not only 
related to the creation of rational man and the image-making of the Enlightenm ent’s 
sense o f itself,47 but also for the proto-humanistic impulses that will still be traceable in 
the developm ent o f the study of chance three centuries later (for instance in the 
Existentialism  o f the m id-twentieth century). Even if the reverberations would not be 
felt for some time, the philosophical encroachment of chance crucially delivered the 
form, if not the content, of atheism.
An im portant tenet o f probability theory was the idea that has come to be 
known as the ‘M onte Carlo fallacy’, which was first articulated by Poisson in 1835. 
This stated that probability, when limited to specific occurrences, had limited power, 
but that its accuracy was greater the larger the number. Therefore, if a coin flip comes 
out heads fifty times in a row, the instinctive position is that it is more likely to come 
out tails on the fifty-first flip. The chances, though, remain exactly the same: 50/50. 
Each independent event, in other words, has no knowledge o f the previous events. 
However, probability theory states that given infinite (or very large) numbers of coin 
flips, the ratio would com e out as exactly 50/50. This made probability theory seem a
15 Hacking, The Taming o f Chance, 2.
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peculiarly distant science, mute on the specifics of actual events, but able to predict how 
large numbers o f people, or things, would behave with alarming accuracy. The 
intimidating effect of this was to reduce the human in terms of m an’s view of himself. 
In this way the new science represented a philosophical reverse to humanism, which 
described how a growth in emphasis on will and rationality formed the basis of human 
freedom.
These twinned and yet contrasting attitudes coexisted perfectly happily, as did 
the probabilists’ growing distaste for determinism, which contrasted with their (in the 
main) pious religious belief. As we saw earlier, de Moivre, in his Doctrine o f Chances, 
had dismissed chance as a ‘mere word’. Around the same time appeared Hume’s 
Treatise o f  Human Nature (1739), which shows that the strain o f thought that dismissed 
chance as either blasphem ous or as that which we happen not to know was still virulent. 
Hume wrote: ‘’tis com m only allowed by philosophers that what the vulgar call chance 
is nothing but a secret and conceal’d cause’:48 the difference was that the ‘vulgar’, now, 
were in the ascendant.
Voltaire’s Candide and Laurence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy, the 
Novel and Aleatory Oppositions.
Kavanagh argues that the emergence of probability theory ‘paralleled and in a 
very real sense sustained’49 the hegemony of the modem novel. Together, he claims, 
they formed a single shift in how we saw and understood the world and how we 
represent our place in it. M onk too emphasises the link: ‘The discovery of probability 
theory in the sciences...[isj here aligned with the newly devised aesthetic practices of
48 David llmnc, Treatise o f Human Nature (()xl'ord: 1888), 130.
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the novel, most notably its redefinition of existing theories of verisim ilitude.’50 Whilst 
Kavanagh rightly emphasises the achievement of, and the continuing reverberations 
from, probability theory, it is equally vital to note that this did not happen in a single, 
swift, paradigm shift. The contradictory thread of culture, the one that denied chance, 
and indeed, human agency, continued apace. One possible rebuttal to this came from 
Voltaire’s Candide (1759), perhaps the first novel to consist almost entirely of chance 
happenings and acts o f random violence, exaggerated to a comic degree to better 
display chance’s cruelty. Voltaire sought to evoke the power of the aleatory as it turns 
upon us randomly, and, indeed, to celebrate its power to make a mockery of the 
distinction between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ by emphasising chance’s neutrality, but he also set 
out to satirize and to attack it for this.
A pparently written as a furious indictment o f a world where one hundred
thousand people could be killed randomly (in the Lisbon earthquake o f 1755), Candide
ironized the sam e impulse to provide causal explanations for events. Voltaire angrily
rails at a world ruled by chance, in which anything and everything happens for no
reason; a world in which man is supposed to shrug compliantly as random destruction is
wreaked upon him. Kavanagh articulates this idea o f Candide as an evocation of the
moral neutrality o f absolute randomness through an exploration of the inadequacy of
our ideas o f good and evil:
All the stories [in CandideJ, like the novel itself, are tales of 
evil -  of human and metaphysical evil, of individual and 
social evil. Their constant reiteration has, however, the effect 
of undercutting everything the word ‘evil’ implies. How can 
so many people, in so many places, be either evil or the 
victims of evil? The cumulative effect of these tales is to call 
into question the very concept of evil, to reveal it as a 
misnomer, an inadequate shorthand presupposing a coherent 
agency when in fact there is none. ‘Evil’, like ‘good’, 
becomes a word without a referent, a testimonial to the 
abiding human desire to moralize chance, to see some 
principle of causality as responsible for the random events
M Monk, Standard Deviations, 31.
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that befall us. ‘Evil’ designates the chance event for which 
someone can be blamed. ‘Evil’ is the scapegoat of chance.51
This shows a new impulse in the history of chance: not to blame it, or to deny it, or even 
to celebrate it, but to criticise human nature through the refracting lens of our reactions 
to it. The moralization o f chance, Voltaire obliquely argues, belittles and oppresses us 
all. We must recognize it for what it is, and only then can it represent what it has the 
potential to represent -  that is, our best chance for liberation from the tyranny of what 
must be. The true result of chance is nothing; liberation, yes, but also a nihilistic appeal 
to meaning that never comes, as the end of Candide represents. Candide is perhaps the 
first novel to recognize the modern reach of chance and to mirror its scope, 
sim ultaneously celebrating its absolute power over our lives and criticising its useless 
neutrality in speaking to us o f catastrophe. Voltaire could thus be described as a writer 
intrigued and seduced by the idea of a fated purpose in life, but one who returned 
unstintingly to the belief, expressed in his work, which is that we live in an entirely 
random universe. The meaning and purpose of life, the novel suggests, may only exist 
retrospectively: that is, fate will turn out to be what happened, rather than what had to 
happen. The narrative significance of this, in Candide, is revealed through the 
bankruptcy o f language, and the inadequacy of the Panglossian vision of the world 
when confronted with the messy reality of a world ruled by chance.
Laurence Sterne, in England, was perhaps reacting to some of the same wider 
intellectual concerns when he wrote Tristram Shandy, his fam ously haphazard and 
disordered m asterpiece published between 1759 and 1767. I will now offer a brief 
reading of the novel as a case study, as its importance in the history of the novel and 
chance is profound. Here is a novel in which chance informs the lack of a linear, 
sequential narrative, the digressive obsession with causes, and the seeming disorder that 
is both an organising principle and a totem spirit of the novel. Tristram ’s task as
,l Kavanagh, Knlig/iiemeiu and the. S/m do ms of C/kuk <\ 167.
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narrator is essentially one that pivots on chance: as he declares early on in the novel, his 
dilem m a rests upon how to plot a ‘tolerable straight line’ through the vast swell of 
information he would like to share with us.52 This information seems to consist of 
comically improbable chance events, and the novel comments ironically on how one 
seems to lead to another in a tissue of contingency that starts to look a lot like fate. The 
m aid’s chance m isrem embrance of Tristram ’s father W alter’s chosen name for his son, 
Trism egistus, collapses it into the hated and unlucky ‘Tristram ’. Tristram ’s 
‘circum cision’ is performed by a sash window which had been fatally weakened by the 
removal o f some of its lead for his Uncle Toby’s obsessive fortifications o f his model 
army. Because o f W alter Shandy’s obscure theories Tristram ends up being pulled out 
o f the womb with forceps ‘so that I was doom ’d, by marriage articles, to have my nose 
squeez’d as flat to my face, as if the destinies had actually spun me without one.’53 
Inevitably enough, it turns out that Tristram ’s father is a great believer in the power and 
significance o f noses in general, and that Tristram ’s lack o f a decent one is likely, it 
seems, to condemn him to a life of misery. In the face of this, the reader is implored to 
pity W alter, whose attem pts to impose rationality on the world of chaos around him are 
continually vexed by chance.
This thematic engagement with contingency is framed by a myriad of devices 
to divert the reader from that ‘tolerable straight line’. Tristram Shandy contains missing 
chapters that turn up at the end of the book, pagination that at one point starts going 
backwards, m issing or blank pages, an entirely black page, squiggly lines to represent 
the narrative haphazardness o f the novel, and one page that has been beautifully 
marbled -  a page, I suggest, with profound ramifications for Sterne’s attempt to 
represent chance. The marbled page (or rather pages, as each side of one leaf has been 
marbled) seems to exist for no fictionally relevant narrative reason. The narrator refers
52 Laurence Sierne, The Ufe and Opinions ofTri.stnun Shandy, Cendenum (London: Penguin, 1997), 425.
53 Ibid., 38.
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to the leaf as ‘the motly emblem of my work!’54 The word ‘m otly’ evidently refers to 
the visually striking mixture of colour, pattern and shape, and ‘em blem ’ makes clear 
that this is a visual page, an abstract counterpoint to the text, not to be read at all. The 
very messiness of the word, and the variegated colour o f the emblem, therefore 
reinforces the page as an icon of disorder -  both in contrast to the writing that surrounds 
it, and as the purest symbol of that writing.
Each marbled page was individually made, and entirely unique. The process is 
long and tricky, and the extent to which the marbler exercises his artistic choice on the 
final product is disputed -  the marbling liquid is constantly moving, and though he 
chooses when to dip the paper into it, the outcome is still largely unpredictable. In fact 
the process o f marbling in itself seems to stand as a metaphor for chance, and offers a 
potent analogue for Tristram Shandy. It suggests the capturing o f something mobile, 
and, as it is a picture o f its own process, the mobility in this case is literally what you 
see, rather than a thing that is moving. It is the representation in an inanimate object of 
something in flux, but that also contains the knowledge that capturing the movement 
has killed that very kineticism: an image of unpredictability, o f contingency itself, 
condemned to stillness on the page. That the marbled page should speak so eloquently 
of uncertainty itself suggests an implicit criticism of the book’s ability to demonstrate 
randomness adequately, and its elusive meaning therefore contributes to the novel’s 
commentary on indeterminacy.
The novel’s blank page, at the end of Chapter xxv, Volume I, is also significant 
in terms o f the novel’s engagem ent with chance, and furtherm ore, it can be read as a 
specific response to an anxiety about chance. The narrator tells us, with a swelling sense 
of righteousness, that
what these perplexities of my uncle Toby were, -  'tis 
impossible for you to guess; -  if you could, —I should blush; 
not as a relation, —not a man, —nor even as a woman,—but I 
should blush as an author; inasmuch as I set no small store by
54 Ibid., 204.
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myself upon this very account, that my reader has never yet 
been able to guess at any thing. And in this, Sir, I am of so 
nice and singular a humour, that if I thought you was able to 
form the least judgment or probable conjecture to yourself, of 
what was to come in the next page,—I would tear it out of 
my book.55
In the original edition, the next page is a blank. J. Paul Hunter calls this blank page 
‘easily guessable’,56 thereby suggesting that since the contents of a blank page are the 
most predictable he could come up with, Sterne is humorously undermining the 
pompous assertion of his authorial power that has preceded it. This explanation seems 
inadequate to me, and I would like to offer an alternative interpretation that links the
blank page to the novel’s preoccupation with chance. The blank page, I suspect, was in
fact supposed to suggest that the narrator had tom a page out. If this is so, the clear 
message is that the reader had already guessed what was on it, and Stem e had 
responded with his promised protest against the predictability of narrative. That the 
reader had therefore successfully predicted what would happen next is a clear 
condemnation of the novel’s inability to represent the unexpected adequately, and 
Sterne’s uncomprom ising response presents us with an equally clear denunciation of the 
same. Stem e would rather tear his book in two, it seems, than accept with quietude the 
determinism of narrative and its corollary, narrative’s suppression of chance.
This reading of the blank page complicates the novel’s approach to causality in 
general. As one o f Tristram Shandy's first critics, Horace W alpole, pointed out, the 
novel’s ‘great hum our...consists in the whole narration always going backwards’.57The 
narrator fam ously must explain in a continual backwards loop the cause o f one thing, 
then the cause of that cause, and so on, which is why the book barely features Tristram 
at all. The whole book, you could say, is a parody of the normal narrative workings of 
cause and effect. The narrator describes this impulse early on as a desire to: ‘come at
f  Ibid., 70.
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the first springs of the events I tell’.58 This impulse is, however, constantly and 
comically thwarted as we realise that every event is connected to another, and that it 
would take an infinitely long narrative to explain the intimately connected causes of 
each happening, until the book should rightly explain the whole universe before it had a 
hope of reaching the ‘first springs’ of even the smallest event.
In fact, the obsessive preoccupation with causal explanations for events in 
Tristram Shandy, rather than confirming the necessity of these events in a series of 
small determ inism s, actually highlights their arbitrariness. The backwards, digressive, 
explanatory impulse builds and builds until the tissue o f explanation becomes a satire 
on the possibility of any events’ explicability. A complex web of chance, circumstance 
and improbable contingency spreads out and threatens to overwhelm the rational 
meaning of the explanations. Cause and effect is thus simultaneously reinforced by 
Sterne’s fealty to the need for causal explanations, and evacuated o f power by their 
ridiculousness: now a narrative fatalism takes hold; now we are shown its absurdity. As 
Tristram comm ents balefully in Volume III, in one o f his frequent ejaculations against 
chance: ‘but there is a fatality which attends the actions of some men: Order them as 
they will, they pass thro’ a certain medium which so twists and refracts them from their 
true directions---------- \ 59
This undermines the randomness of events by implying that there is a supposed 
course along which they should run, that they have, no matter how thwarted, a ‘true 
direction’. And yet in each case we are shown, in Tristram ’s words, the medium which 
they pass through and which twists them, or rather, a specific and intricate set of 
circumstances that have come about randomly to cause each unlucky mishap. It is 
inevitable that things will turn out badly, and yet for each misfiring of events, the 
Shandy family can call up an intricate explanation of contingency -  there is a surface 
cause for each happening awaiting its own narrative digressive explanation. So the
M Sterne, Tri.siramShandy, 59.
59 Ibid., 22.
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opposition of fate and freedom becomes blurred, and eventually meaningless, as both in 
turn are eroded and undermined. There is, eventually, in Tristram Shandy, no real 
opposition between chance and inevitability, as contingency is everywhere and yet 
meaningless: every decision the characters make is freely taken, and yet shown to be 
comically com plicit in their unlikely, and yet somehow inevitable, fate.
Thus, Tristram Shandy celebrates chance whilst bemoaning its impossibility in 
the novel, just as its typographic experiments tell us o f the artificiality o f fiction, and 
parody its lim itations, whilst recreating the randomness of reality in a way that a more 
straightforward novel cannot do. The wandering that a writer like Steme encourages us 
to do, away from sequentiality and towards the unpredictable or im probable in the 
reading experience, shocks us, and both diminishes and highlights the staid artificiality 
to which we are accustomed. Steme therefore, I contend, associates chance with 
authentic lived experience, and so the points at which he tries hardest to get away from 
the artifice and predictability o f the book are the points where randomness and chance 
are invoked. Chance is, in short, the demonic spirit of the book, stymieing the narrative 
order and frustrating the characters at every turn. As Steme shows that to represent the 
chaotic randomness o f experience is at odds with the physical fact of the book, chance 
is allied with the digressive, the dynamic, and Sterne’s attempts to slip out of the 
clutches o f predictability: it is this obeisance to life as it is lived that makes Tristram  
Shandy, in Virginia W oolf’s description of Steme in The Common Reader (1932), ‘as 
close to life as we can be’.60
The argum ent com m only invoked by Stemean critics runs somewhat counter to 
this. As Dorothy Van Ghent concludes, Tristram Shandy, in the last reckoning, is 
‘anything but haphazard or form less’ rather; ‘[it obeys] formal laws of its ow n’.61 Peter 
Voogd similarly detects a well-hidden order at the heart of the novel, which he deems
60 Virginia Woolf, The Common Reader: Second Series (London: Hogarth Press, 1932), 69.
61 Dorothy Van Ghent, "On Tristram Shandy," in huirenceSterne's Tdsinim Shandy, ed. Harold Bloom, Modem 
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operates on ‘the paradoxical principle of accidental design, of carefully planned 
seeming chaos’.62 This is no doubt true. Of course, there does exist design and order in 
the novel, but nevertheless, I would like to add the caveat that this approach perhaps 
gives less emphasis to the accidental or the chaotic as an ordering principle than Sterne 
would intend, and in the main, I think this impulse to deny the randomness of Tristram  
Shandy does the novel a disservice. Moreover, Sterne him self explicitly contradicts it 
when he says, in Volume VIII: T begin with writing the first sentence -  and trusting to 
Almighty God for the second’.63 He thus claims a compository method that entirely 
subverts the customary determinism that would seek to smother chance: he has no idea 
what is going to come next. Tristram Shandy's backwards narrative, eccentric 
pagination, the missing chapters, the marbled page, the blank pages, could all be 
described as devices to postpone, disguise, or perhaps even to avoid determining what 
will happen. Stem e refuses to ‘write’ the future, and thus make certain what he knows is 
not, and his repudiation o f this responsibility makes Tristram Shandy capable, perhaps 
uniquely in its period, o f a sophisticated rebuttal of narrative determinism.
A cluster o f writers and thinkers that emerged in the nineteenth century 
enthusiastically accepted the new opportunities for the increasingly secular appreciation 
o f chance to flourish, and I am going to jum p forward to talk about them before moving 
on to the twentieth century, wherein lies my main area o f study. I will look at ju st a few 
of those whose understanding o f chance is freighted with particular significance, or 
whose writing reverberates beyond their particular discipline. One such thinker was 
Darwin, whose consolidation and extension of chance’s domain originates in a small 
adjustment in his theory o f variation in natural selection. The prevailing theory of the 
origins of variation at the time was called ‘use and disuse’, which invoked the idea of
62 Peter J. Voogd, "Laurence Sterne, the Marbled Page, and 'the Use of Accidents'," Word & Image 1, no. 3 
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adaptive necessity. In contrast to the dominant scientific mood of the time, Darwin used 
the idea of random selection for his explanation of how variation came about. It would 
therefore be a matter of randomness whether or not variation occurs, but, once it has, 
the survival and repetition of a particular variation conforms to the normal dynamics of 
natural selection. Chance and the origins of life thus became inextricable in the post- 
Darwinian nineteenth-century scientific understanding o f the world, an association that 
instilled in us a knowledge of the intimidating one-in-a-million shot that we all 
miraculously achieve in being bom at all.
Philosophically, too, chance was securing its dominion. Nietzsche declares the
role o f chance through his Zarathustra: ‘I have found this happy certainty in all things:
that they prefer to dance on the feet of chance’.64 Nietzsche takes pleasure in reviving
the old idea o f chance as rebellion against responsibility, consensus and logic, and
sim ultaneously foreshadowing the existential twentieth-century sense o f chance as
something to be plunged into, with abandon: as Zarathustra instructs us: ‘Live
dangerously! Build your cities on the slopes of Vesuvius!’65 Nietzsche believed in pure
chance; that is, that nothing happens for any reason, and we all live in a random,
meaningless universe. In Thus Spake Zarathustra (1883-85) he says: ‘Over all things
stand the heaven accident, the heaven innocence, the heaven chance, the heaven
prankishness.’ He goes on to explain: ‘By “chance” -  that is, the most ancient nobility
of the world, and this I restored to all things: I delivered them from their bondage under
purpose.’66 Purpose is the thing to be feared, and if man could liberate him self from it,
then he could be free. Nietzsche was not immune to the idea of necessity as a
controlling force, however:
Those iron hands of necessity which shake the dice box of 
chance play their game for an infinite length of time: so that 
there have to be throws which exactly resemble
64 Friedrich Nietzsche. ThusS/jokcZanuhmim, trails. R.J. Hollingdalc (Harinondsworth: Penguin, 1982), 186.
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purposivcncss and rationality of every degree. Perhaps our 
acts of will and our purposes are nothing but such throws.67
This intertwining of the concepts surrounding chance is explained by Gilles Deleuze: 
‘The dice of creation thrown once are the affirmation of chance, the combination which 
they form on falling is the affirmation of necessity ....W hat Nietzsche calls necessity 
(destiny) is thus never the abolition but rather the combination of chance itself.’68 
Hacking explains this passage by the elision of chance and necessity: ‘Chance, 
Nietzsche asserted, makes sense only when we have a concept of purpose. But we get 
this idea of purpose and reason in part from being in what looks like an orderly 
w orld....N ecessity and chance are twinned, and neither can exist without the other.’69 
W illiam Beatty W arner, whose Chance and the Text o f  Experience (1986) examines 
Nietzsche, Freud and Shakespeare’s Hamlet, has argued cogently that Nietzsche’s 
concentration on chance as an affirmation of life was in fact a pragmatic elision of 
chance as pure coincidence, and chance as willed result of unconscious desires, or a 
retrospective assim ilation o f the contingent event into necessity70.
In continental Europe, both Dostoevsky and M allarme extended and explored 
some of the issues raised by Nietzsche’s philosophy. Dostoevsky examines the 
psychological and social effects of an obsession with chance in The Gambler (1866). 
A lex, the gam bler o f the title, expresses the adrenalin-soaked thrill of experiential risk: 
‘I ought to have left at that point, but a strange sort of a feeling came over me, a kind o f 
desire to challenge fate, a longing to give it a fillip on the nose or stick out my tongue at 
it’.71 A reliance on chance then is not a rejection of destiny, entirely, or a belief in it 
wholeheartedly either: it is a metaphorical rebellion, an existential challenge to destiny, 
daring it to prove its authenticity. The curious doubleness of the gambler’s approach to
67 Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak, trails. R.J. Hollingdalc (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 130.
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chance is explored here too: the sense, common among gamblers, that ‘it was so very 
necessary for you to win. It’s exactly like a drowning man clutching at a straw. You 
must admit that if he w asn’t drowning he wouldn’t take the straw for a tree-trunk.’72 
The gambler experiences life as random, but retrospectively reorders it as fate. W hat did 
happen in fact becomes what had to happen. The significance of The Gambler lies not, 
then, in its psychologizing portrait of the gambling mind, but in its extraordinary 
condemnation of the deterministic worldview, existential in its vehemence. As Alex 
says about women: ‘The very proudest of them turn out to be the most abject 
slaves!...there is something predestined, condemned, fated there!’73 The easy 
association between fatedness and abject slavery foreshadows Sartre and Camus, and 
develops the fam iliar twentieth-century dialectic of freedom and fate, liberated from its 
religious origins.
Thirty-one years later, MaIIarm6’s 1897 poem Un Coup De Des was a formal 
departure not ju st for the poet, but also for the history of chance in literature. As Peter 
Nicholls describes, it is a ‘protracted meditation on language and chance: here a 
shipm aster has to decide whether to throw the dice which, in yielding a definite number, 
will overcome chance and the chaos of the raging sea. But the act o f throwing the dice 
depends on chance’.74 The poem as a physical artefact is striking. It is laid out in 
irregular, sloping lines -  some of which consist of nothing, others of a single word. The 
ideogramm atic text grows larger then shrinks, apparently at random. As Henry 
W einfeld has noted, ‘The “basic unit” [of the poem] is no longer the line but the page, 
or rather the double-page, and each double-page has a character o f its ow n.’75 The 
motifs and themes are also differentiated typographically, as W einfeld also notes: ‘the 
poem incorporates contingency at the same time it attempts to come to terms with it
72 Ibid., 44.
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philosophically...the old problem for Mallarme of how to establish meaning in an 
essentially meaningless universe -  that is, a universe from which the gods have 
disappeared’.76 Contingency and chance thus function as a nexus of atheistic daring, 
whereupon one makes a wager with the universe, echoing Nietzsche, but more 
strikingly, Pascal -  the dice throw resonating with his wager of more than two hundred 
years before.
The turn o f the twentieth century saw one o f the most significant anti-
determinist philosophers, the unconventional American C. S. Peirce, decide to ‘examine
the common belief that every single fact in the universe is determined by law’. He
comes to the striking conclusion that:
The proposition in question is that the state of things existing 
at any time, together with certain immutable laws, 
completely determines the state of things at every other 
time...I believe I have thus subjected to fair examination all 
the important reasons for adhering to the theory of universal 
necessity, and shown their nullity.77
Hacking describes him as ‘riding the crest of an anti-determinist wave’; nevertheless, 
this would have been a controversial piece of work.78 His significance partly stems from 
the absoluteness, as well as the radical nature, of his views. In early 1893 he wrote in ‘A 
Reply to the Necessitarians’: ‘Chance pours itself in at every avenue of sense: it is of all 
things the most obtrusive’ and ‘That it is absolute is the most manifest of all intellectual 
perceptions.’ In utter certainty, he continues: ‘That it is a being, living and conscious, is 
what all the dullness that belongs to ratiocination’s self can scarce muster the hardihood 
to deny.’79 Peirce, then, is instrumental in the increasing sense, at the turn of the 
century, of chance’s dom inance. In a neat counterpoint to the centuries where chance’s
76 Ibid.
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very ontological status was denied, Peirce concentrates on figuring the idea of chance as 
a substantial, almost tangible ‘thing’, ‘a being, living and conscious’.
Gambling, as chance’s representative activity, however, is still described as a 
self-destructive madness. In his essay ‘Dostoevsky and Parricide’ (1928), Freud 
examines The Gambler and Stefan Zw eig’s Twenty-Four Hours in a Woman's Life, and 
comes to the conclusion that the gambler’s hand movements, in which he detects a 
mirroring of masturbatory gestures, prove that the thrill of gambling are rooted in the 
gam blers’ wish to punish himself for his Oedipal fantasies, by deliberately losing.90 
Other than the rather unlikely theory itself, which is rightly given little attention or 
credence by commentators, its significance, I think, is in the moralistic gloss still 
apportioned to condemnations of gambling in the early twentieth century. We are 
reminded o f Bergler’s description of it, cited earlier, as a ‘latent rebellion against logic, 
intelligence, moderation, morality, and renunciation...the one exceptional situation in 
life where the reality principle has no advantage over the pleasure principle. There blind 
chance rules’.81 The gambler, in a sense, needs to create this space outside o f life in 
order to experience certain feelings that a safe and bland life cannot provide. The 
pleasurable physical effects of gambling were demonstrated more than a century earlier 
by Rousseau, whose stone-throwing assumed a magnitude common in the deliberate 
tem pting of chance: ‘I am going to throw this stone,’ he decided, ‘at the tree facing me. 
If I hit it, it is a sign that I am saved; if I miss it I am dam ned’.82 Rousseau felt all that a 
gambler feels: ‘a terrible throbbing of the heart’ until he hit the tree and stopped 
worrying about it. Kavanagh goes so far as to suggest that
there is, consciously or unconsciously, a link between any
meditation on chance, the less than certain, and the gamble of
80 Sigmund Freud, "Dosioevsky and Parricide," in CollectedPajters, ed. J. Sirachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 
1928). Freud ultimately discredited this theory in a letter to Theodor Reik; see Theodor Reik, Thirty Years- with 
Freud (London: The Hogarth Press, 1942), 155-56 . For a summary o f psychological interpretations, still relying 
on Freud’s initial insights, sec Igor Kusyszyn, "The Psychology o f Cam hling," Anna Is o f the America a Academy o f 
Social and Political Science, no. 47 4  (1984). For the psychology of gambling in general see Kdmund Berglcr, The 
Psychology ofCatnb/ing{Nw  York: Hill and Wang, 1957).
81 Berglcr, The Psychology o f (iarnbling, 2.
82 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Confessions (London: Penguin, 1953), 18.
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death. The truly fortuitous event, the event outside any causal 
chain through which we might control it represents an 
unacceptable scandal in the same way that the reality of our 
own death, the ultimate unthinkability of that death, is 
antithetical to any true living of life.*5
Chance, as we have seen, has throughout the ages proved inextricable from gambling, 
and from games in a more general sphere. Play has always existed as a space outside of 
normal life, where different rules are invoked, and different systems of reward and 
punishment operate. In Homo Ludens, Huizinger argues that play ‘creates order, is 
order. Into an imperfect world and into the confusion of life it brings a temporary, a 
limited, perfection.’84 In this sense, chance is the opposite of its earlier incarnation, a 
sign that one was too much ‘a partner with the w orld’ or interested in the material, 
quantifiable and randomised reality of life. Indeed, part of the disapprobation accorded 
to gamblers is that they are seen as not partners enough with the world. This dislocation 
between chance and real life seems to be a fairly recent development. As we have seen, 
chance used to exist only in relation to the divine, and indeed Huizinger, heavily 
influenced by the Platonic notion of sacred play, argued that civilization ‘arises in and 
as play, and never leaves it’.85 In this sense it represents an almost spiritual mode of 
existing, as it helps to impose order and meaning on the world and thus communicates 
our deepest thoughts and hopes for society.
Statistical Fatalism and the Novel -  into the 2& Century.
Kavanagh’s thesis, in The Shadows o f Chance, is that the birth of probability 
theory and that of the modern novel have run a parallel course since the Enlightenment, 
each sustaining and informing the other. As he says: ‘The novel shares with probability
fU Kavanagh, Enlightemeni andthe Shadows- ofChance, 27. 
fU Huizinger, Homo hulen.s: A Study o f the Play Element in Culture, 10.
85 Ibid., 3.
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theory the assumption that individuals act within a world of pre-existing causal 
sequences, of multiple determinisms compelling their reactions.’86 As I have argued, 
there exists a fundamental and intractable problem with the narrative representation of 
chance. The novel is fated, in the most basic possible way, by the author, and ‘chance’ 
events are, or should be, self-evidently not. For Kavanagh, this problematization is at 
least in part resolved by the useful comparisons that can be made with probability 
theory. As we have seen, probability theory has a complex relation to chance: it 
increases predictability in the long term, but has little bearing on actual events, or on the 
randomness of life as it is experienced. Kavanagh’s thesis perhaps emphasises the 
form er at the expense of the latter, by pointing out that the explosion of statistics meant 
a shifting o f consciousness from the Enlightenment’s ideal o f ‘a single rational 
consciousness’ to a measuring of the self against ‘a potentially infinite series of 
averages and m eans’.87 This mutation in the novelistic and cultural understanding of 
chance was an important weapon in the increasing corrosion of determinism.
But if, as Poisson had suggested a century earlier, statistics stripped people of 
their individuality, then Kavanagh’s point is pressing. Chance, in both the novel and in 
probability theory, is threatening to slip between the floorboards. Dostoevsky’s 
Underground Man jeered at the utilitarians who ‘deduce the whole range of human 
satisfactions as averages from statistical figures’.88 As noted before, the paucity of what 
probability had to say about the predictability o f individuals or individual acts, meant 
that there was a possibility, or even a likelihood of human existential freedom. In other 
words, only the behaviour of huge numbers and groups was predictable, so individuals 
who existed within a larger society were free to act as they pleased. Hacking argues that 
this is the obverse of statistical fatality, whereby individuals feel, or are seen as being, 
compelled to act in a certain way because that is how it has been predicted that their
86 Kavanagh, Enligluemeni and the Shadows o f Chance, 118.
87 Hacking, The Taming of Chance, 2.
88 Fyodor 1 )osiocvsky, Notes from the Underground, trails. J. Coulson (Harniondsworth: Penguin, 1972), 20.
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demographic will behave. The implications of this for the individual are perhaps most
famously depicted by Charles Dickens, whose novel Hard Times (1854) expresses a
forcefully anti-statistical rhetoric. Gradgrind declaims the integrity and perfection of
statistical laws, whilst ignoring the individual repercussions of such assumptions. When
his son is revealed as a thief, Gradgrind claims:
‘If a thunderbolt had fallen on me, it would have shocked me 
less than this.’ ‘I don’t see why,’ says the son, with perfect 
and infuriating logic. ‘So many people are employed in 
situations of trust; so many people, out of so many, will be 
dishonest. I have heard you talk, a hundred times, of its being 
a law. How can I help laws? You have condemned others to 
such things, Father. Comfort yourself.’”9
The undercutting of human will and individual responsibility here is palpable, and 
shows that in the wider, non-scientific culture it had become a real concern. Anxieties 
about freedom and determ inism  were played out in the public debates about the related 
pseudo-sciences o f phrenology, criminology and degeneration in the late nineteenth 
century and in the early part o f the twentieth. If traits are determined by certain physical 
characteristics, could then a person help being vicious, or perverted? Was he free? 
Could he be punished for his criminal actions? This idea, after phrenology was widely 
discredited, would be revived by Karl Popper, who invented a ‘propensity’ theory of 
probability in the 1950s. The idea of propensity towards acting in a particular way, or 
penchant au crim e , was clearly related to statistical fatality: if a man was part o f a group 
who were probabilistically more likely to commit a certain crime, that man would not 
necessarily be more inclined to do so, but statistically, he would have a propensity for 
it. His individual conscience, freely applied, could overcome it, and as such the 
penchant au crime's ontological status is sociological rather than applicable to the 
behaviour of an individual.
fW Charles Dickens, Hard Times (London: Penguin, 1989), 378.
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The Early Twentieth Century and Chance -  the Birth of ‘Pure’ 
Chance, Quantum Mechanics and Dada.
First learn to be spasmodic 
A very simple rule 
For f irs t you write a sentence 
And then you chop it small:
Then mix the bits, and sort them out 
Just as they chance to fa ll;
The order o f the phrases makes 
No difference at all.
Lewis Carroll.90
Lewis Carroll’s 1860 poem advocating the introduction o f chance into the 
creative process o f poetic composition was published as ‘nonsense verse’. Humorously 
advocated by Carroll, the method, whereby chance could be allowed to determine a 
work o f art, was undertaken as a serious literary project in the early twentieth century 
by the Dadaists. This idea, which I delineate throughout this thesis as finding its purest 
expression in aleatorical art or compositional chance, elaborates the concept o f chance 
as ‘pure’ chance -  that is, not mediated and undermined by the demands o f narrative. 
As such it is radical; it addresses and seeks to ‘solve’ the problem of chance, an 
acknowledgem ent of which lies at the heart of my project. The construction o f narrative 
recreates our search for meaning and purpose through the modifying refraction of art, 
and novels that deny chance to represent a totalising and meaningful teleology are 
therefore incom patible with a version of life that contains the randomness that 
composes our day-to-day perceptions. The Dadaist contribution to the history of its 
representation is that they recognised this, and responded to the tension between chance 
and narrative by letting the form er disrupt the latter. In some ways, aleatorical 
composition remained, and continues to remain, nonsensical -  in that ‘nonsense’
90 fo c i a Fit, Non Nascitur1 (1860), in Lewis Carrolj ^ p etrs' for Young People, ed. Fdward Mendelson (London: 
Sterling Pnblishing, 2000), .‘52. / S E X
{U3MD0H)
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implies a subversive refusal to play by the conventional literary assumptions about 
order, meaning and sense. Chance has always been allied to ‘non-sense’. The Dadaists 
elevated this same understanding of ‘nonsense’ to the status of art, and in doing so, 
disrupted art’s very definition. In this challenge to convention, chance was both the 
Dadaists’ favoured mode of operation and their best subject. The decline of 
determinism was thus rapid in the first part of the twentieth century: indeed, by the 
nineteen-forties the modern sense of uncertainty as a mode of existence had been 
established: this is what Reith describes as ‘an “orientation” to reality or, rather, as the 
fundamental category o f reality to which we must orientate ourselves...social life has 
become increasingly and openly random ised’.91
The ‘fundamental category of reality’ to which the twentieth century needed to 
adapt was brought about by a variety o f cultural factors: the inexorable decline of 
deterministic thinking brought about by the avalanche of statistics in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century; the cultural movement and attraction to uncertainty, 
especially as expressed by the avant-garde represented by Dada; and the new scientific 
developments of the first third of the century. Quantum Mechanics, which took hold as 
the dom inant mode of explanation in physics in the nineteen thirties, in one fell swoop 
invalidated whole swathes o f the previously predominant deterministic worldview. In 
fact, the period after the nineteen forties, on which the bulk of this thesis concentrates, 
is, I suggest, one o f perhaps unique susceptibility to the aleatorical, and its artistic 
culture ran parallel to a scientific culture in which the doctrine of uncertainty was in the 
ascendant. M oreover, this period has since been proven finite. From the establishment 
of Quantum Mechanics in the 1930s, uncertainty as a scientific principle was dominant. 
However, Chaos Theory, which undermines and problematizes the concept of pure 
chance, can be said to have taken hold in the 1970s and 1980s: James Gleick describes 
Mitchell Feigenbaum ’s experiments on cloud form ations in 1974 as the paradigmatic
91 Rcith, The Age of Chance: Ctnnh/ing in Western Culture, xvi.
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beginning of chaos.02 From this point, non-linear dynamics were in the ascendant. 
Chaos theory compromises our conception of chance because it allows for irregular 
actions, including those that would have previously looked random, as part of a system 
susceptible to regulation; indeed, its first principle is that chaos gives birth to order, and 
that deep, previously unthought-of patterns exist at the heart of what we perceive as 
stochastic anarchy. There is, in fact, a predisposition to those very events which would 
previously have been thought of as unpredictable, as Stewart has it; ‘Deterministic laws 
can produce behaviour that appears random. Order can breed its own kind of chaos’.93 
In as much as science has always informed our understanding of chance, the advent of 
Chaos is an unmistakeable shift in its very definition.94 W herever Chaos theory takes us 
in the future, it is possible that our conception o f randomness has been compromised for 
good. Perhaps it will become clear that there was a clear-cut period of random ness, that 
ended in the 1970s and 80s with Chaos theory, which plunged us back into a new age of 
determinism.
These developments happened in tandem with the cultural revolution of 
indeterminacy that was fomented by the Dadaists. Watts explicitly links Dada to the 
revolution in scientific thought that led to the theory of indeterminacy.95 According to 
her argument, the arts work as a barom eter in the revolt against determinism: they are 
jo in t participants in the cultural redefinition of the concept of uncertainty, and therefore 
of chance. She goes on to suggest that the cross-fertilisation that takes place between 
the arts and sciences in fact works mutually. There are instances of philosophy in some
92 James Glcick James Gleiek, Chaos: The Amazing Science o f the Unpredictable (London: William Heinemann, 
1988).
9-5 Ian Stewart, Does Cod Play Dice?: The Amazing Science o f the Unpredictable (London: Penguin, 1989), xii.
94 for  instance, if we look at a roulette wheel, we would imagine that it is entirely random; the results, after all, arc 
unpredictable in the basic sense. And yet -  Chaos theory has given us a means of explaining why tiny outside 
influences have disprojxmionatc effects. So if we could recreate the exact same throw of the ball at the exact same 
moment as the exact same spin of the wheel then, theoretically, the ball would land in the same slot. Chaotic systems 
explain why outside slight jxTturbances have irregular effects -  but they have lx:en caused and they are predictable. 
Therefore chance has, jx:rhaps, s lo p e d  o|x-rating. Stewart provides the fullest elalxiration of these ideas: for a 
scientific definition of randomness, see p.280; for further discussion of the tension lx:tween chaos and stochastic 
tahaviour, see p. 288.
95 See Harriet Ann Watts, Chance: A Pers/x-ctiveon Dada (Ann Arlxtr, MI: UMI Research Press, 1975), 104.
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case inspiring scientific innovations: Niels Bohr’s greatest influence was not one o f his
fellow scientists but Kierkegaard. He associated the Kierkegaardian irrational leap, with
its exaltation of discontinuity and irrelevance, with the liberation from causality evident
in the new particle physics. Dada, then was the artistic manifestation of ideas fomenting
in different disciplines. In fact, as Watts notes, chance, and compositional chance
specifically, is the paradigmatic Dadaist contribution to the twentieth century:
The Dada artist freed himself from the rule of reason and 
causality by welcoming chance into the creative act itself.
Chance is the new factor in Dada productions. Through 
chance, the artist can destroy old aesthetic habits as well as 
create new patterns of perception. Dada’s unique contribution 
to the modernist movement was its receptive attitude to the 
phenomena of chance.96
D ada’s iconoclastic attitude to its artistic and literary heritage relied heavily on the 
power of shock, surprise and a playful resistance to meeting the viewer or reader’s 
expectations. And yet this playful pose also served to obscure Dada’s undoubtedly 
substantial philosophical and intellectual contribution to the history of ideas.
At the forefront of this new artistic movement was Marcel Duchamp, one o f the 
major figures o f Dada and one of the instigators of this association -  sustained 
throughout the first half of the twentieth century -  of Dadaism with the notion of ‘pure’ 
chance. Ducham p’s goals were, according to W atts, ‘the negation of causality, the 
questioning o f iron-clad notions of meaning, the revelation of an underlying ambiguity 
in all experience that belies the pretensions of any one system, or any number of 
systems, to contain i t ’.97 D ucham p’s major works include Erratum Musical, which 
allowed the vicissitudes o f chance to dictate his compositional method; he wrote the 
names o f notes on slips o f paper, mixed them in a hat, and then randomly selected the 
order in which they were to be played. Similarly, Three Standard Stoppages consisted 
of three dropped pieces of string, whose accidental shape as they landed was recreated 
in wood. This Duchamp then kept in a croquet case and referred to as ‘Canned Chance’,
06 Ibid., 1.
1)7 Ibid., 4 5 -6 .
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creating an image of movement in fixity, or fluidity stilled. His third major work was 
Grand Verre, a large glass which used the three standard stoppages as units of 
measurement for its mould.
For Duchamp, chance was a mode of perceiving opposed to logic and taste: a 
means of effacing individuality. The role of chance was to help the artist ‘forget his 
hand’: ‘L’intention constituit surtout a oublier la main, puis q u ’au fond meme votre 
main c ’est du hazard’.98 As Watts points out, the ‘hand’ here stands for a symbol of 
taste as well as of artistry: after all, ‘what better assurance of aesthetic indifference than 
random selection?’99 Interestingly, the association of chance with the undermining of 
individual physical determinants is echoed in the phrase ‘blind chance’, commonly used 
then as now. Chance becomes a mode of epistemological perception that short-circuits 
our physical selves. The relation between accident and the self deemphasises our 
conscious intentions while perhaps concentrating more on our unconscious ones -  
which o f course contradicts the avowed belief in the importance of the accident. Dada’s 
recourse to mystery as an explanation for chance, whether to reveal sub-conscious 
intention or a belief that external randomness is actually a staging o f a higher meaning 
or purpose, played out for our sublunary bafflement, is a tendency that any examination 
of randomness in art must confront. It is tempting to read it as a shying away from the 
conclusions of one’s own experiment, a fearfulness of the truly random and a desire for 
that which the artist avows to escape -  the constant search for meaning and order, and 
the resulting, inevitable, effacem ent o f chance.
Other Dadaists whose work revolved around chance included Hans Richter, 
Tristan Tzara (who was experimenting with randomly ordered poetry in the first decade 
of the twentieth century), and Hans Arp. In his seminal work Entropy and Art (1971), 
Rudolph Amheim examines A rp’s attraction to randomness in his work in relation to 
the concept of entropy:
98 Pierre Cahannc, Entretiens Avec Mane!Duchamp (Paris: Edition Pierre Belfond, 1967), 81.
99 Watts, Chance:A Pers/mfive on Dada, 36.
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The vision of...harmonious striving for order throughout 
nature is disturbingly contradicted by one of the most 
influential statements on the behaviour of physical forces, 
namely, the Second Law of Thermodynamics. The most 
general account physicists are willing to give of changes in 
time is often formulated to mean that the material world 
moves from orderly states to an ever-increasing disorder and
that the final situation of the universe will be one of maximal
disorder.I()0
Watts similarly connects the Dadaists’ obsession with chance to the idea of entropy: 
‘Much of Arp’s aesthetic preoccupation with chance is expressed in his oscillation from 
one extreme to the other in reaction to the fact that the human hand imposing order on 
the face of disintegration and primal chaos is in fact a participant in the inevitable 
process of disintegration’.101 Entropy is, in fact, one scientific idea concerning disorder 
and randomness that lends itself particularly well to use as artistic metaphor. Stated 
simply, entropy is the amount of disorder in a physical system. The second law of 
thermodynamics states that in a closed system, there is a natural and immutable 
predisposition towards disorder, or higher levels o f entropy. An understanding o f the 
second law as integral to existence therefore inculcates a vision of the universe leaning 
irrevocably towards disorder, like a heliotropic flower permanently inclined towards the 
sun. It envisages our environm ent, and therefore to a degree ourselves, as permanently 
having one foot in the camp o f the messy, the chaotic, and the random, ‘righted’ only by
the intensive application o f human effort and a yearning for that which does not come
naturally to us: order.
The entropic or disordered aspects of the culture of the mid-period of the 
twentieth century, and the fascination with the idea of chance as compositional in the 
fifties and sixties, was directly inherited from the Dadaists of the early and mid­
twentieth century. This interest in the creative potential of chance complemented an 
interest in its contradictory ability in the destruction of order. My thesis therefore 
concentrates on depictions of chance as it relates to and absorbs a specific culture: the
100 Rudolph Arnhciin ,Eiiiro//vand An (Berkeley, LA: University of California Press, 1971), 7.
101 Walls, Chamr: A Persjwlive on Dada, 34.
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period from the 1940s to the 1970s. As we have seen, the perception of chance as a 
meaningful concept begins in the late seventeenth century with the advent of probability 
theory, but as I have also shown, this brings with it numerous anxieties about statistical 
fatalism, phrenological determinism , and the superstition and condemnation still 
accorded to any chance-related activities or thinking, and it is evident that even in the 
early twentieth century the shadows of destiny and determinism still operate. It was 
during the long mid-period of the twentieth century, from the end of modernism, 
through the post-war period of the fifties, and into the sixties and seventies, that 
indeterminism or chance became a guiding explanatory force for the world, 
philosophically, novelistically, and scientifically.
This chance is not only a feature of modern physics but of modem thought: it is 
reflected in culture, in the random noise symphonies of composers like A rnold  
/St^tcuibCTg an t/ John Cage, and in the apparently haphazard compositional methods of 
artists like Jackson Pollock and Robert Rauschenberg. This increasing presence of 
chance runs a parallel course with a growing scientific erosion of determ inistic modes 
of thinking. Our conception of uncertainty had also been destabilised and complicated 
by the existentialists on the continent, who had formulated a mode o f existence based 
on freedom and the operation of chance. This was the background against which the 
authors whose works I will discuss throughout the rest o f this thesis emerged, and this 
changing understanding o f chance informed and shaped their work in any number of 
different, way s.
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C h a p t e r  Two
'Swear to tell me everything that goes wrong’: Henry Green 
and the Idea of Free Will in the Novel
In Mimesis (1946), Erich Auerbach argues that ‘m odern’ writers display a
preoccupation with the random and accidental in their work:
These are the characteristic and distinctively new features of 
the technique: a chance occasion releases processes; a natural 
and even, if you will, a naturalistic rendering of those 
processes in their peculiar freedom...(the modern author] 
submits, much more than was done in earlier realistic works, 
to the random contingency of real phenomena; and even 
though he winnows and stylizes the material of the real world 
-  as of course he cannot help doing -  he does not proceed 
rationalistically, not with a view to bringing a continuity of 
exterior events to a planned conclusion.1
The focus on the random, the everyday, and the inconsequential is thus a result of an 
authorial reluctance to engage in what we might term ‘selection’: the desire to choose 
and represent events and reality that further a plot. As Auerbach concedes, every author 
‘winnows and stylizes’ his material during the process of its transubstantiation into 
literature, but the modem author, importantly, ‘does not proceed rationalistically, not 
with a view to bringing a continuity of exterior events to a planned conclusion’; in other 
words, the impulse to plot is subdued as much as possible. Auerbach goes on to clarify 
the reluctance of the modem novelist to ‘impose’ an external structure on to his work in 
the form of a story arc with a clear chronological and temporal structure: a beginning, a 
middle, and an end. The fear that this imposition might overwhelm the material and 
prevent the novel from fulfilling its task of mimesis:
Then too |the modern novelists such as Virginia Woolf]
hesitate to impose upon life, which is their subject, an order
1 Erich Aucrhach, Mimesis, trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1953), 538.
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which it does not possess in itself. He who represents the 
course of a human life, or a sequence of events extending 
over a prolonged period of time, and represents it from 
beginning to end, must prune and isolate arbitrarily. Life has 
always long since begun, and it is always still going on.2
The determinism inherent in the novelist’s task is intensified by selection; the greater 
the author’s role, the more unlifelike the text becomes. Writers who ‘hesitate’ over this 
aspect of their task, therefore, are displaying a sensitivity to the unrepresentability of the 
randomness o f life within the novel.
Chance has, throughout the history of its representation in literature,
sporadically threatened to undermine the god-like creative omnipotence of the author.
That ‘life has always long since begun’ is an admission of the author’s inadequacy in
the face o f the ‘random contingency of real phenomena’ that he or she must attempt to
represent in fiction. When incorporated into the process of literary creation, where
chance determines the arrangement of words or sentences and thus in a sense ‘creates’
the work, this can in fact threaten the very idea of authorship entirely. This reduction of
the author’s role appears to become more pressing in the middle decades of the
twentieth century, as writers responded to the destabilising effects o f modernism.
Samuel Beckett articulated this distinction usefully as he was trying to individuate
him self from Joyce, and, to a lesser extent, the legacy of modernism in general.3 In an
interview with Israel Shenker that was published in 1956 Beckett insists on Joyce’s
minute attention to, and weighing of, every word, and calls attention to his obeisance to
ideas of order and control:
The difference is that Joyce was a superb manipulator of 
material -  perhaps the greatest. He was making words do the 
absolute maximum of work. There isn’t a syllable that’s 
superfluous. The kind of work I do is one in which I’m not 
master of my material. The more Joyce knew the more he 
could. He’s tending toward omniscience and omnipotence as
2 Ibid., 5 4 8 -9 .
As Patrick Swindcn Iras suggested, Beckett’s lame in Britain reignited the ex|terimental tradition when in 1956 
Wailing for (,'odo/ made the translation of The Trilogy into English necessary: ‘the link with Joyce’ he explained, 
‘had Iteen reibrged’ (Patrick Swindcn, The English N ovelof Ilim n' and Society, 1940-1980  (London: Macmillan, 
1984), 4.)
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an artist. I’m working with impotence, ignorance....My little 
exploration is that whole zone of being that has always been 
set aside by artists as something unusable -  as something by 
definition incompatible with art.4
Beckett’s movement away from absolute authorial control and his attraction to the
dramatization of doubt, ignorance, and randomness, is characteristic of the period. The
desire to move away from  omniscience becomes more pressing in the literary culture of
England in the nineteen forties and fifties, and contributes significantly to the prevailing
literary mood of the immediately post-war period. The ‘modern author’,5 as Auerbach
suggests, is, rather, keen to render naturalistically the inconsequential, or events in their
peculiar freedom; in other words, chance.
One inheritor of this tendency against plot and selection noted by Auerbach was
Henry Green. As Jerem y Treglown points out, ‘not since Laurence Sterne was a
novelist more willing than Green to take his readers up false paths and leave them in
6
confusion. Green published his first novel, Blindness (1920) when he was still a 
teenager, and his last, Doting (1952), while still a comparatively young man. Green, 
whose best novels were stylistically experimental responses to what Rod Mengham 
calls ‘the idiom of the tim e’,7 is a writer who is somewhat awkwardly placed in literary 
history. Much influenced by W oolf and Joyce, but contemporary with Isherwood, 
Waugh and Powell, he is often thought of as primarily a writer of the nineteen thirties, 
though in fact his best work was done for the most part in the forties. Bom Henry 
Yorke, Green was prolific for a relatively short space o f time; by 1952, although he was 
still a relatively young man of 47, his fictional output had all but stopped, and although 
he had intentions to do so, he was in fact never to write a novel again. Throughout the 
fifties, Green suffered a slow descent into alcoholism, peppered with bursts of critical 
activity. He gave two lectures on the mechanics of his style to the BBC, entitled ‘An
4 Israel Shcnkcr, "Moody Man of Letters," New York Times, f> May 1 9 56 ,3 .
5 He lakes as his example Virginia Woolf, though lie is writing in the period Itetween 1942 and 1945.
6 Jeremy Treglown, The Uje and Work <fHenry'(ireen (London: Falter & falter, 2000), 109.
7 (Rod Mengham, The Idiom o f the Time: The Writings o f Henry' Cnren (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982).)
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Author to His Readers,’ wrote a few book reviews, and published one or two other short 
pieces. His fascination with the accidental, the inconsequential, and the unruly remained 
undimmed, however: Treglown reports that by the end of the forties Henry frequently 
turned maudlin, crying ‘One can’t do right,’ ‘There’s no hope, there’s no hope’, and 
lamenting that life consisted entirely of mistakes -  not disasters, just mistakes.8 
Treglown also tells us that V. S. Pritchett, in giving a speech at Green’s memorial 
service, spoke o f how Henry had once begged him gleefully as Pritchett was going to a 
wedding to ‘swear to tell me everything that goes wrong’.9
As Angus Wilson has noted, the revival of traditional novel forms that took 
place in the fifties seemed to Green ‘a betrayal of what the twentieth-century masters 
had done,’10 and, in this resistance to neo-realist forms, Green deserves to be considered 
as ‘the most prominent novelist of the forties and fifties with experimental leanings’.11 
His attraction to the experimental grew from his desire to find ways o f exploring how 
better to capture the experiences he wished to represent: to this end he quoted 
approvingly Henry Jam es’s fam ous words about ‘the effort really to see and really to 
represent’, which had been published in the preface to Volume XI of the New York 
edition of his work.12 In a late interview with Terry Southern, Green described the 
innovatory impulse as a simple necessity caused by the tectonic shift effected by 
modernism: Joyce and Kafka, he complained, are ‘like cats who have licked the plate 
clean. Y ou’ve got to dream  up another dish if you’re to be a writer.’13 Similarly, his 
refusal to limit his prose to the ‘correctness’ of English was deliberate, and reflected his 
love o f Joyce: ‘In “good English’” , he observed, ‘the brain is dulled by cliches’.14 My 
study of Green will concentrate on Back (1946), after a brief look at its precursor,
8 Treglown, The Uje and Work oj'Henry' Green, 190.
9 Ibid., 257.
10 Angus Wilson, "Livingand Loving," Twentieth Century' IJtern lure 29, no. 4 (1982): 386.
11 Kingsley Weatherhead, "Structure and Texture in Henry Green's Latest Novels," Accent, no. 19 (1959): 112.
12 Reproduced in Henry James, What Muisie Knew (London: Penguin, 1996), 11.
13 Henry Creen, "The Art of fiction," in Surviving: The Uncollected Writings o f Henry' Green, ed. Matthew Yorke 
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1992), 9 3 -4 . This interview with Terry Southern was originally published in The Paris 
Review, 1958.
14 Henry Green, "The English Novel of the future," Contact, no. 1 (1950): 20.
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Caught (1943). In my discussion of these texts I will concentrate on the reconfiguration 
of the relationship between character and author that occurs in Green’s work, and its 
relation to the perception o f chance.
Reconfiguring Concepts of Character
As Donald S. Taylor has observed, ‘this final abdication of the determining, 
evaluating authorial role, however concealed, is Green’s major break with the traditions 
of the English novel’.15 G reen’s distrust of plot, and of selection, emerged from his 
essential contrariness in respect to the tradition and idiom in which he was working, 
which was largely the neo-realist strand dominated by writers such as Evelyn Waugh 
and Anthony Powell. Each of Green’s novels reveals an attention to verisimilitude that 
consistently threatens to undermine the novel’s traditional alliance with form and 
structure. Green’s construction of his novels gives just as much weight to the 
inconsequential as it does to the supposedly ‘significant’, leaving the reader to doubt 
which aspects o f the story are meaningful. As John Russell notes, ‘Green will not 
falsify experience when he formulates it’.16 This refusal to play by the rules of 
authorship (the principle of ‘falsification’, or the author’s imaginative powers and art), 
and Green’s authorial reluctance to ‘impose’ himself upon his creation, can be 
interpreted as em bodying an alm ost existential idea about freedom in the novel.
Green’s reluctance to meddle in the lives of his characters, an impulse that 
Southern describes as Green’s ‘non-existence of author principle’, aimed ‘to leave 
characters alive enough to go on living the life they have led in the book’. Together 
these aspirations amount to no less than a desire for his story to ‘be alive. To have a real
15 Donald S. Taylor, "Catalytic Rhetoric: Henry Crcen's Theory of the Novel," Criticism: A Quarter/)'for Criticism 
and the Arts, no. 7 (1065): 82.
16 John Russell, Niue Novels and an Un/xtc/ed Bag (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1060), 27.
life of its ow n’.17 Green shows this desire to shift the emphasis from creator to created 
again and again. In the interview with Terry Southern, Green speaks of his characters as 
if they were real people that he needed to persuade into a state where they could act for 
our enjoyment: ‘Laughter relaxes the characters in a novel’.18 As he told David 
Lambourne in an interview published in Shenandoah in 1975, he wanted to remind his 
readers in every novel that, after his story ended, the characters ‘arose the next day and 
life went on as before.’19 These ideas dominate his off-stage pronouncements, and the 
desire to introduce an element of freedom into his novels could be described as Green’s 
most clearly defined literary philosophy.
John Updike describes this desire o f Green’s to produce something 
approximating life in his novels as ‘alm ost hierophantic.’20 It is undoubtedly an odd 
idea, and one that is easily demolished with logic: of course, no character in a novel is 
ever free to act. No character can rebel against the author, and chance cannot operate. 
The novel is always unfree because narrative by definition contains its own 
determination. Certainly, the feeling that Green’s monomania in his fealty to the 
recreation of freedom for his characters represents a sort of oddity pervades the growing 
body of Green criticism. The general consensus within Green criticism is that Green’s 
desire to grant his characters autonomy is a peculiarly romantic idea, and as such it has 
been given little attention. Nevertheless, I would argue that it deserves to be treated 
with a critical seriousness equal to the seriousness with which Green proposed -  and 
consistently reiterated -  it, and that notes its relation to other aspects of the novel, 
namely the difficulty o f the representation o f chance. When approached as an essential 
facet of the retreat from authorial omniscience that he so desired to achieve in his work, 
this reconfiguration of the place of character contributes significantly to the
17 Crecn, "The Art of Fiction," 234.
18 Ibid.
19 S/tenadonh (Summer 1075). Quoted in Stuart Lain#, "Society and Literature 1045-1070,"  ed. Alan Sinlield 
(London: Methuen, 1083), 326.
20 John Ujxlike, Introductory Hssay to Henry Creen, Surviving: The Uncollected Writings o/Henn' Green, ed. 
Matthew Yorke (London: ( lhatto & Windus, 1002), xvi.
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representation of chance in the novel. In fact, G reen’s attachment to the creation of 
freedom in the novel complicates the representation of the free operation of chance in 
narrative in interesting ways, and although his attempts to loosen the bounds around his 
characters may not literally introduce free will into the novel, Green’s confrontation of 
the problem is significant for various reasons. It seems to me that the idea of the 
possibility of free will for the characters in a novel also has relevance to the 
Auerbachian insight about selection, undermining as it does the author, and the authors’ 
functions, for it admits the cultural questions of the time about Existentialism and 
welcomes the introduction of chance into the narrative by attaching importance to 
seemingly unimportant things. When read as part of a composite, coherent literary 
philosophy and critical diagnosis, Green’s desire and attempt to create a real, free life in 
his characters amounts to a reordering of the dynamics of fate, free will and chance in 
the novel o f the m id-twentieth century.
In his first lecture for the BBC, ‘A Novelist to his Readers: I ’ recorded and 
broadcast in 1950 and subsequently published by The Listener, Green expounds upon 
his theory of what he calls ‘non-representational’ art ‘meaning to create a life which is 
not’:
That is to say, a life which does not eat, procreate, or drink, 
but which can live in people who are alive...if it exists to 
create life, of a kind, in the reader -  as far as words are 
concerned, what is the best way in which this can be done?
Of course, by dialogue...because if you want to create life 
the one way not to go about it is by explanation.21
Explanation, he goes on to state, is an intrusion and an imposition on the life of the 
story: ‘the writer, who has no business with the story he is writing, intrudes like a Greek 
chorus to underline his m eaning.’ ‘His’ -  the author’s -  meaning here is a monolithic 
entity, one that in its certainty would undermine the principles of misunderstanding that 
are so central to G reen’s aesthetic. Green’s essential scepticism about the author’s
21 ‘A Novelist lo his Readers: I’ (Broadcast by the BBC. Published in The Listener, Novctnlter 1950. Collected in 
Ibid., 136.)
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ability to ‘know’ extends to his plan for his readers, who should ideally be cast into a 
state of doubt and uncertainty: only then can they experience the narrative of the novel 
as they experience life.
This idea has obvious parallels with the representation of chance. Chance’s 
characteristic marginalization in narrative, its smothering by textual determination, will, 
if Green’s task succeeds, be reversed. Uncertainty will instead become the key mode of 
communication between author and reader, and the action will thus become more 
contingent and the characters more free. The centrality of our inability to know, finally, 
is also fundamental to a character’s verisimilitude and existential freedom: ‘and do we 
know, in life, what other people are really like? I very much doubt it. We certainly do 
not know what other people are thinking and feeling. How then can the novelist be so
sure?’22 The ignorance of the creator has become an essential facet of the character’s
privacy and freedom. ‘M ood’, a very early piece of 1926 that was supposed to become a 
novel, but that remained unpublished in Green’s lifetime, also shows an early 
preoccupation with the idea that there is an inescapable loneliness within each human 
being:
Of everyone you met was only you you would be with 
always and she thought that’s how it is, don’t lets have any 
monkey business with other people, the issue ultimately is 
with ourselves. As my two eyes are coordinated so let me 
have myself as my friend, may I have that glory where I draw
on no one, lean on nobody. May I leam to be alone.33
The language here, with three ‘you’s in the first eight words, alerts us to the speaker’s 
underlying meaning -  one which seems to stand in contrast to the one that he avows. 
‘Y ou’ here means ‘one’, but the effect of its repetition nevertheless serves to undercut 
the line’s overt meaning by its preoccupation with the subject. You, you, you, it cries, 
expressing a longing to escape the confines of the solipsistic self, even while it asserts 
that very solipsism and indifference to the other.
22 Ibid., 139.
23 (Axm, Surviving, 47.
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Green’s self-abasement in terms of his creative control was a direct reflection 
of this belief in human loneliness, and his fealty to recreating the essential 
unknowability and impregnability of each character. Since he believed an author’s 
efforts to ‘know’ any character were acts of arrogance, it follows that the writer, as he 
said, ‘has no business with the story he is writing.’24 His palpable dislike o f so much 
‘character’, those unreal puppets who would dance for the reader, speaks o f an awe he 
had in the face o f his task. His subsequent efforts were always, therefore, to deal instead 
in the partial, the unknown, and the unpredictable. As Valentine Cunningham has noted, 
G reen’s aversion to definite articles and other ‘deictics’: the, this, that, which is 
especially evident in his second novel Living, could be read as a revealing contrast 
between this manner and the style of Auden, whose excess of demonstratives conveys 
‘an effort to assert authority, knowledge, command of experience.’25 Not-knowing, 
then, is at the heart o f G reen’s literary philosophy as surely as it is o f Beckett’s. The 
‘not-knowingness’ o f chance, where anything might happen, and we are in ignorance o f 
the causes o f what does, is in fact closely related to the ‘not-knowingness’ o f Green’s 
conception of character. He sees his characters as real people, and, like real people, they 
are essentially alone: incomprehensible from the outside, both to other characters and, 
crucially, to their creator. A refusal to ‘know’ what his characters will do next allows a 
chink o f light, in the form of chance, to enter the dark, predictable world o f the 
deterministic novel. In G reen’s work, his proclaimed ignorance of his characters’ causal 
motivations and future actions is sometimes obscure, but his concentration on 
contingency and the distinctions between fate and free will serves to illuminate his 
approach for us. His characters are vulnerable to the machinations o f happenstance; 
their volition is compromised, partial, and their actions are distinctive for their lack of 
consequences. Exacerbating this existential loneliness, each is entirely isolated in a fog 
of misapprehensions and mishearings.
2* ll)i<l.. 137.
25 Valentine Cunningham, British Writers qf'/he Thirties (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1088), 10.
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M isunderstanding, in fact, as a corollary to the essential impossibility of
knowing another person, is central to Green’s aesthetic, and interestingly,
misunderstanding is also explicitly linked to the ‘hierophantic’ desire to create a ‘life
which is not’. In his interview with Southern, Green says, ‘and if the novel is alive of
course the reader will be irritated by discrepancies -  life, after all, is one discrepancy
after another’.26 He makes a similar point in ‘A Novelist To His Readers: I’, saying that
‘to create life in the reader, it will be necessary for the dialogue to mean different things
to different readers at one and the same tim e.’27 Terry Southern suggested that the
bewilderingly confused aspect of Back in fact allowed readers to have a better grasp of
the novel than Green, seeing ‘more in the situation than the author does’.28 As many
critics have noted, G reen’s deafness formed a significant part of this aesthetic; he
believed that deafness, whether pathological or willed (in other words a determined
refusal to hear), was a both a metaphor for, and a means o f achieving, the
misrepresentations and misunderstandings that constitute human intercourse. His
dazzling skill at rendering his characters carrying on conversations at cross purposes is
not merely stylistically exuberant but full of humour and pathos, and reminds us that his
emphasis is always on the unbridgeable ontological gap between people that
paradoxically confirms their freedom. Southern talks usefully about the disappearing
author in Green’s work, while simultaneously fending off accusations of sloppiness and
lack o f attention to detail, o f which there were many:
The reader does not simply forget there is an author behind 
the words, but because of some annoyance over a seeming 
‘discrepancy’ in the story must, in fact, remind himself that 
there is one. This reminding is accompanied by an irritation 
with the author because of these apparent oversights on his 
part, and his ‘failings’ to see the particular significance of 
certain happenings. The irritation then gives way to a feeling 
of pleasure and superiority in that he, the reader, sees more in 
the situation than the author does -  so that now all of this 
belongs to him. And the author is dismissed, even perhaps 
with a slight contempt -  and only the work remains, alone
26 CI recn, Surviving, 2 4 4 -5 .
27 Ibid., 140.
28 Ibid., 144.
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now with this reader who has had to take over. Thus, in the 
spell of his own imagination the characters and story come 
alive in an almost incredible way, quite beyond anything 
achieved by conventional methods.29
Green was not alone in this period in showing an interest in ideas of narrative 
indeterminacy and free will, and this reordering of the traditional relationship between 
the narrative and character is reflected in a set of disparate, but contemporaneous, 
literary theories and practices. Ideas about the representation of randomness in narrative 
become increasingly prominent in the forties and fifties in response to an emergent 
existential literature on the continent. In his groundbreaking study of novelistic 
polyphony, Problems o f  Dostoevsky's Poetics, Mikhail Bakhtin describes the idea of a 
work that has somehow escaped the author’s overweening control: ‘as if the character 
were not an object of authorial discourse, but rather a fully valid, autonomous carrier of 
his own individual world’.30 He goes on to illustrate his argument with the example of 
Dostoevsky, his paradigm of an author who is able to achieve this: ‘Dostoevsky, like 
Goethe’s Prometheus, creates not voiceless slaves (as does Zeus), but free  people, 
capable of standing alongside their creator, capable of not agreeing with him and even 
rebelling against him ’. For Bakhtin, ‘Dostoevsky’s major heroes are, by the very nature 
of his creative design, not only objects o f authorial discourse but also subjects o f  their 
own directly signifying discourse'. Indeed, each character ‘freely  (without the author’s 
interference) reveals and substantiates the rightness of his own position’.31
Bakhtin’s ideas would have been little known in England in the nineteen forties, 
if at all. Nevertheless, it is apposite for my project to note the idea of the possibility of 
novelistic free will emerging in apparently unrelated places during the period. For 
Graham Greene, a writer normally grouped with the neo-realist post-war writers, the 
creation of character was also a question o f freedom, though one where the metaphor of
29 Green, "The Arr o f Fiction," 96.
30 Mikhail Bakhtin. Pmhleim o f Dostoevsky\v Pocric.v, ed. Caryl Emerson, irans. Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis, Ml: 
University of Minncajxdis Press, 1999), 5. Author’s emphasis throughout.
31 Ibid., 6 -7 .
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author as God has been imbued with an intense, religious angst. In The End o f the Affair 
(1951) Greene notes the relation between novelistic ‘selection’ and the familiar 
metaphorical link between God as creator and author: ‘A story has no beginning or end: 
arbitrarily one chooses that moment of experience from which to look back or from 
which to look ahead’. He goes on, ‘it is convenient, it is correct according to the rules of 
my craft to begin just there, but if I had believed then in a God, I could also have 
believed in a hand, plucking at my elbow, a suggestion’.32 Belief in God, for Greene, is 
thus necessary for belief in creative determinism, or the idea that the writer is a conduit 
for something beyond him; an indication that the engagement with chance and freedom 
on its own terms was a largely secular undertaking.
G reene’s religious imbuing of creative processes also, and more importantly,
extends to characterisation, as he has his protagonist Maurice Bendrix speak here of an
obstinate character, refusing to come to life:
He never does the unexpected thing, he never surprises me, 
he never takes charge. Every other character helps, he only 
hinders. And yet one cannot do without him. I can imagine a 
God feeling in just that way about some of us. The saints, 
one would suppose, in a sense create themselves. They are 
capable of the surprising act or word. They stand outside the 
plot, unconditioned by it. But we have to be pushed around.
We have the obstinacy of non-existence. We are inextricably 
bound to the plot, and wearily God forces us, here and there, 
according to his intention, characters without poetry, without 
free will.33
This attention to the representation of freedom in narrative is notable for its recognition 
of the difficulty of chance or the unexpected being made present in a predetermined 
plot, and in this Green foreshadows the existentialist concern with freedom and the 
novel. In an article on M auriac, Sartre declared that the amount of freedom which an 
author leaves to his characters is the true mark of art.34 The ‘obstinacy of non-existence’ 
for Greene, which is also the obstinacy of the creation to the creator, establishes the
12 Graham Greene, The End o f the Affair (bunion: Heineinann, 1951), 51.
33 Ibid.. 154.
u Claude-Edmond Magny, "The Duplicity o f Being," in Sartre: A Collection o f Critical Evtayif, ed. Edith Kern 
(Englewood Clills, NJ: Prentice-HaJl, 1962), 21.
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essential truth that Henry Green was so concerned with -  if his characters have no life 
or real existence then they cannot choose, and thus are no more than puppets. Greene, 
whilst diagnosing the problem usefully here, never seems to have attended to its 
narrative implications in his work, as Henry Green attempts with his rejection of 
omnipotence and omniscience. The concern noted by him is in fact tied closely to the 
impulse pondered by Auerbach in terms of the ‘m odern’ novel’s retreat from 
omniscience, and it is only through this that a greater representation of freedom in the 
novel can be attained. This realization represents one of Henry Green’s key 
contributions to the various depictions of chance in the period, recast as an anxiety 
about representing freedom in the novel.
Henry Green’s writing career was extraordinarily diverse, with a period of 
sustained brilliance from Party Going (1939), a novel about a group o f frivolous rich 
young people stuck at a train station, to Concluding (1948), which is set in an imagined 
future in which schools have been replaced by state controlled institutions with 
ambiguous modus operandi.35 These two works bookend the period where my real 
interest lies,36 which is in the three novels that were written and published during the 
war: Caught, Loving (1945), and Back. Of these three, Caught and Back deal directly 
with the war and its consequences; both rely on coincidence and are concerned with 
contingency as a fallout from the uncertainty of the war, and both brilliantly dissect the 
experience o f  the Blitz from the perspective of, respectively, a London fireman and a 
shell-shocked prisoner o f war recently returned home. My case-study will be on Back, 
though I will briefly look at Caught, as it foreshadows many of the same ideas that Back 
confronts.
r> Treglown sees the most overt parallels with Samuel Beckett, the subject of my next chapter, in Party Going: 
‘Samuel Beckett was lx>rn only a year alter Henry Green, and there are resemblances Ixaween their work, esjteeially 
in Party Going s emphasis on obsession, loneliness, and the i iu jK tss ib iliiy  of truly communicating wit h or knowing 
anything certain altout other |)cople’' (Treglown, The Lfeand Work o f Henry'Green, 111.)
36 Green's lirst two novels, B/indne.vtmvX Uving, are too early to l>e of real interest for this project, and his last two. 
Nothing and Doting, are less substantial than those of his middle period.
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Green’s method varies wildly between books: his late adherence to a self-
imposed restriction to pure dialogue (with a thin covering of stage-directions when
needed) thwarted the ambition and range that we see displayed in his war novels. His
subjects were similarly disparate, and his attention was divided between the social
classes: Living (1909) is about factory workers; Party Going the idle rich; and he
dissects the deceptions, social awkwardnesses and interior lives of each with an equally
clear eye. His engagement with chance and freedom is also wide-ranging; both
structurally and philosophically. His novels are a mixture of meandering, seemingly
artless renderings of random timeframes (what Patrick Swinden describes as ‘events
occurring in almost plotless inconsequence’)37 and action engendered by strings of
improbable coincidences that start to look a lot like fate. The war novels, when read as a
body of work, argue that contingency represents the reality of life, and in their very
urgency this subtext becomes translated into a commentary on the chaos of the war.
I was born a mouthbreather with a silver spoon in 1905, three 
years after one war and nine before another, too late for both.
But not too late for the war which seems to be coming upon 
us now and that is a reason to put down what comes to mind 
before one is killed, and surely it would be asking much to 
pretend one had a chance to live.38
So opens Pack My Bag, written by Green in 1939, anxious to ‘put down what comes to 
mind before one is killed.’ This air of insouciance is belied by the determination with 
which he iterates this belief that he is about to die, and implies that it is no mere pose, 
but a conviction, as later when he states: ‘This feeling my generation had in the war, of 
death all about us, may well be exaggerated in my recollection by the feeling I have 
now I shall be killed in the next.’39 And later, ‘it is impossible when saying goodbye to 
be certain that where one is going will be any better than what is being left. It is so 
much on the cards it may be worse’.40 Rod Mengham, in The Idiom o f the Time,
37 Swindcn, The English Nave!ofHiston'and Society, 1940-1980,6 6 .
38 Henry C rccn,/V //l/r/fr/g(L ondon: Hogarth Press, 1940), I.
39 Ibid., 74.
w Ibid., 195.
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describes this constant foreboding of what was to come as the book’s ‘premonitory 
quality.’41
This tendency to adopt a fatalistic attitude towards death, to assume its 
proximity to the present at all times, is not, however, necessarily the dominant attitude 
of the war novels, which nevertheless dwelt much on the chances for dying, and on the 
irony of luck. The opposition between fate and free will in Caught, published in 1943 
and set during the ‘Phoney W ar’ (the period during which raids had not yet begun but 
were constantly expected) and at the beginning of the blitz, is certainly complex. 
Absolute freedom, allied with an awareness of the oppressive profusion of chance, is 
shown as potentially dangerous, while fatalism is consistently shown to be incompatible 
with happiness. Caught is primarily the story of Richard Roe, who becomes a fireman 
in London during the war. His wife has died some time before, and his son, Christopher, 
is living with Richard’s w ife’s sister in the house Richard grew up in. Roe is alienated 
from his home, his job  (before the war, he ran a factory, in an echo of G reen’s own 
industrial career) and his romantic life. He is haunted by images of his dead wife, and 
socially stymied by his hamfisted attempts to fit in with the working men that make up 
the ranks of the fire unit. His young son, we are told at the start of the novel, has been 
abducted by a mad woman from a department store, an episode that we are privy to in 
the form of an extended flashback a third of the way through.
The plot cjonsists o f the firemen’s day-to-day lives, as they fearfully anticipate, 
and then finally become involved in, the war. The narrative draws increasing parallels 
between Roe and his superior, the working class career fireman Pye, who has been 
promoted, it seems, before he is ready, and is self-consciously awkward in his wielding 
of the resultant power. Through a series of coincidences we see how constricted Pye’s 
life has become, as his attempts to befriend and help his inferiors backfire through 
incomprehension and Green’s characteristic resort to misunderstanding. Pye is haunted
u Mengham. The Idiom o f the Time: The Writings o f I lean,' Creen, 5 3.
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by an adolescent memory o f losing his virginity, until one day the vagueness of the 
memory sharpens suddenly into relief, and he realises that the girl he slept with -  or 
perhaps, ambiguously, raped -  in the dark of a garden shed was probably his own sister. 
The reader is aware that this sister, now in a mental institution, was also the woman 
who abducted Roe’s son Christopher. This series of chance intersections between each 
of the two m en’s families has led critics to note that they are doubles of each other -  
Pye and Roe together make up Pyro, the Greek word for fire, and it is likely that Green 
consciously played with this idea. As Jeremy Treglown notes in the introductory essay 
to the 2001 Harvill edition of Back, ‘there’s no mistaking the contrasts between the two 
men, claustrophobically entangled while utterly separated by the kinds o f determinant 
not even war can change: luck, for example’.42
Indeed, the cruelty of luck, and how it can misdirect a good life, seems the 
conclusion to be drawn from Pye’s tale. Free will is shown to be meaningless if one’s 
volition is constantly thwarted by the equally meaningless, but seemingly cruelly 
inescapable, vacillations o f chance. Roe, on the other hand, proclaims a belief in ‘fa te’, 
but lives his life otherwise; his freedom is consistently shown to be real, if 
underestimated. Roe is clearly Green’s alter ego, sharing his diffidence, his desire to be 
accepted by the working class, and his recourse to that very ‘easy determ inism ’ of 
predicting one’s own death -  this is an echo of Green’s own unshakable conviction, in 
Pack my Bag in 1939, of the proximity of his own death. Green describes this fatalism, 
which is here tinged with the opening up of possibility that usually is anathema to it: 
‘He has never felt war was possible, although in his mind he could not see how it could 
be avoided....He was called up three days before the outbreak and, certain of death in 
the immediate raid he expected to raze London to the ground.’43 When the bombs 
finally start falling toward the end of the novel, and Richard is shown to confront death 
bravely, we can nevertheless see his agency consistently undercut by Green:
12 Henry Creen, Caught (London: Hogarth Press. 1943), x-xi.
13 Ibid., 24 -5 .
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Richard was number one, that is in charge of a pump, called 
during night blitz to an incident at which two heavy bombs 
had fallen within a hundred yards of each other. He found the 
driver had brought them to a statue, which still looked 
blindly on, in the centre of a London square.44
He is in charge, yet he ‘finds’ himself at the centre of the action. The statue, still
looking ‘blindly’ on through the chaos, works as a literal figuration of his inactivity and
passivity. Later, ‘through shattering silence he heard two aircraft. Then machine 
gunning. He looked up. He expected a dog-fight he would not see. That flare, nearer, 
was still coldly, majestically descending with his fate.’45 All that Richard can do, in the 
face of his ‘fa te’, is look, blindly, searchingly. The repeated mention of his fate, which 
represents Richard’s conviction o f his own imminent death, does not, however, change 
his status as the one character whose fate is not actually sealed, the lucky one, as when 
he is injured and sent home: ‘some months later, after nine weeks of air raids on 
London, Roe was unlucky one morning. A bomb came too close. It knocked him out.’46 
The ‘unlucky’ here, of course, is ironically imbued with the certain knowledge that Roe 
was, in fact, ‘lucky’ to have survived such a close shave.
Richard’s odd and ambiguous occupation of a space between fate and freedom 
is further articulated in this exchange with Hilly, with whom he has a brief, unsatisfying 
affair:
‘Isn’t there something between old man Piper and Mary?’ he 
asked, to head her off.
‘Don’t be so silly,’
‘There could be, you know.’
‘Anything’s possible, and all the more so now, but not 
between those two, please.’
‘Then you do feel, as well, that anything is possible between 
people now?’ said he, with purpose.
‘But Richard, of course. This war’s been a tremendous 
release for most.’47
44 Ibid., 9 4 -5 .
a Ibid., 95.
46 Ibid., 175.
i7 Ibid., 98.
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Here, the bounds of possibility that have been broken are primarily sexual. Roe, whose 
‘as well’ and purposeful tone belie his eagerness for her assent in this matter, is 
invigorated by this lack o f the old social determinants, and in his submission to a radical 
freedom, he assents to a subsequent reduction in his agency: ‘I never felt so alone in all 
my life. Our taxi was like a pink beetle drawing a peppercorn. We were specks. 
Everything is so different from what you expect, and this was fantastic’.48 His ally in 
this is Prudence, a girl he meets and is briefly attracted to, who in turn sleeps with and 
then discards Pye. Prudence, who believes that ‘war is sex’, uses the uncertainty and 
expectation of death as a means to freedom: ‘It was danger Prudence sought in this lull 
of living’.49 This exchange is later echoed ironically by Pye, who by this point is caught 
up in his web of determ inistic contingency that will lead him to his inevitable fate: 
‘anything in this bloody country’s possible, mate’.50 Pye’s words here assume a terrible 
force, as by this point the reader has begun to gather that although anything might be 
possible, only one outcome is possible for him. Nevertheless, in an inversion of the 
usual connotations o f ‘luck’, it is emphasised throughout that Pye’s fate is not 
synonymous with necessity, as here, where Pye’s dismissal of the necessity of a 
government institution slips with disturbing ease into the greatest necessity o f all -  the 
existential necessity of existence: ‘“ I don’t hold with the necessity of the AFS,” he 
would say, “because I don’t hold with the necessity for war. But our parents didn’t ask 
us if we wanted to be bom , they couldn’t ask me or any of you’” .51 Green’s 
identification o f Pye with this rejection of determinism, however, remains on the 
surface level of character, while on a deeper, structural level of plot, he is hopelessly 
entangled in the very necessity he professes to abhor. He clings to a belief in chance, by 
not holding with necessity, and yet, throughout the novel, Pye is the character that 
Green most ruthlessly allies with his fate. Pye is, in fact, in a further allusion to tropes
“ Ibid., 179-80.
w Ibid., 121.
50 Ibid., 168.
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of ancient Greek literature, a classically tragic figure -  he represents the eternal image 
of helpless man, subject to the whim of a cruel and inevitable fate. He is ‘caught’. He 
wasn’t asked if he wanted to be bom, nor was he really the agent of his own suicide, 
which becomes necessary because of the cruelty of events engendered by chance, and 
he has thus ceased to be the subject and agent of his actions. This string of hellish 
mischances, as John Russell describes them, consists of ‘so many terrible coincidences 
that Pye is led to distrust his own good will’.52 Which is, of course, an observation that 
could be equally applied to Oedipus.
Coincidence here, then, is symbolic of the control that chance had over the lives
of those living through the Blitz, and yet Green’s employment of it holds it suspended
in a complex interrelation with the characters’ perception of fate, and with the narrative
determinism that Green him self so reluctantly wields. Pye, especially, is shown to be
‘caught in the determinism of crisis’:53
When he had finished with the electrician Pye went into his 
office, and picked up the telephone as though taking hold of 
a black handle of the box which held all his hopes 
imprisoned; delicately, so that he should not break his luck 
which had broken; fearful because he could not make the 
connection, he already knew.54
His hopes are imprisoned inside a telephone, figured as a box, which he doesn’t want to 
‘open’, because when he does it will confirm what he guesses will be bad news. This is, 
of course, reminiscent of Schrodinger’s cat. The hypothesis states if you put a cat in a 
box, with a theoretical 50/50 probability of ether being released and thus a 50/50 chance 
of the cat dying, then the cat can be said to exist in an indeterminate state, neither living 
nor dead, until the box is opened and we can observe the outcome. The image of Pye’s 
hopes being similarly imprisoned inculcates the sense of a vulnerable indeterminacy 
surrounding Pye’s actions, and re-emphasises the link between chance and ignorance
>1 Russell, Nine Novels and an l/n/xtcked Bug, 20.
5-5 John Bardin, "hire and Flight," The Freeman, May 7 1951. 
'1 Green, Caught, 151.
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mentioned earlier. Pye’s absolute reliance on chance is a facet of his ignorance, but the 
state of not-knowing (here, before he opens the box) is also the blank slate on which 
chance can operate. The confusion of the tenses ‘that he should not break his luck 
which had broken’ makes clear this paradox: the outcome is unknown, yet his fatalism 
‘knows’, simultaneously undermining that fatalism by showing it to be at odds with the 
indeterminacy, and underlining it; he is, after all, right. This adds an extra complexity to 
the idea of Pye trapped in a web of contingency: the contingency is the cause and effect 
of random phenomena, and yet it is self-fulfilling in a purposeful way that undercuts 
chance entirely. His fate will happen to him in part because he wills it to be so. 
Nevertheless, it is also clear that Green colludes, in a wilful undermining of his stated 
desire to lessen such authorial meddling, with his character’s fatalistic instincts. Pye 
comes to an implausible conclusion about his own chances for ruin; the reader assumes 
this is a matter o f his perception; then the universe o f the novel proves him right. This 
ruthlessness on the part o f Green, which underlines the author’s power, imbues Pye’s 
attempts at denying this fatalist position with cruel irony, as here, when Pye is 
discussing a stranger: “ ‘you’ve never seen such filth lying about you in all your life. He 
simply would not fetch the water. He went on and on about his own brand of fatalism, 
making out that when your number was up, it was up, you can imagine the sort of 
thing’” .55
Caught ends with a delicate human sympathy for Pye that the narrative 
machinery of events and coincidences of the novel have belied throughout. Indeed, as 
we have consistently been made aware of the strength of solipsism and the subsequent 
impregnability of human existence, it surprising to discover that sympathy, or what the 
existentialists called ‘fellow -feeling’, is even possible. Pye is unreachable, Richard is 
unreachable; each exists in a heightened and entirely private hell. Nevertheless, the 
conclusion to the novel seems to suggest that sympathy, while its chances of affecting
55 Ibid., 185.
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action remain slim, nevertheless remains the only human response that reflects the
ultimate singularity at the heart of each human being. Richard, returned to his country
house, is talking to his sister-in-law:
She then said a very foolish thing, because it was true.
‘I wonder what’s the meaning of it all?’ she asked.
He felt a flash of anger. It spread.
‘I know this,’ he announced in what, to him, was direct 
answer, ‘you’ve always been most unfair to Pye.’
She was astounded.
Pye?’ she asked.
‘Yes, to Pye,’ he said. He stopped, turned away from her.
‘That’s the tragedy.’
‘What d’you mean?’
He could not look at her. He knew, if he did, that it would 
break down, that he would not be able to go on, that Pye 
would be nothing; because he now knew the whole 
experience was almost over.56
And a few pages later, at the book’s close,
He waited, watching his anger. Then he heard the verdict.
‘I can’t help it,’ she said. T shall always hate him, and his 
beastly sister.’
This was too much for the state he was in. He let go. ‘God 
damn you,’ he shouted, releasing everything. ‘You get on my 
bloody nerves, all you bloody women with your talk’.57
G reen’s commentary here seems to suggest that freedom may, in fact, be impossible,
for Pye or for Richard, and that chance’s operations have somehow become extended
into a crisis of contingency. Either way, Green has failed, in Caught, to achieve the task
he set himself: to create a character free from authorial determinants. The obsession
with freedom constantly frustrated, or extended into meaninglessness, also works as a
metaphor for Green’s writerly frustration at his inability to escape determining the
action of his novel. And yet, as Jeremy Treglown has commented, in Caught:
among exaggerations, inventions, and cover-ups, the 
narrative wanders in fatalistically corrective mood: ‘She was,
56 Ibid., 195-6.
57 Ibid., 198.
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of course, hopelessly wrong in this’; ‘but he was wrong’; ‘In 
this the men were wrong.’ Green claimed to dislike too 
knowing story-tellers, but what he really disliked was 
omnipotence, not omniscience. He knows what his people 
are doing but knows, too, that in an imaginatively truthful 
story, they can’t be saved from it.58
In Caught, this precise articulation of Green’s anxiety about the role of the author has 
been transmuted into a discussion about fate and free will among the characters. 
Green’s sadness at Pye’s submission to his fate is both a condemnation of the forces 
that conspire to bring it about, and a sophisticated rebuttal of his own limitations as a 
writer who aspires to a sort of narrative indeterminacy. Caught's  significance lies in 
Green’s cool dissection of people’s inability to determine the difference between moral 
actions and chance: once this distinction is elided, then what Caught articulates and 
describes is this very tension, both for his characters, and for his readers.
Back and the Second World War
As John Brannigan, in his book on post-war society, has argued, after the 
Second World War the act o f imagining Europe again as a composite entity, as a place 
of civilisation and culture, and not of death camps and mass destruction, was a 
mammoth, and perhaps impossible, task.59 V. S. Pritchett echoed this vision precisely 
when he wrote, as the continent ceased its firing, that ‘to imagine Europe -  that is the 
hardest thing we have to do. The picture comes to us in fragments and to piece it 
together and above all hold it in the mind is like trying to hold a dissolving dream and 
to preserve it from the obstinate platitude of our waking life.’60 Europe was, of course, 
literally fragmented by the war into previously nonexistent geographical entities, and 
this idea of disintegration and fragmentation was echoed again and again by individuals, 
and became the totemic collective articulation of emotion and experience. Elizabeth
58 Treglown, The Life anti Work o f Henry' Green, 131.
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Bowen’s decisive declaration of the putative link between this ‘fragm entation’ and 
literary stagnation was typical: ‘these years rebuff the imagination as much by being 
fragmentary as by being violent.’61 The idea of fragmentation manifesting itself as an 
incompatibility between the times and artistic creation is echoed by Stephen Spender, in 
his September Journal, for whom the only solution to this incompatibility is, seemingly, 
an imaginative recourse to the past: ‘During these first days of war I have tended to live 
in the past, partly because the present is so painful, partly because it is so fragmentary 
and undecided’.62 Orwell, too speaks of the chaos of modernity, as he says in ‘The Lion 
and the Unicom ’ (1941): ‘And the diversity of it, the chaos!’ ‘How can one make a 
pattern out of this muddle?’63 Orwell’s exclamation is accompanied by an exhilaration 
that implies that the chaos spurred his literary imagination rather than stymied it, and 
his immediate impulse remains creative, to ‘make a pattern’ out o f it -  and thus to 
render the disorder ordered. Evelyn Waugh, rather more nihilistically, wrote in 
Unconditional Surrender (1961) through his character Everard Spruce that ‘the human 
race was destined to dissolve in chaos’.64
Hazard, uncertainty, chaos, anxiety -  it is notable how many of the words and 
ideas that were brought close by the war are intimately related to concepts of chance. 
This closeness was perhaps made especially acute by the technological facts of the new 
bombs that Londoners, from the first moments of the war, were told to expect; the 
‘pilotless’ missiles -  whose very name suggests a wild, agency-less randomness, 
impossible to forecast -  which became a terrifying totem of the unpredictability of 
death. Questions about the part that luck and chance played, then, were paramount. If 
anxiety itself is understood as the anticipation of unpredictable events, chance can
61 Flizalxuh Bowen, "Contein|X)rary. Review of In My Time by V.S. Pritchett," New Statesman, 23 May 1942 ,340 .
62 Stephen S|>en<ler, "Septemlxir Journal," in The Thirties and After ndon: Fontana, 1978), 122.
6:5 George Orwell, "The Lion and the Unicorn," in Collected. Essays, Journalism and haters o f George Orwell\ ed. 
Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1968), 75.
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therefore have its equivalent as a state of mind, turned towards the future random event, 
the ‘future of the next second’.65
This proximity of death was removed from the traditional conception of death 
as a telos or destination at the end of a temporally circumscribed life. Death in wartime 
is constantly proximate, and yet as a phenomenon it is also more subject to chance than 
ever, since its status as a randomly distributed risk is drastically enhanced. Before the 
bombs of the Second World War started, of course, they were constantly expected, and 
this state of expectation, experienced as a fearful sort of fatalism and constant 
expectation of the event, can be understood as a space dominated by thoughts of 
chance: a passive, uncertain waiting for the unexpected. In fact, bombs were anticipated 
by the civilian population almost as soon as hostilities had commenced, and, as Bernard 
Bergonzi remarks, in the years leading up to the war ‘the idea [of the bombing of 
London] haunted the literary imagination’.66 The air-raids had been foreshadowed in 
Greene’s A Gun For Sale (1936), and in Orwell’s Coming Up For Air (1939), in which 
an RAF bomb is accidentally dropped on a village in England.67 The belief that the 
aerial bombardment of London was imminent was increased due to false alarm air-raid 
sirens that started within hours of Chamberlain’s announcement of the beginning of the 
war, and the expectation o f bombs was to instil an uncertain, searching fear in the 
British population for the duration of the war. Mengham describes the first and longest 
of the many ‘Lulls,’ before the raids had begun in m id-1940: ‘The interminably anxious 
time that came to be known as the Phoney W ar’ represented, he suggests ‘the irreal 
space between the declaration of war and the first air-raids on Britain’, and the nature of 
this irreality, he argues, depended on this sense of the expectation of action. Life was on 
hold: ‘lines of civil defence were drawn and the papier-mache coffins for the anticipated
65 Tom Harrisson and Charles Madge, eds.. War Begins at Home, Mass Observation (London: Chaito, 1940), 187. 
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thousands of air-raid victims were made to order; for ten months the civilian population 
looked to the sky, but still the bombs did not fall’.68
This indivisibility between chance, or the anticipation of its operation, and the 
chaos and anxiety of the Second World War was, Mengham argues, profoundly 
connected to the transition that the novel form went through.69 During the war and in 
the immediately post-war period the population’s appetite for totalizing, explanatory 
narrative novels waned drastically, subject to what he calls a ‘lull in m eaning’.70 This 
chronological space also perhaps functioned as a lull in determinism, where danger and 
hazard made chance the only ruler o f circumstance. Chance could thus be described as 
the ruling spirit of the time, intimately connected to, and informing, the prevalent 
anxiety, confusion, and haphazardness.
In Mimesis, Auerbach discusses the putative link between books that are
concerned with the ‘everyday occurrence’ and a verisimilitude in the author’s ability to
represent chance:
[TJhere is a greater confidence in syntheses gained through 
full exploitation of an everyday occurrence than in 
chronologically well-ordered total treatment which 
accompanies the subject from beginning to end, attempts not 
to omit anything externally important, and emphasises the 
great turning points of destiny.71
This ‘chronologically well-ordered’ novel sounds much like the sort of novel which, as 
we have seen, rang so hollow during the war. A swing towards the random and 
arbitrarily ordered, then, can be seen as not merely a stylistic inheritance from the 
experimental modernists, but rather as a specific response to the war. Along with a 
reluctance to impose artificial structure, a desire to give equal weight to events of 
consequence and seeming inconsequence was a way to represent a certain chance- 
bound or chaotic element of life: ‘Irrelevancy means so much,’ as Green wrote to
60 And Mengham and N. H. Rcevcy-eds., Tite Fiction o f the JfMOstSn>norr>fSuft'it>(d\&zsnitf*wki:\ Palgravo, 20 0 1 ),
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Coghill (a friend and tutor from Oxford), ‘it shows you what a person is & how he
thinks, & conveys atmosphere in a way that is inconceivable’.72 The fixation with the
trivial and the everyday is related to something noted by Michael North:
for the novelists of Green’s age the basic political fact is the 
utter irrelevance of the individual and his complete 
helplessness in the world of fact. The characters of Waugh,
Powell, Isherwood, and Orwell are all at loose ends [and 
have] nowhere particular to go. The comic lack of 
consequences...is an index of their very lightness, their 
nature as extraneous beings.73
Green’s singular achievement is recognising this characteristic helplessness in the face 
of the whims of chance and subsequently attempting to represent it truthfully in his 
novels. Moreover, his wish that his characters could have that very lightness and 
verisimilitude that North notes as characteristic of the age was overtly linked to the 
sense of fragmentation that, as we have seen, was perhaps the most notable aspect of the 
historical moment. In 1954 Green acknowledged to Rosamond Lehmann the fecundity 
that the war, and the immediately post-war period, had inspired in him: ‘The truth is, 
these times are an absolute gift to the novelist. Everything is breaking up. A seed can 
lodge or sprout in any crack or fissure.’74 The ‘gift’ to the novelist can be read as an 
environment sympathetic to Green’s natural inclination towards narrative reticence, or 
as an invigorating tool to convey the character’s freedom. During a period of 
dissolution, when ‘everything’ is breaking apart, the writer, in his narrative 
representation of reality, is perhaps called upon to do less formulation. He can, in 
Green’s hopeful vision, let his work grow freely; it can act as a conduit for that which 
he wishes to represent. This is, of course, what Green has been advocating all along: the 
retreat of the overbearing author figure who seeks to ‘create’ a ghastly puppet show that 
has no bearing on the true nature of reality -  which is, of course, full of discrepancy,
'2 Letter from Henry Green to Neville Coghill, 8 April 1925, quoted in Treglown, The Ufe and Work of Henry 
Green, 54.
':! Michael North, Henr)r Green and the Writing ofHis Generation (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 
1984), 10.
74 Green, letter to Rosamond Lehmann, quoted in Mengham, The Idiom o f the Time: The Writings of Henn' Green, 
71.
82
irrelevancy, and chance. The horrors o f selective narrative, then, perhaps retreat during 
periods of instability, and the contingency and uncertainty of real life can find their 
narrative representation in more meandering, less determined forms whose relation to 
the wartime atmosphere is explicit.
Back was written directly after Loving and published in the year after the end of 
the war in Europe. It is saturated with anxiety about states of uncertainty, ignorance, 
and the significance or otherwise o f coincidence. The novel centres on Charley 
Summers, a diffident and damaged young man sent back from the war after his leg has 
been amputated, and on his attempts to readjust to life in England. Charley’s lover Rose 
has died during the war, and her widower, James, has been left with their small boy, 
who Charley believes to be his son. Charley is damaged, paranoid, and has little grip on 
a reality that even to the reader seems indeterminate; indeed, the novel’s central ethical 
concern is how to act under a fog o f uncertainty. At the beginning of the narrative, we 
see that Charley is effectively incapable of exercising his agency: he knows nothing, 
and is directed in almost everything by others. His speech is characterized by awkward 
pauses and faux pas, misunderstandings of people and situations, and is constantly 
contradicted by the perceptions o f other characters. As the plot pivots and weaves 
between the twin pillars of coincidence and misunderstanding, Charley becomes 
increasingly helpless at the centre of a web of contingency that spreads until it threatens 
to envelop his agency altogether.
As Edward Stokes notes,
coincidence is employed by Green even more lavishly in 
Back than in Caught. The whole plot is based on the 
accidental likeness of two half-sisters bom a few weeks 
apart, and on the verbal coincidence that the name of a 
flower, rose, is also a woman’s name, a colour adjective, and 
the past tense of a common verb.75
75 Kdward Stokes, The Novels o f Henry' Green (London: Hogarth Press, 1959), 121.
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In the midst of his grief for the dead Rose, Charley is beset by coincidence. He meets a 
man named Middlewitch, whom he dislikes, in a bar, who calls a waitress Rose, and 
happens to have digs in the same building as Nance, who turns out to be the illegitimate 
half sister of his dead love and her double. As a result of these coincidences Charley 
believes that Nance is Rose, though other characters cast doubt upon the extent of their 
physical resemblance. The word ‘chance’ appears constantly -  someone will think of 
their ‘chances for promotion’, or will ‘chance a kiss’, or a cigarette. ‘By any chance?’ is 
the customary tag to any question and things are done when a character gets ‘the 
chance’. Charley finds himself, ‘by chance, within a few yards of the address Mr. Grant 
had given.’76 ‘What are the odds!’ is Charley’s secretary Dot’s favourite expression, and 
the slightly baleful epithet ‘lucky’ is applied to the most unfortunate o f characters and 
situations: ‘“Here’s luck,” Charley said, to speak for the first tim e’ during his 
uncomfortable drinking session with Middlewitch.77 Middlewitch declares to the 
waitress that ‘he’s stuck on a girl called Rose. Bit of a coincidence, isn’t it?’.78 In 
Charley’s opinion, Nance’s situation is down to ‘Tough luck’.79 Later on in the novel, 
Nance and Charley have this exchange: “‘only it was queer the way we met, and now 
here you are knowing so much I’ve no idea what you haven’t learned.” “It’s luck,” he 
explained. “Chance, that’s all.’” 80
In the midst o f this anxious, chance-soaked narrative, the fear of the mental 
state of the returning servicemen is a constant presence: “‘They’re coming back nervous 
cases, like they did out o f the last war,” he repeated to himself, and thought that, in that 
case, then everything was hopeless’.81 As Mr. Philips, Rose’s father, explains to his 
wife: “‘My dear, this is the war. Everything’s been a long time. Why only the other day 
in my paper I read where a doctor man gave as his opinion that we were none of us
76 Henry Green, Jfr/rA' (London: Hogarth Press, 1946), 43.
77 Ibid., 20.
78 Ibid., 112.
79 Ibid., 140.
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normal. There you are.’” 82 Charley’s inability to act is therefore clearly linked to the
war’s having forced him into a state of ignorance and fear that is inimical to the
decisive exercising of his volition. The uncertainty and the state of ‘not-knowingness’
that characterize Back, and the descriptions of the fall-out from the war, are clearly
connected. As Mr Grant tells Charley: ‘Because what you have to remember, Charley
boy, is that you’re one of the lucky ones. You’re back’.83 While Charley’s ‘luck’ is
consistently emphasized, it is imbued with a tragic irony since we can see that he has
been stripped of any meaningful agency o f his own. If one does not act, how can one be
anything but subject to the vagaries of fortune and misfortune? The link between the
sinister coincidences that flood Charley’s existence and the view of the servicemen is
here made obliquely as a contrast between interiority and exteriority:
He fled Rose, yet every place he went she rose up before 
him; in florists’ windows; in a second hand bookseller’s with 
a set of Miss Rhoda Broughton, where, as he was staring for 
her reflection in the window, his eyes read a title, ‘Cometh 
up as a flower’ which twisted his guts; also in a seed 
merchant’s front that displayed a watering can, to the spout 
of which was fixed an attachment, labelled ‘Carter’s patent 
Rose.’
For she had denied him, and it was doing him in.
A woman behind him said, ‘They’re like flies those bloody 
uns, and my goodness are they being flitted.’84
In a resort to his customary preoccupation with the unknowability of the individual, 
Green ironically contrasts here Charley’s interior landscape, which consists of panic 
and horror at the seeming infinity of the improbable occurrences that dog him, with an 
exterior view of his actions: to an observer, he is a just another ‘hopeless case,’ like a 
fly ‘being flitted’. The wom an’s pathetic metaphorical comparison of the men to flies 
has its obvious antecedents in Tennyson and Shakespeare. The Tennysonian metaphor 
is couched in terms of the revelation of the lack of a plan for mankind:
And men the flies of latter spring,
82 Ibid., 84.
83 Ibid., 79.
84 Ibid.. 52.
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That lay their eggs, and sting and sing 
And weave their petty cells and die.85
Similarly Shakespeare’s men, described by Gloucester ‘as flies to wanton boys are we 
to th’ Gods’, are volitionless, vulnerably subject to the whims and hazards o f an 
indifferent and cruel divine force.86
That the servicem en, and Charley in particular, are more profoundly subject to
fortune than other people is a persistent theme. Luck, in fact, ebbs and flows in the
narrative along with the presence of the war: the nearer one is to death, the more chance
matters. Mrs Frazier, Charley’s landlady, who foresees in her bumbling and banal way
much of what comes to pass, frequently tells Charley how lucky he is:
‘take what pleasure and comfort you can, because who is 
there to tell what may befall. When these new bombs he’s 
sending over, turn in the air overhead, and then come at you, 
there’s not a sound to be had. One minute sitting in the light, 
and the next in pitch darkness with the ceiling down, that is if 
you’re lucky’.87
Mrs Frazier’s role as ironically cast seer is thus established. One should live as 
passively and pleasantly as possible, and accept chance’s vagaries with aplomb. As she 
undercuts the significance o f random phenomena -  o f a bomb turning and coming at 
you -  she also poetically and subliminally reinforces the mysterious power of chance 
with her use of the archaism befall. The root of chance, cadere, is the verb ‘to fall’ in 
Latin: befall is therefore related to chance’s original meaning, how the dice, or the 
bombs, fall for, or on, you.88 As yet another improbable coincidence confronts Charley, 
she remains unmoved: “ ‘Never knew the two were acquainted,” Charley explained,
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aghast. “What is there strange in that?” Mrs. Frazier enquired, irritable still. “Once you 
start on coincidences why there’s no end to these things’” .89
Mrs. Frazier’s passivity contrasts here with Charley’s disproportionate reaction 
to coincidence. He is ‘aghast’ at the improbability of all that happens to him. This is 
sustained throughout the novel: early on, when Nance reveals offhandedly that 
Charley’s acquaintance M iddlewitch lives in the same building as her, he reacts with 
comic disproportion:
‘I’d never have done this, only I happened to know that Mr.
Middlewitch was in across the landing.’
‘Middlewitch?’ He spoke out in real horror.
‘Now then,’ she said, beginning to look frightened.
‘Middlewitch?’ he repeated, absolutely bewildered.
‘Just because I give you the name of someone who lives in
these digs, don’t you start wondering if you’ll strike lucky
twice,’ she said.
‘Me strike lucky?’ he mumbled.90
Charley’s horror, bewilderment, and importantly, total ignorance of cause and effect, 
here, are shown as both a product o f chance and the cause of the misunderstandings that 
ensue. Coincidence rules his life, and he is terrified of it. The word ‘lucky’ here is 
charged with a double-edged irony: it is both a positive interpretation of the chance that 
is oppressing Charley, and entirely erroneous -  at no point so far in the novel has 
Charley struck ‘lucky’ in the positive sense. His movements have been fated, not by a 
universal power, but by coincidence and by characters whose actions have malign 
effects on him for no discernible reason or meaningful cause; in other words, by chance. 
This chance is, however, so seemingly malign, that the word ‘lucky’, with its happy 
associations, becomes imbued with a cold irony. This example of the dialogue that 
floods the novel ably demonstrates the comic use of chance in Green’s work. Arbitrary 
coincidence brings Charley and Nance together as a plot device, and then coincidence
m Green,Back, 30.
90 Ibid., 46.
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furthers the misunderstanding from which Green’s aesthetic springs. In this sense, 
coincidence and the inherent meaninglessness of random happenings, whatever 
eventual purpose they are put to, are at the heart o f Green’s characterisation. The 
concentration on misunderstanding emphasizes the essential ambiguity of all human 
communion, and subsequent loneliness, of each person, and in doing so, fulfils Green’s 
prescriptive advocacy of freedom for his characters: this is how real people are.
In Back, chance fulfils this function of aesthetic well-spring as completely as
blindness does in Green’s first novel, Blindness, or as self-absorption does in his novel
of the idle rich, Party Going: it is the basis of all action at cross purposes, and thus of all
interaction between characters. Nance is the novel’s believer in chance and luck: ‘“you
see, I ’ve thought about this more than you can ever. If you like to put it that way, I’ve
been brought up with the problem. It’s chance, is all, nothing more than bad luck. I’ve
known since I was sixteen’” .91 Yet she is also the one who denies chance’s operation,
and assumes that Charley’s stumbling actions must be down to his agency; ‘you’ll strike
lucky twice’ refers to her erroneous belief that Charley is taking advantage o f her good
nature, when at this point he believes that she is Rose. Nance’s faith in chance is what
leads her to doubt Charley’s intentions:
‘Did he send Middlewitch?’ He asked, jealous again as soon 
as Mr. Grant was mentioned.
‘Of course not. I said, didn’t I?’
‘How did you come across him, then?’
‘I’ll not have these questions. I’ve a life of my own, haven’t 
I? It’s not my fault, is it? And if I’m being nice to you its 
only that I’ve the responsibility. Even if he did send you 
along so things wasn’t natural, like crossing one another in 
the street.’92
She fears that chance’s normal, and ‘natural’ operations have been fatally meddled 
with: if she had crossed Charley in the street, the chain of events would have
91 Ibid., 69.
92 Ibid., 70.
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corresponded to an idea o f what is proper. Chance, to Nance’s mind, is the natural order 
of things, an order that it is foolhardy, and perhaps even dangerous, to distort.
Andrew Gibson has suggested that Charley’s horror of coincidence, far from
being a paranoiac and disproportionate reaction to the normal course of events that life
metes out, is in fact justified by the exterior view of the events in the novel:
The numerous coincidences in Back...not only tax our 
credulity, but are, like coincidences in The Trial, quite 
blatantly implausible....They shrink the gap between 
Charley’s view of the world and that world itself. Yet it is a 
difference that the novel nonetheless insists on. Charley 
wrongly assumes the improbable to be the case, in a world 
where it sometimes is. He mistakes the different for the 
same, in a world which seems likely to encourage him in his
93error.
This is a convincing argument, and one that allows for the possibility that although 
Charley’s worldview might be essentially paranoiac, he might also be right. All 
relationships and events in the book conspire coincidentally so that the smallest trivial 
occurrence becomes imbued with suspected significance. Rod Mengham has also 
argued persuasively that these ‘coincidences’ could in fact be portents of a hidden 
coherence that Charley cannot quite perceive, while allowing for the explanation that it 
is all a product of Charley’s confused mind. He suggests that the word ‘rose’ becomes a 
symbol for the inter-connectedness of the paranoiac worldview, a ‘talisman for 
coherence which is out of his control; its magic is endangered by every chance 
occurrence in the environm ent’.94
Of course, the flipside of this fatalistic interconnectedness of all events is 
misunderstanding and incomprehension, as when Charley, in a desperate grab for 
meaning, makes up his mind about Nance: ‘then he knew what she was. She was an 
enemy’.95 As Mengham points out, Freud’s definition of paranoid delusion emphasises 
chance, making, as it does, creative use of accidental, disconnected events, and deduces:
'}i Andrew Cibson, " Henry Creen as l/xperimemal Novelist/' Studies in the Novel 16, no. 2 (1984): 207.
*n  Mengham, The Idiom o f the Time: The Writings ofHenry' Creen, 167.
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‘the writing of Back is like an elaboration of Pascal’s wager; it is the construction of a 
working knowledge, in the absence of what remains unknown and hidden.’96 This 
working knowledge is akin to the paranoiac world-view, as it assumes coherence where 
there is none. The suggestion by Gibson and Mengham that Charley is ignorant of the 
reasons why the many coincidences are connected is persuasive, and yet leaves little 
room for chance. Perhaps it is apposite to note that there exists an alternative 
significance to Pascal’s Wager. By reducing the question of divinity to a probability 
calculation, the wager introduces a rational approach to chance, as well as a 
probabilistic attempt to ratify the irrational. In fact, far from being necessarily symbolic 
of the attempt to access a ‘hidden order,’ Pascal’s W ager can equally be understood as 
anathema to a fatalistic world-view, in that it reduces and undermines the determinism 
it seeks to quantify. If Back can be further illuminated by mention of Pascal’s theory 
then perhaps it is in the sense that the interconnectedness of events, or the idea of a 
‘hidden order’ that directs one’s fate, and to which we are not privy, does not, in the 
final analysis, matter; Pascal’s Wager instructs us that whether there is or there isn’t a 
God has no bearing on how one determines the meanings of events. Rather, one should 
assume nothing, and proceed through life rationally. Back articulates this passivity as 
illumination rather than as inaction or solipsism, just as Pascal does. Chance -  largely 
rational -  and fate -  largely mystical -  are continually seeping into each other, and are 
impossible to separate: and importantly, Green seems to suggest, there is no point in 
even trying.
The other defined paranoia at work in the book is a topical concern with the 
overwhelming bureaucracy with which the society of 1945 found itself flooded. One of 
the best running jokes in the book concerns the proliferation of nonsensical acronyms 
for countless useless government institutions. This contrasts with the description of the
% Mengham, The Idiom o f the Time: The Writing*of!lenn' Creen, 179.
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discovery of parabolam (made from bird lime) and stainless steel, which are both truly
‘lucky’ coincidences:
‘It was an accident,’ he began, ‘like it was with stainless 
steel, when the heads were on inspection round the foundry 
yard and one of ’em spotted something he’d noticed before, a 
bit of bright scrap through the rain. So they had it analysed, 
and there you are. Now it’s what you cut your meat up 
with...It was exactly the same with parabolam,’ he went on,
‘only this time it was bird’s droppings.’97
The idea of paranoia in connection with managerial systems identified by critics in Back 
here seems misplaced. The description of chance’s operation, untainted by 
predisposition, paranoiac coherence or sinister inexplicability, is like a brief respite 
from the miasma of ‘bad’ chance that infiltrates the book. Science, work, and the 
ensuing logical world of order where chance’s operations are marginalised, are 
Charley’s escape.
Lyndsey Stonebridge has commented interestingly on the distinction between 
fate and chance in Back:
There is no space for interiority in Back: no imagistic 
memorialising as self-authoring. Charley’s fate is wholly 
determined by the agency of the roses that relentlessly pursue 
him through the text....Charley’s life is scripted beyond his 
conscious desires. That script, in this sense, is what lies 
beyond Eros (or beyond Rose). To live a life in which one’s 
history and one’s fate are so cruelly beyond the limits of 
one’s wishes...is painful, but the result is not always fatal.98
That Charley’s fate is ‘wholly determined’ by the agency of the ‘hidden order’ that the 
roses represent is, I think, quite wrong. It is eventually Charley’s ability to fall in love 
with Nance, as distinguished, albeit somewhat ambiguously, from Rose, that proves 
otherwise. If Charley’s agency had not been restored to him then this romantic ending 
would make no sense. In fact, the slow process of regaining his agency is clearly shown
97 Green, Back, 37. It is worth noting that Summers works at a paralx>lam factory, and thus literally fulfils the 
Freudian motif of turning shit into precious metal.
98 Lyndsey Stonebridge, " Bombs and Roses: The Writing of Anxiety in Henry Green's Caught," in The Fiction of 
the 194(h: Stories of Survival, ed. Rod Mengham and N. H. Reeve (Basingstoke: Palgravc, 2001), 65.
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to be linked to his social rehabilitation, and thus his growing understanding of the true
nature of chance is what makes possible his ability to act as a free man.
But what a night to choose. Wasn’t it just like his luck the 
old man should have another bad turn, exactly when his own 
affairs promised better? Then, with surprising intuition, he 
supposed that one crisis in this life inevitably brings on 
another, that she wouldn’t have kissed him if Mr. Grant had 
not been having a relapse (either if neither of them knew), 
nor, and here he fell unwittingly on the truth, would she have 
asked him if it hadn’t been for the doubly serious illness. All 
the same, so to speak in spite of himself, he began to have 
hopes.w
The illumination of his understanding of chance’s place in the natural order of things is 
clearly identified as what brings about his ability to hope, and thus to love: Nancy 
would not have kissed him if the chain of events had been different. ‘He put his arms 
around her, and luckily, was very gentle....Again, more by luck than good judgement, 
he kept silence’.100 This demonstrates the frailty of human relationships by revealing the 
extent to which their success depends upon on chance, but more importantly, it also 
reveals Charley’s recognition of luck as just that, luck. It has been liberated from the 
oppressive, ironic undertones that it has carried through the bulk of the novel, and this 
liberation seems to have had the corollary of freeing him. Back ends in a sort of 
romantic quietude. Charley sees Nance naked; he cries ‘Rose’, and she shushes him. 
The word has been stripped of its meaning and of any status it might have had as totem 
of a hidden order o f events to which Charley could not gain access -  it is finally just a 
word. When Charley and Nance kiss in the rose garden, Charley ‘could not speak, 
paralysed,’ and the possible allusion here to the Hyacinth Girl episode o f The Waste 
Land (or, indeed, to the rose garden at the opening of ‘Burnt Norton’) again emphasises 
the fact that communication is not only unconfined to its sensory bounds but entirely 
disconnected from them. Charley’s ‘usual state of not knowing, lost as he always was’
<w Green, Back, 179.
100 Ibid., 180.
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transmutes, then, from the pathos-laden vulnerability of not-knowing, but, rather, his 
not-knowing has become a kind of state of grace.
As I established in my first chapter, there exists a long association between 
notions of ignorance and those of chance. If one lacks a causal explanation for an event, 
one is in ignorance -  ignorance is thus the starting point for recognising chance as 
chance: as mere coincidence or arbitrary randomness, rather than a series of happenings 
that speak, however obliquely, of a hidden knowledge of our fate of which we are for 
whatever reason unaware. W hat Green’s best novels elaborate is akin to the Beckettian 
self-definition, quoted at the head of this chapter, of working around the unknown and 
the partial. It is this ‘not-knowingness’ that allows the free operation of narrative 
chance. Back seeks to examine the complex interrelation of chance and fate in the world 
of one vulnerable, damaged young man, where the probability of death has charged the 
idea of chance with a terrifying fatedness. The recognition of chance as chance, and of a 
state of ignorance, at the end, is the beginning of Charley’s ability to function normally 
as an agent in his own life, to exercise his free will, and engineer his escape from the 
portents, the roses, and the coincidences that have dogged him so sinisterly for so long.
It is therefore mistaken to interpret chance in Green’s Back, and in his work in 
general, as a metaphor for fate. Green’s significance for the history o f chance’s 
representation in the literature of the twentieth century is that, for him, chance functions 
as a mode o f existing in the world passively, and in this he represents a wholly new 
expression o f literary chance, and a wholly new way of planting a profound 
indeterminism at the heart of the novel. Green’s careful associations between the 
unexpected, the improbable, and the coincidental, and his wartime setting, can be read 
as a commentary on the uncertain, contingent mood of the war. His characters in Back 
and in Caught are trying to live under an oppressive regime of extreme chance: 
expecting at any moment to die in Caught, and in a world made chaotic and paranoid by 
wartime in Back. The incidences of predetermination, foreknowledge, and the of
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moments of sudden illumination that everything is connected that abound in Back, and 
which appear to push chance and randomness to the periphery, can also be read as 
harbingers of an anxiety about the perception of chance. In an historical moment at 
which life was lived under the rule of randomness, and where the fear of being hit by a 
bomb meant that probability was an overriding concern in everyday life, a 
preoccupation with the predetermined speaks forcefully of an anxiety of its opposite. 
The emphasis on circumstance and contingency simultaneously tells us that actions are 
the only engine of meaning in the world, and that there is no point in performing those 
actions as the web o f circumstance is so intricate that one will never be able to predict 
the outcome of an event.
Green’s formal and stylistic virtuosity similarly reflects this set of ideas about 
passivity, freedom and chance. As Auerbach has demonstrated so clearly, a suspicion of 
plot is a corollary to a concern about the accurate representation of the randomness of 
everyday life. Green’s stylistic virtuosity is itself symbolic of this passivity. Why plot? 
Why not fiddle with beautiful images of flames and roses instead of imposing an order 
that does not really exist? What will happen, Green seems to suggest, will happen 
anyway, with no help from any of us. Images are also the most concrete expression of 
the randomness of the mind, coming as they do arbitrarily, connecting the unconnected, 
setting up associations and engendering chance digressions and parallels that bring 
meaning into being by the fact of their imposition, rather than being made necessary by 
an explanatory, deterministic framework. Green‘s contribution to the novel form is, at 
least in part, his recognition that narrative is inimical to chance’s true operations, an 
observation which is closely related to the specific circumstances of the historical 
moment in which he worked. When read as part of a composite, coherent literary 
philosophy and critical diagnosis, Green’s desire to create a real, free life in his 
characters amounts to a reordering of the dynamics o f fate, free will and chance in the 
novel of the mid-twentieth century.
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C h a p t e r  T h r e e
T admire the will to welcome everything -  the stupid 
violence o f chance’: Samuel Beckett and the Representation
o f Possibility.
The fetishisation of chance by the existentialists as ‘stupid violence’ linked 
chance indelibly with that other ‘stupid violence’: the Second World War. The culture 
of chance that the existentialists were surrounded by was not a mere avant-garde 
indulgence, but was, and had been for the length of the war, a reality: chaos, 
randomness, and instability were everywhere. Chance itself, it almost seemed, could do 
real damage; bombs that were impossible to predict, killed; uncertainty was made 
concrete. Anything could happen. It seemed for a while that, for the majority at least, 
chance was no longer part of the vocabulary of hope, but part of the vocabulary of 
terror.
The existentialists recognised this dilemma and recast it anew, so that the 
discussion about chance became transformed into a discussion about possibility and 
contingency.1 For the existentialists, hope only became possible once despair about our 
existential situation had been acknowledged. The hope that springs from resignation, 
therefore, was a result of the acceptance of a random, meaningless universe, where 
traditionally causal explanations of events could no longer speak to us. Possibility was 
therefore essentially conceived o f as a space in which anything might happen. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, V.S. Pritchett wrote in the final months of the war 
that:
1 Hazel Barnes makes elear ihe closeness l>eiwecn the ideas of'possibility and chance: ‘Like uncertainly, |possibility | 
simply means that something is not yet decided, that the future is ojten’ (Hazel E. Barnes, The Uterature o f  
Possibility: A Study in Humanistic Thisientialism (Lincoln, NB: University ol’Nebraska Press, 1959), 365.)
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To imagine Europe -  that is the hardest thing we have to do.
The picture comes to us in fragments and to piece it together 
and above all hold it in the mind is like trying to hold a 
dissolving dream and to preserve it from the obstinate 
platitude of our waking life.2
By the mid-1950s Samuel Beckett was echoing this sense of cultural uncertainty and 
fragmentation in the artistic sphere: ‘art has nothing to do with clarity, does not dabble 
in the clear and does not make clear’, he told one interviewer: ‘One can only speak of 
what is in front of him, and that now is simply the mess.’3 Beckett’s refusal to impose a 
novelistic order on top of reality as he saw it, and his efforts to represent the ‘m ess’, 
namely a contingent and uncertain modernity, aligns him with those novelists that, more 
than trying to merely represent chance, actively try to incorporate it into both their form 
and content.
Beckett's concern with questions of contingency and possibility, and their
representability in fiction, are perhaps the aspect of his writing that are the most
relevant to existentialist thought; and yet these are also the aspects of his fiction that
have received the scantest attention. Many critics, when talking about Beckett and
philosophy, construct readings based on his assumed philosophy of being or his
affiliations with this or that movement. I am not attempting to do this; I do not merely
wish to excavate his texts for references to, or parallels with, Existentialism. Rather, I
will look at the ideas about possibility and chance that were current, namely existential
ones, before moving on to examine Beckett’s work, with particular attention given to 
/153
his novel Watt, in the light of these. This chapter will acknowledge the formal 
ramifications this had for the novel in general. I am not trying to argue that Beckett is 
an existentialist, or to prove that he is not; rather, I wish to suggest that his recognition 
of life’s ‘m ess’ and his belief that a writer should perhaps represent it as it is,
1 Pritchett, 11.
3 Tom F. Driver, " Beckett by I lie Madeleine," Columbia University Forum IV (1961): 22.
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nevertheless echoes ideas that were feeding into the intellectual culture at the time -  one 
that was, I believe saturated by notions of chance.
Narrative, the Novel and Chance
As we saw in my first chapter, Thomas Kavanagh has argued convincingly that 
the emergence of probability theory in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
‘paralleled and in a very real sense sustained’ the hegemony of the modern novel. 
‘Together they formed a single shift in how we saw and understood the world and how 
we represent our place in it.’4 His reasoning for this is essentially formal: ‘The novel 
shares with probability theory the assumption that individuals act within a world of pre­
existing causal sequences, of multiple determinisms compelling their reactions.’5 The 
novel’s insistence, then, that moral character is roughly equivalent to fate is key. If 
probability theory ‘tam ed’ chance, as Hacking has argued, then the novel effects a 
similar sleight of hand by containing it under larger movements of cause and effect. The 
reasons for a character’s actions are fundamental to our understanding of the literary 
entity of a novel. Sartre’s concentration on the aspects of narrative inimical to a 
representation of chance in Nausea (1938), therefore, mirrored Beckett’s insistence on 
non-causal explanations for events in his fiction: both seek to counter this smothering, 
as they saw it, of the truly random nature of reality under a blanket of plot.
The novel form also adroitly reflects the ambiguity of chance’s representation 
in literature, as it necessarily represents a deterministic universe: its events are ordered, 
pre-determined, written by the author. Yet if the novel is to fufill its mimetic function 
then moments, realisations, coincidences and events, all must come to the reader as 
unexpectedly as they do in life. The possibility of the author ceding his or her god-like
i Kavauagh, Eii/ig/i/emen/ and/he Shadowsof Chance, xi.
3 Ibid., 118.
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control admits that perhaps events could become dictated by something else: if not 
chance itself, then perhaps something analogous to chance. The appearance of chance in 
the novel is thus aligned with spontaneity and modernity, and, in its refusal to accept 
cause and effect as the teleological explication of plot, inscrutability. As Sartre points 
out:
A work is never beautiful unless it in some way escapes its 
author. If he paints himself without planning to, if his 
characters escape his control and impose their whims upon 
him, if the words maintain a certain independence under his 
pen, then he does his best work.6
In Nausea, Sartre's protaganist Roquentin also displays some writerly anxiety over this 
ambiguity: ‘we forget the future was not there yet, that the guy was walking in a night 
without signs which offered him monotonous riches in a jumble and that he made no 
choices’. 7 Rather, he argues, we read in bad faith if the character is stripped of a 
genuinely temporal existence: ‘it all began with the end. It’s there, invisible and present, 
giving these words all the pomp and value of a beginning’.8 Throughout his literary 
career, Samuel Beckett showed an alertness to this narratological tension, and a desire 
to explore the possibilities for expressing it. In Watt, my main case study, which I shall 
come to later in the chapter, he highlights the idea of chance as a self-consciously 
mechanical cog in the narrative wheel: Mr Hackett suspects that Watt finds the thought 
of leaving the city as painful as the thought of remaining in it, and that therefore he has 
left the decision to chance, or, as Beckett puts it, to ‘the frigid machinery o f the time- 
space relation’.9 Of course, the frigid machinery here is actually a living, breathing 
Beckett, but this overt acknowledgement of the mechanistic and inhuman nature of 
causality ironically subverts the reader’s suspension of disbelief, and simultaneously 
represents that which it is drawing attention to as unrepresentable: it adds a note o f real, 
if logically impossible, freedom.
6 Jean-Paul Sartre, "Situation of the Writer in 1947," in What Is Litema/re? {\a)\\{\ow. Metluien, 1950), 154.
7 Jean-Paul Sartre, Nomra, traits. R o I x t i  BaJdick (London: Penguin, 1965), 62.
8 Ibid.
9 Samuel Beekett, Wan (London: John Calder, 1976), 4 3 -4 .
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Existentialism and Chance: the Idea of the Possible.
The mathematically informed, statistical idea of chance, as we saw in the first 
chapter, had changed the way that chance and the random were thought of. The idea 
that the future was entirely uncertain, and that predictable events only existed in terms 
of very large numbers -  for instance, that in a population of twenty million, three 
hundred thousand people a year would commit a crime, so, one could say, that that 
percentage of the population might have a propensity to crime -  was now 
commonplace. The Leibnizian idea that it was possible to ‘incline without 
necessitating’ had been accorded new weight by the bankrupting of absolutely 
deterministic ideas by the developments in Quantum Mechanics in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Similarly the mathematical arm of probability theory, the study of statistics, was 
prevalent. In 1927, L. J. C. Tippet compiled a huge and hugely influential table of 
completely randomised numbers that were taken from parish registers’ dates of birth 
and death for Biometrika, the journal run by Karl Pearson.10 Some historians argue that 
there was no ‘pure’ theory of mathematical probability until 1933,11 and Bennett12 
attributes an radical, groundbreaking significance to the mathematician Richard von 
Mises, who, in 1928, wrote a book developing a theory of probability based on random 
selection which argued that where there is no predictability at all in the longest run, 
there is absolutely no rule that might help one devise a system. This method of long-run 
frequency, or random sequencing, was controversial, as it opened up the remarkable 
possibility that a sequence of random events could conform to no statistical rule 
whatsoever.
10 L.J.C. Tip|)eL, Random Sampling NnmfteniLondon: Cambridge University Press, 1927).
11 Cigerenzer et al.. The Empire of Chance: How Probability Changed Science and Everyday UJe.
12 Delx)rah Bennett, Randomnexs(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 2 0 ,2 9 -3 0 .
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These ideas were taking hold in the period between the end of the modernist 
period and the end of the Second World War, and, coupled with the instability induced 
by the war itself, contributed to the ‘mess’ at the scientific and intellectual fringes of the 
culture, that Green, Beckett and Sartre, had, in different ways, all identified as the 
primary state of modernity. Culturally, too, as we have seen, the idea of randomness 
was breaking free o f its previous incarnations as significance-bearing coincidence,13 
Fortuna, or destiny, and was assuming the unsettling mantle and modus operandi of 
true uncertainty. The Dadaist and Surrealist experiments had introduced the idea of 
chance as a formal principle in art, and though the sense o f these experiments as 
artistically vandalistic was always present, they, along with Mallarme's groundbreaking 
poem Un Coup de Des, had sown the seeds of possibility for the literary avant-garde to 
make their forms reflect the realities of chance in new and revolutionary ways.
The existentialists were influenced by these ideas about randomness and 
chance, both scientific/mathematic and cultural: Albert Camus, in ‘Absurd W alls’ in 
The Myth o f Sisyphus, could now say ‘no code of ethics and no effort are justifiable a 
priori in the face of the cruel mathematics that command our condition’.14 And Sartre, in 
‘Determinism and Freedom ’, defines probability, or ‘statistical prediction’, as ‘the result 
of a reasonable calculation about a pattern of behaviour’.15 His definition of possibility 
emphasises the importance of pure chance, as it ‘knows no conjuncture, that is, no 
connection with antecedent causes’ (Sartre's emphasis throughout). He goes on to say 
‘pure future is neither knowable not predictable...which nothing has laid the 
groundwork for and nothing helps to bring about... makes it a future to be created.’ The 
subsequent existentialist concentration on action, then, is dependent on a world that is 
subject to the fluctuations of chance. The largely existentialist conception of
13 Coincidence is, of course, merely randomness that has I teen brought to our attention, or chance made narrative, 
but as mentioned, its utilisation as a narrative device normally heralds a hidden significance, and always, once it 
ap|tears, inevitably Itecomes subsumed as ‘plot’.
11 Albert Camus, The Myth o f Sisyphus, traits. Justin O'Brien (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1955), 21.
K' ‘Determinism and Freedom’ in Jcan-Paul Sartre, The Writings o f Jean-Tan! Sartre, ed. Michel Contat; Michel
Rybalka, traits. Richard McLeary, vol. 2 (Lvansion: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 245.
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contingency, furthermore, attacked the very notion of causality, as Sartre has Roquentin 
muse: ‘It is out of laziness, I suppose, that the world looks the same day after day...and 
in that case anything, anything could happen’16; indeed, those people who believe in the 
‘proof’ they are given that ‘everything is done mechanically, that the world obeys fixed, 
unchangeable laws’ are castigated as ‘idiots’.17 Sartre, in his Notebook fo r  an Ethics, 
writes that ‘Every human undertaking succeeds by chance and at the same time through 
human initiative....In a word, possibles get realised in terms o f probability. Freedom 
lives in the sphere of the probable, between total ignorance and certitude.’18 This 
emphasis newly associates possibility, or freedom, with probability theory.19 Chance is 
no longer ‘tam ed’ by probability, in the existentialists' understanding of it, but instead 
given its fullest possible rein.
This acute sensitivity to the possible was wide spread in the thought and 
literature of the immediate post-war period. One of Sartre's favoured definitions for the 
possible was that it represents ‘an option on being’; in other words life itself is, or has 
become, profoundly contingent.20 This idea also adds ambiguity to the distinction 
between chance and the existentialist emphasis on choice. If you are able to choose, and 
act according to your will, then you are free, and you therefore exist in a random 
universe where chance operates. The existentialist absurd is merely the revelation of
16 Sartre, Nausea. 114.
17 Ibid., 225. Sartre's fictionalised attack on casualitv here is anticipated by a speech given in 1931 to the school in 
Le Havre where he had been a teacher (presumably to a crowd of increasingly saucer-eyed children): ‘You know that 
each instant depends narrowly on those which have preceded it, that any given state of the universe is absolutely 
explained by its anterior states; that there is nothing which is lost, nothing which is in vain; and that the present goes 
strictly towards the future. You know this Ix:cause you have been taught it. But if you look within yourself, around 
yourself, you do not in the slightest feel it. You see movements arising which, like the sudden stirring of a treetop, 
seem spontaneous. You see others which, like waves on sand, are dying out, and in their dying seem to lose their 
vital force. It seems to you that the past is bound very loosely to the present, and that everything gets old in an 
aimless, sloppy, groping way.’ Quoted in Bernard Merkel, The Concept ofFreedom and (he Development ofSartre's 
Early Political Thought {New York: Carland, 1987), 45.
18 Jean-Paul Sartre, Notebooks for an Ethics, traits. David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 
335.
19 Ha/el Barnes, The IJtenitnre of Possibility: A Study in Humanistic Existentialism. Barnes takes her title from the 
central tenet of the Iralian existentialist Nicola Abbagnano, who argued that (xissibility is central to any conception 
of freedom, and that the jxipular formulation of one Ixang ‘condemned to freedom’ was thus disingenuous. ‘Like 
uncertainly, ||X)ssibilityl simply means that something is not yet decided, that the future is o|x;n...logically it 
demands a background o f inijxissibility’ (365).
20 Jean-Paul Smug, Being and Nothingness, trails. Hazel H. Barnes (London: Rouilcdgc, 2002), 99.
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this fact -  the revelation that possibility, and therefore chance, is infinite. McBride calls 
the existentialist understanding of possibility ‘existence turned towards the future’.21 
That the future is as yet unwritten, and entirely uncertain, is an obvious corollary to this. 
Subsequently, the existentialist’s figuration of chance is as a premise and not a 
consequence of the absurd, a necessary tenet of our existence as self-creating beings. 
Chance, for the existentialist novelists, is the opposite of what we saw in pre­
seventeenth century culture. It is no longer a negative, or a lack, but rather it is 
possibility in its widest sense: what could happen.
However, Sartre’s definition, ‘option on being’, provides us with another layer 
to the reading of the idea of possibility as a discussion of chance recast for a specific 
time: the idea, grimly well suited to the immediately post-war period, that life itself is 
profoundly contingent. As Roquentin says in Nausea: ‘the essential thing is 
contingency. I mean that, by definition, existence is not necessity. To exist is simply to 
be there', what exists appears, lets itself be encountered, but you can never deduce it.’22 
If existence is not necessity, and therefore not necessary, then our whole being is based 
on chance, an awareness of which brings with it the spectre of non-being: ‘For the 
future dimension is ignorance, risk, uncertainty, a wager. If each human being is a risk, 
humanity as a whole is a risk. The risk of no longer existing, the risk of indefinitely 
stagnating in one aspect of its history’.23 The bleakness of this vision for the individual 
is emphasised in Nausea: ‘Every existent is bom without reason, prolongs itself out o f 
weakness and dies by chance’.24 Sartre's disquiet at the centrality of non-being to being 
is apparent when he contends ‘that the world is suspended in not-being as the real is 
suspended in the heart o f possibilities’.25 Possibility for Sartre, therefore, is an almost 
physically conceived space, analogous to not-being, ‘a sort of geometrical place for
21 William McBride, ed., Sartre and Existentialism: The Development and Meaning of Twentieth Century' 
Existentialism (New York: Garland, 1977), 92.
22 Same, Nausea, 188.
n  Sarire, Ethics-, 467.
2 * Sarrre, Nausea, 191.
i ‘> Sarire, Being and Nothingness-, 19.
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unfulfilled projects, all inexact representations, all vanished beings or those of which 
the idea is only a fiction’. 26 This sense of possibility casts it not in the future realm of 
what could have happened, but in the present realm of what might have happened, and 
brings with it an elegiac sense o f loss for vanished possible lives.
Early Beckett: Proust, Murphy and the Decline of Cause and Effect.
Hans Arp, who was Beckett’s co-signatory in 1932 to an aesthetic credo called 
‘Poetry is Vertical’, which appeared in issue 21 of transition, was a poetic advocate of 
chance, along with his fellow Dadaists. In the manifesto was included this extraordinary 
passage:
Chance opened up perceptions to me, immediate spiritual 
insights. Intuition led me to revere chance as the highest and 
deepest of laws, the law that rises from the fundament. An 
insignificant word might become a deadly thunderbolt. One 
little sound might destroy the earth. One little sound might 
create a new universe.27
There are a number of striking aspects to this: firstly, the significance accorded to 
chance in philosophical terms; secondly, his insistence on the connection between 
chance and ‘intuition’ and ‘spiritual insights’; and finally, the markedly physical 
association o f chance with the real world. It is no longer an instrument of the gods or a 
tool of augury, but, rather, has real physical presence; it can induce a ‘thunderbolt’, 
‘destroy the earth’ or ‘create a new universe’. Importantly, A rp’s sense of chance as a 
catalyst for radically lopsided effects is also indicative of a new way of looking at cause 
and effect, and one that had not yet become common parlance in mathematics,
26 Ibid.
27 Quoted in Susan Bricnza and Enoch Brater, "Chance and Choice in Beckett's Ije-s.sne.u," E/JJ43 , no. 2 (1976): 
246. Briony her, in her book on abstract art in the twentieth century, descriltes Arp’s commitment to the aleatorical 
expression o f form in his own work: ‘His formal language... (consists of| a set of curved, amorphous and apparently 
random forms -  configurations which are contrasted with the geometric, the grid, and the straight line.’ He 
Itelonged, along with his friend Blossfcldt, to rhe group and journal Ahstmctioti-Cmiiion from 1 932 -36 , which her 
descriltes as the mouthpiece for those avant-garde artists who were in part in opjxrsition to Surrealism. See Briony 
her, Onylhstma Art (New Haven, CT: Yale U niversity Press, 1977), 5611'.
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foreshadowing as it does the idea of the butterfly effect in modern chaos theory28 (‘One 
little sound might destroy the earth’). In 1932 Newtonian determinism and causal 
explanations for events were becoming scientifically unfashionable, and were being 
replaced gradually, as we have seen, by an increasingly statistical approach to 
prediction and a quantum approach to explanation.29 Parallel to this was the 
acknowledgement o f random phenomena, or uncaused events, necessary for the science 
of probability, demonstrated by the growth of probability and statistical theory. So 
although A rp’s invocation of something close to the butterfly effect has no established 
scientific parallels in 1932, it poetically suggests an idea (in this case a cause inducing a 
wildly disproportionate and random effect), which, later in the century, will become 
common mathematical and scientific parlance. The sense of randomness as terrifyingly 
absolute, then, if merely among the avant-garde, seemed to be gaining currency.
Beckett shared with Arp a longstanding disquiet about the Newtonian world of 
cause and effect which was reflected throughout his writing career, and which mirrored 
these scientific and cultural shifts. Although Beckett denied vehemently any specific 
alliance to any philosophical movement, idea or practitioner,30 he nevertheless
28 See James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (London: Heinemann, 1988).
29 What was being replaced can be described as the general scientific dogma, stretching back to Aristotle, that each 
event will generate predictable effects, and that each effect will have a related cause, even if hidden. Hume makes an 
interesting point that ‘Every effect presupposes a cause; effect being a relative term, of which cause is the 
correlative. But this does not prove that every being must be preceded by a cause; no more than it follows, because 
every husband have a wife, that therefore every man must be married’. Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, 128. 
■^Indeed Beckett went as far to disavow the existentialist theories of being, in an interview with Tom Driver: ‘When
Heidegger and Sartre speak o f a contrast between being and existence, they may lie right, I don’t know, but their 
language is too philosophical for me. I am not a philosopher’ Driver, "Beckett by the Madeleine," 22. Edith Kern 
makes a useful summary of critical linkages made lie tween Beckett and philosophy: she argues that he defies 
philosophical pigeonholing, yet his work alxnind with references, if mocking ones. Descartes was the protagonist of 
‘Whoroscope’, Geulincx is mentioned in Murphy and The End. Jacqueline Hoefer has argued that Watt is an 
engagement with the premises o f logical positivism and Wittgenstein, and In 1962 Milton Rickcls identified overtly 
existential themes in The llnnatnahle. Kern linds common ground Ixuwecn Beckett and Sartre in the concept of the 
Self and the Sartrcan /xour-soi, and Michael Collins also relates Waiting For Godot to Existentialism. Erie P. Levy 
argies that /J/«//or represents a rejection of the Sartrcan notion of freedom. Kern jxtints out the uncomfortable fact 
that in Beckett’s denial of allegiance to philosophy there is something profoundly Kierkegaardian, in that 
Kierkegaard railed frequendy against the idea of philosophical system, and argued instead that one must merely 
represent true, lived experience. See Eric P. Levy, "Living without a Life: The Disintegration of the Christian 
Humanist Synthesis in Molloy," Studies in the Novel 33, no. 1 (2001). Edith Kern, Existential Thought and 
Fictional Technit/ue: Kierkegaard, Sartre, Beckett (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 1970), 167.
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anticipated the later Sartrean attack on the notion of cause and effect31 by frequently 
arguing against the domination of narrative by, as he saw it, overly simplistic causal 
explanations for behaviour and events, as well as, I would argue, attacking its dominion 
in the novel in general by downplaying its function in the machinery o f his fiction.32 In 
his first published work, the monograph Proust (1931), he says ‘[Proust| is almost 
exempt from the impurity of will. He deplores his lack of will until he understands that 
will, being utilitarian, and a servant of intelligence and habit, is not a condition of the 
artistic experience. When the subject is exempt from will the object is exempt from 
causality (Time and Space taken together)33...A s a writer he is not altogether at liberty 
to detach effect from cause’.34 Further, he argued that despair35 in life was due in no 
small part to unpredictability, the only (ironically enough) reliable constant. This sense 
of despair in the face of possibility will become increasingly predominant, anticipating 
as it does Beckett’s characters Murphy, Watt, and Molloy, all of whom sit passively and 
painfully by while life doles out indignity after indignity.
Murphy
Before I come to the period where my real interest lies, I would like to see how 
Beckett dealt with chance earlier in his novelistic career, by a brief examination of 
Murphy (1938), which deals with the idea of causality and chance thematically. Murphy
31 The argument against this development 1 have attributed to Kavanagh, but it is also a widely held view of the 
nineteenth-century novel, the type that Beckett would be self-consciously kicking against, that it concentrates on 
explanatory, psychological motivations.
32 Richardson also argues this, but for Molloy. Richardson argues that by deferring the causal connections, Beckett 
leaves us with a ‘mere collocation of fragmentary episodes’ (Brian Richardson, "Causality in Molloy: Philosophic 
Hieiiie, Narrative Transgression, and Metalictional Paradox," Style 26, no. 1 (1992): 71.)
33 Samuel Beckett, Promt (London: Chatto & Windus, 1931), 69.
34 Ibid., 1.
'*■' The association between jxtssibility and despair is clarified by Sartre in the short, explanatory Ixmk Existentialism 
and llnmanism: ‘As for “‘despair,” the meaning of this expression is very simple. It merely means that we limit 
ourselves to a reliance upon that which is within our wills, or within the sum of probabilities which render our 
actions feasible. Whenever one wills anything, there are always these elements of probability. If I am counting on a 
visit from a friend, who may be coming by train or by tram, I presup|x>se that the train will arrive at the ap|X)inted 
rime, or that the tram will not l)e derailed. I remain in the realm of jxissibilities’ (Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism & 
Humanism, trails. Philip Mairct (London: Methuen, 1980), 39.)
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himself is obsessed with ideas of freedom, and Beckett plays with ideas of chance and
freedom on both a thematic and structural level. The plot turns on accident and chance
encounters, and the word ‘coincidence’ is charged with a mocking tone throughout.
Chapter Three opens with ’a striking coincidence’: that the moon, ‘full and at perigee,
was 29,000 miles nearer the earth than it had been for four years.’36 Later, by another
‘striking coincidence’, the moon is again at the same location, only this time it is
‘bathed...in an ironical radiance’.37 As the narrative develops, Murphy becomes ‘the
contingent, as he him self would say, of a contingent’.38 Murphy is a lackadaisical
waster, with a circuitous mind bent on paradox and puns, and his fixation on the
dialectic between complete freedom and absolute idle inaction is manifested in his
favourite past-time: rocking back and forth as quietly as possible, in the half-light,
naked, bound by the feet and hands to his rocking chair, which he positions so that he is
staring at the wall. The story pivots on a number of missed chances: M urphy’s lover,
and love, the prostitute Celia, thinks he has left her; by chance, he comes back five
minutes after she has given up and left him for good. The text is filled with M urphy’s
intellectual digressions while his life disintegrates around him. He has a revelation of
sorts, while describing the five different biscuits that make up his lunch every day, ‘a
Ginger, an Osborne, a Digestive, a Petit Beurre and one anonymous’. He much prefers
the Ginger biscuit, and so usually eats that first, and he despises the uncertainty of the
anonymous, so eats it last. One day it hits him:
On his knees now before the five it struck him for the first 
time that these prepossessions reduced to a paltry six the 
number of ways he could make this meal. But this was to 
violate the very essence of assortment, this was red 
permanganate on the Rima of variety. Even if he conquered 
his prejudice against the anonymous, still there could only be 
twenty-four ways in which the biscuits could be eaten. But 
were he to overcome his infatuation with the ginger, then the 
assortment would spring to life before him, dancing the
36 Samuel Beckett, Murphy (London: John Colder, 3993), 19.
37 Ibid., 70.
38 Ibid., 121.
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radiant measure of its total permutability, edible in a hundred 
and twenty ways!39
The importance of possibility is demonstrated here by Murphy’s stubborn avowal of it 
over any conception of taste or habit. What he must ‘overcome’ is his choice, his 
preference: the fact that he actually likes ginger biscuits the most. Get that out of the 
way, and the joys o f possibility open up to him, even though he will find himself eating 
biscuits he doesn’t much care for. It is, it seems, a good in itself to have expanded your 
possibilities, ‘dancing the radiant measure of its total permutability’, even if these very 
possibilities in reality lessen your enjoyment of life. This is a lightly limned indication 
o f the fascination and neurosis surrounding the notion of possibility that will be a much 
more insistent, dominating presence in Watt.
Murphy's lopsided aetiology has become refined into farce by the end of the 
novel. Murphy dies as a result of an unlikely chain of events: as the coroner comments, 
one feels sardonically, it is ‘a classic case of misadventure’. Before his death he had 
found happiness, of a sort, whilst working in a home for the mentally retarded (the 
Magdalen Mental Mercyseat, or MMM). The minutely ordered life o f the patients 
seems to provide Murphy with a feeling close to happiness; we are reminded of the 
times he spent bound to his rocking chair, and it becomes clear that it is perhaps only 
under constraint, or constraints, that he feels a genuine freedom. Someone in the home 
accidentally pulls a chain in the bathroom, which sets off the complicated system for the 
delivery o f gas to M urphy’s bedroom that he had insisted on, and his lit candle 
eventually ignites the escaped gas. Murphy’s chosen past time, that which made him 
feel free -  rocking in his chair while bound -  means he cannot escape the ensuing fire.
In Deborah J. Bennett’s 1998 book, Randomness, she comments on Hume:
In his 1739 work A Treatise of Human Nature, the Scottish 
philosopher David Hume discusses chance from a different
V) Ibid., 37. This mathematically informed delil)eration anticipates Molloy’s calculations of his number of farts 
(‘extraordinary how mathematics helps you to know yourself), and the famous 16 sucking stones in the four pockets 
of his greatcoat, both from Molloy. (Samuel Beekett, Molloy, Malone Dies-, The Unnuinable (London: John Calder, 
1994), 3 0 ,6 9 .)
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perspective: its effect on the mind. He said that chance leaves 
the mind ‘in its naive situation of indifference’. That is, a set 
of equally likely outcomes produces a mental state of 
indifference among alternatives, and there is no reason to 
prefer one outcome over another. The belief that chance 
represents either insufficient knowledge or indifference is 
sometimes referred to as the subjective definition of 
randomness.40
This idea of passivity in the face of contingent events, I would contend, is important in 
Murphy on several levels. Firstly, the form of the novel and the narrative voice in 
particular pretend to eschew an overweening, heavily plotted tale: the first line of the 
book, ‘the sun shone, having no alternative, on the nothing new’ gives us no indication 
of why this day, rather than any other, is being reported.41 Or, similarly to the last line in 
First Love: ‘But there it is. Either you love or you don’t’. 42 In both texts, Beckett affects 
an indifference incapable of narrative judgment. It is this artificial rendering of a blank 
reporting of that which is in front of him that reminds us of Beckett’s experimentalism; 
it is a radical stance; and that reinforces his distaste for causality. Its perceived 
inadequacy as an explanatory force in the traditional novel was something he 
determined he would get around, even if his avoidance of it at this point in his career 
meant nothing more than the drawing of the reader’s attention to the writerly 
mechanism ('the frigid machinery of the time-space relation’ 43 which is actually a very 
much alive Beckett). In fact, causation in Murphy, in a strikingly Stemean manner, 
almost seems to work backwards. As in Tristram Shandy, every cause seems to need an 
effect, with the story o f how one became the other always dutifully, if ironically, 
explained later.
"“ Bennett, Randomness, 154. This is different to the view, which 1 share with Reith, Kavanagh, and Hacking, and 
that 1 argued Cor in Chapter 1, where chance is not given full status but instead [terceived as an ontological lack. 
Before the explosion of probability theory in the seventeenth century, references to chance had Ixxome 
interehangeablc with those to ignorance, and it was widely understood that if something hapjtened by ‘chance’, it 
was merely an event whose cause or the machinery that brought it into being had not yet Iteen revealed to us. Bennett 
elides this Humeian ‘indifference’ with this idea of insullicient knowledge, a blurring I would not endorse merely on 
the grounds she gives, i.e. their shared ‘subjectivity’.
11 Beckett, Mnrphy, 5.
12 Samuel Beckett, "First Love," in First Lone andOther Novellas (London: Penguin, 2000).
1:1 Beckett, Watt, 4 2 -4 .
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The second significance of passivity is that, for Murphy, it is perhaps the state 
closest to, or at any rate most analogous to, freedom. In a world where chance is felt to 
rule, and traditional ideas of cause and effect have been shown to be disingenuous, an 
affected indifference to events seems to be a new and radical mode of existence, and 
subsistence, for Beckett’s characters. This reading is corroborated by M urphy’s 
revelation of a condition where the absolutely random rules: the dark is equated with a 
‘w illessness’ and freedom, a ‘perpetual coming together and falling asunder of form s’.44 
As a corollary to this, it seems that absolute freedom necessarily limits individual 
freedom, as individuality is meaningless, as the narrator comments: ‘Here he was not 
free, but a mote in the dark of absolute freedom.’ Similarly, the patients at MMM with 
their ‘indifference to the contingencies of the contingent world’ perhaps understand 
how to deal with the ‘m ess’ that is modernity better than the characters.45 I think that 
this ability of the patients -  or inmates -  in particular is more than the fairly 
commonplace inversion and interrogation of the normal societal categories of sane and 
insane: the cliched realisation that it is the mad who are truly sane. Rather, this is a clear 
association between contingency and happiness: the ‘self-immersed indifference to the 
contingencies of the contingent world which he had chosen for himself as the only 
felicity and achieved so seldom ’:46 it is, perhaps, the mad who are most aware of their 
unimportance and therefore the most likely to be truly happy. Indifference, or passivity, 
to the randomness around us is thus key if we are to achieve this tantalising ‘only 
felicity’.47
14 Beckett, Murphy, 65.
15 Ibid., 96.
10 Ibid.
17 This association of a rapprochement with contingency as a path to happiness is a tantalisingly early example of
contingency and chance as an ethical ‘Good’: an association that, J go on to argue, Ixeomcs systematic in the work of
Iris Murdoch.
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Watt and the ‘Possibilities of Choice’
k
Watt was written fry 1945 but published in 1953, when Beckett was already
famous for Waiting fo r  Godot and for the first two books of what later came to be
known as the Trilogy: M olloy and Malone Dies (The Unnatriable, the final book of the
Trilogy, was also published in 1953). He commented nonchalantly a little later: ‘it was
written as it came, without pre-established plan,’48 a comment, that, in itself, might
impress upon us his identification with or view of the artistic importance of chance and
his artistic rejection of an overarching authorial presence. David Hesla argues that Watt
as a whole can be related to this first impulse -  to give voice to, but, crucially, not shape
to, the mess and confusion that we find around us.49 In the course of an interview with
Tom Driver, Beckett stated:
the confusion is not my invention. We cannot listen to a 
conversation for five minutes without being acutely aware of 
the confusion. It is all around us and our only chance now is 
to let it in. The only chance of renovation is to open our eyes 
and see the mess. It is not a mess you can make sense 
of....One can only speak of what is in front of him, and that 
now is simply the mess.50
And later in the same interview:
What I am saying does not mean that there will henceforth be 
no form in art. It only means that there will be new form, and 
that this form will be of such a type that it admits the chaos 
and does not try to say that the chaos is really something else. 
The form and the chaos remain separate. The latter is not 
reduced to the former. That is why the form itself becomes a 
preoccupation, because it exists as a problem separate from 
the material it accommodates. To find a form that 
accommodates the mess, that is the task of the artist now.51
48 Leiter to Gottfried Buttner Dec 4, 1978, Quoted in Gottfried Buttner, Samuel Beckett's Novel Watt 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), ix.
w David Hesla, "The Shape of Chaos: A Reading of Beckett’s Watt," Critique, no. 6 (1963).
50 Driver, "Beckett by the Madeleine," 22.
51 Ibid.: 23. Interestingly, this quote will later become a talisman of the chance-obsessed strand o f the British avant- 
garde of the 50s and 60s that idolised Beckett. B. S. Johnson rejteated this quote often and let it inspire his paean to 
randomness of form, die 1969 ‘novel in a Ixix' The Unfortunates. See Jonathan Goe, Like a Tien,' Elephant: The B. 
S. JohnsonStor\' (London: Picador, 2004). I deal with this link in more detail in Chapter Three
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Beckett’s increasing disquiet about the notion of the ‘form itself’ is self-evident on 
reading Watt, which consciously seeks to counter the ‘domination of chance by 
narrative’ that, as discussed, can be said to constitute no small part of the novelistic 
form throughout its history.52 It is this primacy of Beckett’s formal experimentation 
with novelistic causality that I take to be at the heart of the novel, and which forms the 
basis of my reading of Watt.
Watt extends and deepens the themes that had appeared in Murphy. Watt, the 
protagonist of Watt, is further removed from reality than Murphy. They share a 
solipsistic, essentially inactive view of the world, but this impulse, leavened by wit in 
Murphy, is exposed as a kind of nihilism in Watt. We meet W att on his way to the 
house o f a Mr Knott, whose servant he is to become. Various misunderstandings and 
exploitations of him occur, largely to his bafflement. We are told he moves with an 
awkward gait, unable to bend at the knees, and we see him rolling into ditches, dressed 
shabbily, ejected from a train through no fault of his own, and pelted with stones by a 
furious aristocrat. We get the sense of someone to whom things happen as misadventure 
and bad luck, and for whom events have obscure and murky causes. He offers himself 
up to work at the house without telling the reader why he is asked to or would want to, 
and does what he is told unquestioningly. Other than the plot’s basic refusal to 
interrogate reasons for characters’ choices or those for the inscrutable, ‘imprevisible’ 
happenings in the novel,53 we can see a similar preoccupation with ideas of chance and 
possibility on both a narrative and a linguistic level. A chance event is ‘a trifle and in all 
probability tractable obstruction’ -  that is, if it exists at all: ‘as chance would have it, or 
some other agency.’ The possibility of ‘some other agency’, though, is playfully 
dismissed: ‘But that little was enough, for Watt the possibility was enough, that
r’2 ‘ITlhc novel came to identify itself will) an ability to evoke, yet limit, chance’s jtower to disrupt narratives of 
mastery and reason’ Kavanagh, En/ig/nement and die Shadom o f Chance, ix.
',-J A favourite Beekettian word, impremible is Spanish for unpredictable.
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something other than he, in this box, was not intrinsic to its lim its’. 54 Uncertainty, in 
fact, is the primary mode of W att’s existence: ‘his progress, though painful, and 
uncertain, was less painful, less uncertain, than he had apprehended, when he set 
out...all he desired was to have his uncertainty rem oved’. 55 Furthermore, much of the 
novel is taken up with long lists of possible happenings, or ‘demented pondering’, to 
borrow a phrase from Alvarez’s incisive anti-Watt critique56. The narrative, seemingly 
never-endingly, runs through every scenario that may form the outcome of any, usually 
banal, day-to-day event in W att’s life. After these lists of the mathematically figured, 
minutely altered calculations, which resemble the workings out of an equation, all we 
are left with is usually a bathetic, inconclusive result: ‘it seems probable she was not’.57
The prose itself in these cases can be seen to represent an understanding of the 
world as specifically contingent, and at every turn expresses a fraught relationship 
between this arbitrary, unpredictable reality and the confines of narrative. If every 
possible outcome is listed, then perhaps chance will be extinguished; or, in other words, 
perhaps the unpredictable will be predicted. The language is uncertain, digressive, and 
attempts to cover every possibility: ‘the possibility, if not the probability, is not 
excluded of our finding two or less than two or even more than two men or women or 
men and women as little bony and so on as fat and so forth eternally turning’.58 Beckett 
is unwilling to allow his prose to take the easy route of providing ‘the illusion of 
fix ity’,59 of stating that something is a particular way because something else made it 
so, and in this unwillingness we can see an implicit critique of the easy lies upon which 
fiction so often relies. Fixity is an illusion, and yet narrative ‘fixes’ reality. There should 
be no conclusions to be drawn about life, Watt insists, because all is uncertain, and all is
54 Beckett, Wan, 196.
“ Ibid., 2 3 4 ,2 5 .
56 A1 Alvarez,Beckett, ed. Frank Kermodc, Foma no Modern Mas ters Series (London: Fontana, 1973), 45.
57 Beckett, Wan, 138.
58 Ibid., 60.
59 Ibid., 222.
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up for grabs. It is these anxieties that I would like to suggest are encoded in the very
sentence structure of the novel.
But Tom’s two years on the first-floor are not because of 
Dick’s two years on the ground-floor, or of Harry’s coming 
then, and Dick’s two years on the ground floor are not 
because o f  Tom’s two years on the first floor, or of Harry’s 
coming then, and Harry’s coming then is not because of 
Tom’s two years on the first-floor, or of Dick’s two years on 
the ground-floor, and Dick’s ten years on the first-floor are 
not because of Harry’s ten years on the ground-floor, or of 
the other’s coming then, and Harry’s ten years on the ground- 
floor are not because of Dick’s ten years on the first-floor, or 
of the other’s coming then, and the other’s coming then is not 
because of (tired of underlining this cursed preposition)
Dick’s ten years on the first-floor, or of Harry’s ten years on 
the ground-floor, no, that would be too horrible to 
contemplate, but Tom’s two years on the first-floor, and 
Dick’s two years on the ground-floor, and Harry’s coming 
then, and Dick’s ten years on the first-floor, and Harry’s ten 
years on the ground-floor, and the other’s coming then, are 
because Tom is Tom, and Dick Dick, and Harry Harry, and 
that other that other, of that the wretched Watt was 
persuaded.60
The ‘cursed preposition’ he is tired of underlining, the fact that one event is not 
‘because o f  another, is once again a refutation of the efficacy of cause and effect in the 
novel, and, indeed, a similarly damning refutation of causal explanations for the 
linkages between events in real life. So, are we supposed to accept that each action and 
event is unrelated, and yet is accorded identical narrative weight, worthy of equal and 
passive reportage? Things are as they are, we are told, simply because ‘Tom is Tom, 
and Dick Dick, and Harry Harry’. So will individuals always reject a rigid 
psychological or causal determinism, one that would seek to explain away their actions? 
And if things exist as they are because ‘Tom is Tom’, does that not imply that Tom is 
determined through his nature to act as he does, thus ambiguously embracing that very 
determinism?
These sorts of inconclusive formulations, typical of the novel, are distinguished 
by a prose that stumbles and retraces its steps at every turn. It goes round and round a
“ Ibid., 132.
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subject with miniscule alterations, until every possibility, even of linguistic or semantic
difference, has been stymied. Alvarez has noted:
There are 250 pages of this pausing, devious, repetitive 
withdrawal from statement, 250 pages of qualification after 
qualification, a hesitant, slightly hiccupping timidity 
masquerading as precision....It is like a squirrel running 
around his treadmill: an enormous expenditure of prose in 
order to say more or less nothing and go more or less 
nowhere; an expense of spirit in a waste of mannerism.61
The idea that the autistic precision of W att’s perception of possibility is in fact
‘tim idity’ is, I think, correct. As Richardson has said of Moran from Molloy:
He is a willing component of that well-ordered system that is 
an integral part of a larger (though ultimately irrational) 
totality. When narrating, he displays an almost neurotic 
obsession with probabilistic thinking and causal explanation 
as he seeks to fit every element into a cohesive teleological 
order in which each cause unproblematically produces its 
intended and appropriate effect.62
The failure of cause and effect to gel so ‘unproblematically’ is thus what produces this
uneasy, and we might say, autistic (Alvarez calls it ‘psychotic’) obsession with
cataloguing and categorising reality:
The only other object of note in Erskine’s room was a 
picture, hanging on the wall, from a nail. A circle, obviously 
described by a compass, and broken at its lowest point, 
occupied the middle foreground, of this picture....Watt 
wondered how long it would be before the point and the 
circle entered together upon the same plane. Or had they not 
done so already, or almost? And was it not rather the circle 
that was in the background, and the point that was in the 
foreground? Watt wondered if they had sighted each other, or 
were blindly flying thus, harried by some force of 
mechanical mutual attraction, or the playthings of chance. He 
wondered if they would eventually pause and converse, and 
perhaps even mingle, or keep steadfast on their ways, like 
ships in the night, prior to the invention of wireless 
telegraphy. Who knows, they might even collide. And he 
wondered what the artist had intended to represent (Watt 
knew nothing about painting), a circle and its centre in search 
of each other, or a circle and its centre in search of a centre 
and a circle respectively, or a circle and its centre in search of 
its centre and a circle respectively, or a circle and its centre in 
search of a centre and its circle respectively.63
61 Alvarez, Beckett, 43.
62 Richardson, "Causality in Molloy: Philosophic Theme, Narrative Transgression, and Metaliciional Paradox," 67.
63 Beckett, Watt, 126.
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And so on. The frequent, yet always funny, application of Beckett’s bathetic wit here 
( ‘prior to the invention of wireless telepathy’) is perhaps the reader’s reward for 
trudging through these lists, which appear on every page of the novel, as is the presence 
of beautifully arresting images such as: ‘blindly flying thus, harried by some force of 
mutual attraction, or the playthings of chance’. The personification of the circle and the 
point thus sees them figured as an allegory of m an’s position in relation to forces 
beyond our understanding. Their blindness to the root causes o f their situation remains 
the same whether they are blind to some force of ‘mechanical mutual attraction’ or to 
the fact that their relationship to chance mirrors that of a fly to a wanton boy. We all, 
Beckett seems to imply, are similarly blind to the causes of our situation, and the 
ensuing pathos is both deeply felt and ironic.
W att’s neuroses, and the style of the prose that reflects them, are both
reminiscent of the desire that Richardson identifies in Moran in Molloy -  ‘there is a
frantic urge to eliminate the random and deprecate the inexplicable.’64 Alvarez notes the
same impulse in Watt:
He reacts to the mild occasions of his life like someone 
whose inner world is so terrifying that to contain it he must 
account in advance for every possible eventuality, like a man 
who can keep his demons out by blocking every chink in the 
floorboards....More simply, Watt’s demented pondering is a 
defence against the dangerous unpredictability of life65.
Hugh Kenner, meanwhile, excuses the style as ‘deliberately witty pedantry’66. I would 
like to suggest that, as Alvarez states, this narrative obsession with possibility in Watt is 
intimately connected to an anxiety about unpredictability, and that the ensuing style has 
a deeper internal coherence and logic than most previous critics have argued. They have 
diagnosed the style, but have not seriously looked at the possibility that it represents a
64 Richardson, "Causality in Molloy: Philosophic Theme, Narrative Transgression, and Meiaficfionai Paradox," 67.
6j Alvarez, Beckett, 45.
66 Ibid., 44.
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formal engagement with the same ideas that Watt examines thematically: namely, 
possibility and contingency.
The prose, it is important to note, whilst unarguably repetitive and mechanical, 
is nevertheless also firmly suggestive here of a kind of joyful linguistic inclusiveness -  
no possibility ( ‘two or less than two or even more than tw o ...’) is ever shut down, 
which not only leads to an impasse in the normal order of cause and effect, but also to 
an exponential increase in irrationality between one thing and another: there is, we 
could say, a cause, and then infinite possible effects. This dislocation of cause and 
effect in Beckett’s writing leads to obfuscation, necessarily; to the unexpected and 
poetic beauty of surprising and illogical correspondences; and also to a -  wilful, I think 
-  embracing and celebration of the contingent, the pointless, and the exhilaratingly 
voluble. To rule nothing out is not, Beckett sometimes seems to suggest, to let any old 
thing in -  it is to allow possibility its fullest rein.
As Hesla points out:
[Watt] is Samuel Beckett’s version of the human experience 
which Jean-Paul Sartre in Nausea and Albert Camus in Le 
Mythe de Sisyphe defined as the sense of the absurd.
Existence off the ladder is Beckett’s phrase for what Sartre 
calls “contingency” and what Camus describes as life after 
the “stage sets collapse.”67
Existential absurdity thus appears as an ally of chance, of the uncertain, and of 
possibility. It also stands as the existential revelation that accompanies the realisation 
that the universe is meaningless, or, that we live in a world ruled by chance. Yet again 
we can see that although existential conceptions of possibility are unlikely to have 
influenced Beckett directly, we can nevertheless trace a literary and philosophical 
confluence of ideas: namely Beckett’s belief, as expressed in Watt,, that possibility need 
not -  indeed, perhaps, cannot -  be allowed to equal an easy and fallacious optimism.
67 David Hesla, The Sha/je o f Chaos: An Interpretation o f the Art o f Samuel Beckett (Miniiea|X)lis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1971), 8 3 -4 .
116
Beckett overtly links the idea of absurdity to necessity, and expends a little autistic 
energy wringing it dry:
But he had hardly felt the absurdity of those things, on the 
one hand, and the necessity of those others, on the other (it is 
rare that the feeling of absurdity is not followed by the 
feeling of necessity), when he felt the absurdity of those
things of which he had just felt the necessity (for it is rare
that the feeling of necessity is not followed by the feeling of 
absurdity).68
The frustrating ability of the prose to examine every possibility, while shying away 
from anything approaching an interpretation or judgment on the list that has gone 
before, is overt here: is absurdity, as we would perhaps imagine it to be, opposed to
necessity, or are they aligned? Beckett is equivocal. Edith Kern seems to suggest that
the existential revelation of absurdity is simultaneous with the revelation o f freedom. 
She notes a moment where Arsene has a momentary ‘sensation o f being both free 
intelligence and contingency’. She comments: ‘what happens to Arsene is a realisation 
of the universe’s being there ...in  its purposelessness and total disregard for the logic to 
which man wants to reduce it.’69 This absurdity provides a further narrative reason for 
the minute descriptive precision, and the paralysis of W att’s decision-making facility, as 
he futilely tries to tether him self to the objective reality of any given situation.
Further evidence o f the meaninglessness of the novelistic universe in which 
W att is operating comes from  the mindless violence in which Watt and Sam (a 
character who may or may not exist inside W att’s mind, and may or may not be a 
narrative manifestation of Samuel Beckett) engage enthusiastically. After they have 
forced a rat to eat its own offspring, we are told: ‘it was on these occasions, we agreed, 
after an exchange of views, that we came nearest to God.’70 In the essay ‘Situation of 
the Writer in 1947’ Sartre says ‘they [French writers of the earlier generation) were all 
fascinated with violence, wherever it might come from; it was by violence that they
68 Beckett, Watt, 131.
69 Existential Thought and Fictional 1ec/ntiqne: Kierkegaard, Sartre, Beckett, \ 87.
70 Beckett, Watt, 170.
wanted to free man from his human condition.’71 He returns to the chance/violence
relationship in Notebooks fo r an Ethics:
all violence, beginning where force leaves off, implies a 
certain confidence in chance (taken as unknown laws). If I 
hammer harder and harder on a nail, there is no violence. But 
a moment arrives when I am no longer in control of my 
gestures. At this moment, I count on statistics: twenty blows 
of the hammer will fall somewhere by chance, but one will 
come that will strike the nail. I do not count on what is 
known but on what is unknown, there is hope in violence and 
certitude in a lawful operation. Recourse to magic.72
As we saw in the Chapter One, the link between danger and chance is, and always has
been, overt. We are reminded of Kavanagh’s observation that,
there is, consciously or unconsciously, a link between any 
meditation on chance, the less than certain, and the gamble of 
death. The truly fortuitous event, the event outside any causal 
chain through which we might control it represents an 
unacceptable scandal in the same way that the reality of our 
own death, the ultimate unthinkability of that death, is 
antithetical to any true living of life.73
This link between death or despair and possibility, mirrored in the existentialist ideas, is 
present in Watt's paradoxical statement that he was closest to God while committing 
acts of violence, and is key to my argument. In the insistent refusal of the text to let the 
linguistic inclusivity brought about by its attempt to represent possibility equal hope, 
Beckett ironises the easy association of possibility with optimism. As we are told 
overtly, Watt ‘abandoned all hope...w hile continuing to believe in the possibility’.74
The need for an engagement with the idea of possibility and chance, in all of its 
aspects, is perhaps the primary underlying structural motivation for the peculiarities of 
Beckett’s prose in Watt. There is a parallel, and related, neurosis about language in 
Watt, one related, as Edith Kern notes, to the presence of class in Watt: ‘certainty 
prevails only among the “they”: the Hacketts and the Lady McCanns’.75 It seems that
71 Sartre, "Situation o f the Writer in 1947," 145.
72 Sartre, Ethics, 171-2.
73 Kavanagh, Enlighienient and the Shadows o f Chance, 27.
74 Beckett, Watt, 45.
75 Ibid., 90.
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certainty about language, too, is a privilege available only to those for whom every
choice is not agony: ‘The realisation of the purposelessness and absurdity of the
universe turns the certain ties... into inanities. It affects the value given to facts, their
explanation, and their expression.’76 This suspicion of certainty and purpose extends to
W att’s apprehension of language:
Looking at a pot, for example, or thinking of a pot, at one of 
Mr. Knott’s pots, of one of Mr. Knott’s pots, it was in vain 
that Watt said Pot, pot. Well, perhaps not quite in vain, but 
very nearly. For it was not a pot, the more he looked, the 
more he reflected, the more he felt sure of that, that it was not 
a pot at all.... he could always hope, of a thing of which he 
had never known the name, that he would learn the name, 
some day, and so be tranquilised. But he could not look 
forward to this in the case of a thing of which the true name 
had ceased, suddenly, or gradually, to be the true name for 
Watt. For the pot remained a pot, Watt felt sure of that, for 
everyone but Watt For Watt alone it was not a pot, any 
more.77
This inability to call a pot a pot, here, is still extraordinarily disquieting.78 Is reality, 
here, becoming arbitrary, or is it merely a disjunction between reality and the linguistic 
tools we have to describe it? Beckett had met Axel Kaun in 1937 and, under his 
influence, decided that rationalism was ‘the last form of animism’ and that chaos was a 
preferable alternative. Beckett wanted an assault against words, and specifically against 
the English language,79 as they were getting in the way of what he wanted to say: ‘It is 
indeed becoming more and more difficult, even senseless, for me to write an official 
English. And more and more my own language appears to me like a veil that must be 
tom apart in order to get at the things (or the Nothingness) behind it’.80 The dislocation 
of things and their names experienced by Watt amounts to a randomising of perception, 
and reminds one of Sartre’s protagonist Roquentin in Nausea, who says to himself, 
‘“ It’s a seat,” a little like an exorcism ’, but the word fails to do its job  of naming the
76 Kern, Existential Though! and Fictional Technique: Kierkegaard, Sartre, Beckett, 189.
77 Beckett, Watt, 78.
‘8 It seems almost a |X ) s tm o d e r n  cliche now, but it certainly wasn’t then -  although Eliot among others had had a 
modernist preoccupation with the disjunetion Ixnween language and reality.
79 This is obviously, for an Irishman, not a purely philosophical position.
80 John Pilling, Beckett before Godot (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 153. Pilling is quoting from 
Beckett’s German notclx>ok 4, entry for 15 Jan 1937.
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object: ‘it refuses to go and put itself on the thing’. The seat, he finds, ‘called a seat...is 
not a seat. It could just as well be a dead donkey, tossed about in the water.’81 This is 
the terrifying obverse to the cool rationality associated with chance in its early 
twentieth-century incarnation, that of the arbiter of a statistically ordered universe. If we 
can talk about chance in terms of probability then we have effected the taming of 
chance. Beckett’s profound anguish at the excruciating arbitrariness of his character’s 
relationship with language, in contrast, reveals a keen awareness of the old sense of 
chance as a lack of knowledge, and of the original Greek idea of the chaos that existed 
before the world came into being.82 Experience, for Beckett, is now analogous to this 
terrifying sense of anarchy, of words and meanings cut free from their age-old tethers. 
Chance, here, is the enemy of meaning.83
In the middle of one of his many streams of consciousness, Watt says:
And if I could begin it all over again, knowing what I know 
now, the result would be the same. And if I could begin again 
a third time, knowing what I would know then, the result 
would be the same. And if I could begin it all over again a 
hundred times, knowing each time a little more than the time 
before, the result would always be the same, and the 
hundredth life as the first, and the hundred lives as one. A 
cat’s flux.84
Chance, and therefore possibility, is here marginalised, impotent. Nothing will ever 
happen that is not already laid out for us. This is, however, not a hopeful 
meaningfulness, one adjacent to ideas of destiny and purpose -  there doesn’t seem to be 
anyone to lay them out -  but rather, a hellish vision of, and version of, a Nietzschean
81 Sartre, Nausea, 169.
82 And, in fact, when Beckett talks o f ‘chaos’ (as he does, for instance, in the quote from his interview with Driver, 
above) this is certainly what he means by it -  the parallel 1 drew with modem chaos theory in respect to the butterfly 
effect and wildly disproportionate narrative aetiology is not meant to suggest that Beckett, or any of his 
contemjtorarics, would have been aware of this level of meaning. The idea of classical chaos is nevertheless an 
inqxtrtant one, and a aselul inetaphorisation of cither the ‘mess’, that recurring Beckettian idea, or of the expansion 
of possibility in the existential sense that Watt, and Wan, are Ixnh at supreme pains to curtail.
83 Kavanagh’s conclusion to his analysis of Voltaire’s Candide also elided an awareness of the power of chance with 
the failure of language: ‘Pangloss’s defence of a lilterty compatible with necessity enunciates the ultimate cacophony 
of language, the bankruptcy of man’s attempts to represent reality, to oiler anything more eloquent than silence as a 
way of making sense of what happens in the world.’ Anything else will l>e ‘a fragile crust of language proclaiming its 
categories of good and evil, knowledge and ignorance, causality and rationality, over a volcano of chance poised to 
contradict and abolish them’ (Kavanagh, Eidiglih-inent and the Shadotns- ofC/iainr, 168.)
84 Beckett, Wan, 46.
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eternal return: ‘a cat’s flux.’ Where chance’s operation is thus curtailed, but not
replaced by ideas of hope, purpose or religious meaning, we see a stasis in human
endeavour: what is the point of existence if, by the force of your will, you cannot effect
change on your surroundings? Beckett’s concern with possibility and contingency has
become embedded in the sentences themselves. Watt doesn’t have to be about chance;
by its very being it demonstrates at every turn a neurosis or anxiety about chance’s very
existence. In Watt, the narrative doesn’t move toward anything so much as circuit itself,
and, by doing so, erases the very possibilities it has so carefully and minutely built up.
Buttner, one of Beckett’s best critics, concluded that ‘In face of the emptiness and
spiritual aridity of existence, hope is always kept alive in Beckett’s characters’.85 But it
is this very assumption, the easy linkage between possibility and hope, that I hope I
have shown to be fallacious. Leland Monk argues that Joyce’s Ulysses marks the cut-off
point of chance’s representation in literature because it ‘rejoices in things that happen
by chance’ and the resulting ‘undecidability of pleasure’ that is celebrated is an
aesthetic that has:
a certain pleasure, the expression of a capricious whim, a 
vagary that is erratic and unmotivated....It is finally 
undecidable whether such a “throw beyond” is the function 
of a pleasure that transgresses the authorial will or the 
function of a will that legislates its own pleasures.86
Beckett throughout his career distanced himself from Joyce’s very ‘authorial w ill’
(‘He’s tending toward omniscience and omnipotence as an artist. I ’m working with
impotence, ignorance’)87 and on the topic of chance this was no different. Joyce’s
understanding of chance as the ‘undecidability of pleasure’ has perhaps become, under
Beckett, reversed. Thomas Kavanagh has depicted the history of chance’s relationship
with literature as follows:
against a vision of the world as a potentially finite series of 
knowable and ultimately controllable determinisms, chance
8j Buttner, Samuel Beckett's Novel Wan, 151-2.
86 Monk, Siaiiclanl Deviations-, 151-2.
87 Shenker, "Moody Man of Letters," 1.
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implied a resolutely tragic vision. To recognize chance was, 
more than anything else, to recognize our inability to reason 
toward and become part of any natural order. Chance speaks 
of the limits of reason as a faculty that, finally, reflects only 
its own presuppositions.88
Chance as a ‘resolutely tragic vision’ is the chance of the universe of Beckett’s novels, 
peopled by those with an ‘inability to reason toward and to become part of any natural 
order’: of Murphy rocking himself to death to achieve some sort of freedom, and of 
Watt obsessively categorising reality until it barely exists other than in a series of 
equally meaningless options. Chance is not a Joycean voluptas, an eroticized 
undecidability, but a painful taxonomy of being. What should be an image of 
exhilarating volubility, of fulfilment of possibility, of filling up life to its very seams, 
turns out to be the reverse. If every possibility is mooted, it is simultaneously stymied. 
The exploration o f possibility, then, becomes its death, cancelling itself as it reproduces. 
When we hold Watt in our minds as a coherent achievement, we see possibilities 
expanding exponentially like dividing bacterium; but in a stark echo of the times, it has 
become an image not of hope, but one o f panic.
vy7
Coda: Lessness
The final Beckettianjlction that I would like to look at is Lessness (1969),89 a 
long short story or brief novella from later on in Beckett’s literary career, which in a 
minor way serves to back up my reading of Watt, while also linking Beckett’s 
experimental treatment of narrative chance to the sixties generation of aleatorical artists 
and writers that will form the subject of my next chapter. Like the Dadaist experiments 
of fifty years earlier, Lessness experiments with how chance could be incorporated into 
the form of the work, perhaps as a radical, if not entirely successful attempt to rid his
m Kavanagh, Enlighteineni and die Shadows o f Chance, 4.
m Samuel Beckett, "Lessness," in Collected Shorter Prose, 1.94.'J-SO (London: John Calder, 1984).
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fiction of the dreaded teleological predictability and therefore induce a ‘purity of the
will’ of his own. Seemingly influenced by Dada, Lessness incorporated chance into the
very fabric of its constitution. The important distinction here is that the constitutive
parts were written phrases by Beckett (or ‘image clusters’), and chance was left to
dictate new and un-hoped-for or imagined associative links between them, unexpected
interactions, and correspondences unforeseen. Susan Brienza and Enoch Brater, in their
1976 paper ‘Chance and Choice in Beckett’s Lessness’, defend the work from this
seeming influence of Dadaism. The clear distinction, they point out, between the
nihilism of those experiments and Lessness is the use of authorial choice: chance’s role
is reduced to deciding what goes where, but the ‘what’ is all Beckett’s. Brienza and
Brater describe this method:
Writing his 60 sentences in six categories, Beckett had each 
grouping centre on the following images: 1) the ruins as the 
‘true refuge’; 2) the endless grey of earth and sky; 3) the little 
body; 4) the space ‘all gone from mind’; 5) past tenses 
combined with ‘never’; 6) future tenses of active verbs and 
the ‘figment’ sentence about dawn and dusk. He then 
composed units of repetitive melody within each category.
He wrote each of the sixty sentences on a separate piece of 
paper, mixed them in a container, and then drew them out in 
random order twice: the resulting sequence became the 120 
sentences. Beckett then wrote the number 3 on four separate 
pieces of paper, the number 4 on six pieces, the number 5 on 
four pieces, the number 6 on six pieces, and finally the 
number 7 on four pieces. Again drawing randomly, he 
ordered the units into sentence blocks according to the 
number drawn, finally making 120.90
They then go on to argue that although the ultimate arrangement of sentences is left to 
chance, it is not chance, but Beckett, who has chosen what the words and phrases will 
be. This emphasis is undoubtedly right, although the distinction between the Dada 
experiments, which in fact used varying measures of aleatorical composition, and were 
rarely conducted without any selection at all, and the minutely controlled and 
controlling Lessness is perhaps overstated. Nevertheless, speculation on the exact
90 Brienza and Brater, "Chance and Choice in Beckett's 1/wne.w," 245-6 .
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division of labour of the authorial decision-making process between Beckett and 
chance, is not, as I see it, the main point of Lessness.
The story is in fact remarkably unified in purpose and effect, and as a formal 
and structural experiment it is at one with its lyrical and thematic content. The 
cumulative effect of the text is deadening: while it feels like a comprehensive 
exploration of poetic and imaginative possibility, with each combination of words and 
phrases being given full rein and expression, it ultimately returns no sense of hope to 
the reader. The repetition forces the reader to confront the meaning of the phrases, but 
then because of its cyclical nature it nullifies hope for a progression of thought, or hope 
of an escape. As the circularity of the repetition decreases, the ‘Lessness’ of the title 
seems redolent of a poetic prediction of the reader’s experience, that of ever- 
diminishing returns.
This deadening effect is reflected in the subject matter. Beckett describes the 
‘lessness’ of a being who is less than alive because he was still-born: ‘Blacked out 
fallen open four walls over backwards true refuge issueless’.91 This might well serve to 
remind us of the ever-present link between chance and mortality, since our original 
prospects and chances of life at all, Lessness insists, are bleak. This acute sensitivity to 
the divorce between possibility and hope, and the overt parallels with Sartre’s 
discourses on being and non-being is instructive. We are reminded of Roquentin’s stark 
confrontation of the logical extension of a world governed by chance in Nausea: ‘Every 
existent is bom without reason, prolongs itself out of weakness and dies by chance’.92 
Which, in turn, reminds us of one of Sartre’s definitions of possibility in Being and 
Nothingness, where he calls it ‘a sort of geometrical place for unfulfilled projects, all 
inexact representations, all vanished beings or those of which the idea is only a 
fiction’.93 The ‘vanished beings’ here, though, bring to mind not ghosts of the newly
91 Beckett, "Lessness," 255.
92 Sartre, Nausea. 191.
93 Sartre, Being andNothingness, 19.
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war dead, but grief for those who never were, for whom existence was only ever an 
‘idea’ or ‘a fiction’.94 Lessness, then, as an experimental piece of short fiction, is less 
interesting perhaps for its limited formal use of the principles of chance, and rather 
more so for its ever greater radical disengagement with the idea of meaningful 
possibility.
()i An idea which has an antecedent in Hume: ‘To form a clear idea of anything is an undeniable argument for its 
possibility’ (Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, 136.)
C h a p t e r  F o u r
‘Let’s Celebrate the Accidental’: B. S. Johnson, the 
Aleatory and the Radical Generation.
‘Well, the grand thing about the human mind is that it can turn its own tables and see 
meaninglessness as the ultimate meaning.... Let us say Yes to our presence together in 
Chaos. ’
John Cage.1
Few concepts are as alien to human thought as the notion o f pure chance -  the idea that 
events have no identifiable cause and no particular meaning.
Gerda Reith.2
Karl Miller, in a 1968 summation of the literary landscape of the 1950s and
1960s, concluded that the period had not been a fertile era for literary experimentation.
That the search for new form hasn’t prospered in Britain 
lately is not very alarming: a great deal of the new form that 
has been found, here and elsewhere, is an illusion (William 
Burroughs’ collage technique, for example), and the original 
abstention from experiment strikes me as having been both 
comprehensible and rewarding.3
In retrospect, M iller’s judgm ent looks a little pre-emptory. In fact, rather than being a 
period characterised by ‘abstention from experiment’, the period under scrutiny in this 
chapter, from the mid-fifties up until the end of the sixties, saw writers and artists return 
to the avant-garde, obscurantist and experimental aspects of early twentieth-century
1 John Cage, "Where Arc We Going? And What Are We Doing?," in Silence: Lecture.',-and Writings (Middletown, 
C l’: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), 194-95.
2 Reith, The Age of Chance: Gambling in Western Culture, 157.
3 Karl Miller, ed.. Writing in England Today: The hist Fifteen Years (London: Penguin, 1968), 26.
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modernism (especially Dada), that had been in retreat in the forties and early fifties.4 
Once again, formal fragmentation was being celebrated for its ability both to undermine 
the authority of texts, and to cast doubt on the very idea of the text as pronouncement 
from a god-type figure.5 The innovation, too, that had characterised aspects of high 
modernism, was back: as Stuart Laing has commented, this was an era in which ‘Joyce 
was allowed to come down from the bookshelves.’6 In fact, as we get further away from 
the fifties and sixties, it seems a period particularly characterised by an awareness of the 
possibilities of new forms, and a desire to move away from the conservatism that had 
characterised the art of the immediate post-war era.
One tendency that seems retrospectively characteristic of the period, and one 
that is closely related to the impulse to experiment, is a preoccupation with the aleatory. 
Chance and randomness were now endemic across the artistic disciplines, and emerged 
as both a thematic and formal concern in as diverse areas as the visual arts, poetry, the 
novel, and music. Bernard Bergonzi’s observation, made in 1970, was typical: ‘I have 
become discontented with the customary academic notion of the novel as a complex but 
essentially self-contained form, cut off from the untidiness and the discontinuities of the 
world outside’.7 Once again the constant motion and unpredictable, senseless bustle of 
life is seen as being impossible to recreate on the page; it resists order, it is unplottable. 
The incomprehensibility of chance, its refusal to be subsumed into the ordered world of 
art, is the aspect of our understanding of chance that became firmly entrenched during 
the period. This chapter argues that ‘pure’ chance can never be fully present in 
narrative, and that therefore the combination of the two is combustible and potentially 
disruptive. I define ‘pure’ chance in this section as chance that plays a part in the 
procedures that determine the composition of the work of art, either through
1 The conservative tendency of the immediately |Mist-war years in Britain I understand to he cmlxxlicd by writers as 
diverse as Graham Greene, Patrick Hamilton, Evelyn Waugh, and in certain respects, He my Green.
5 An idea which found articulation in Roland Barthes’s 1 969’s Death of the Author (Roland Barthes, "The Death of 
the Author," in Image, Music, Text (London: Fontana, 1977).
6 Laing, "Society and Literature 1945-1970,"  251.
7 Bergonzi, The Situation o f the Novel, 7.
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arrangement or selection, or (in terms of the novel) by letting the reader decide the 
order in which elements of the text will be read. This definition necessarily entails a 
mingling of the arbitrary with the creative process itself, whether in fiction, music or 
visual art; formal intervention is the only way that chance can be fully present in art. 
This randomness does not signal a meaning that we are merely unable to grasp, nor the 
significant coincidences familiar to us from the nineteenth-century novel; it is not the 
chance-as-mysticism which so often prevailed in modernist literature, nor probability as 
‘statistical fatalism ’: it is randomness that has no meaning other than that which we 
futilely try to assign to it, and which in fact problematizes the idea of meaning 
altogether. Once this randomness is introduced as a collaborator it joyfully and 
anarchically denies the supreme power of the author, and thereby subverts and 
complicates the idea of ‘art’ altogether. Chance, for many artists in the sixties, became a 
way to forge an artistic identity that was concerned with freedom and possibility away 
from the constraints of form; as such, it undermined the very idea of a possible 
composite artistic identity. To embrace chance is to commit to those very subversive 
capabilities that eventually lead to the failure of its representation. To what degree 
shades of individuality and identity affect the work of art in conjunction with chance, or 
even are amplified by them, is a moot point, but not necessarily a problematic one; as 
we will see, the elision of chance and choice is in part what invigorates the artwork, 
and, as in the novels o f B. S. Johnson, there is a significant degree of interplay between 
individual artistic authorial choice and the submission to absolute unpredictability.
The post-war representation of chance elsewhere had, as I have shown, so far 
presented itself in diverse and sometimes oblique ways. Writers still, for the most part, 
engaged with chance as a thematic or philosophical concern, albeit one that was starting 
to nag at the confining and stultifying effects of Bergonzi’s ‘essentially self-contained 
form ’ that had consistently failed to accommodate chance. As we saw with Beckett, an 
examination of novelistic possibility therefore necessarily affected the very sentences
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that attempted to describe it; a proper engagement with chance, I have argued 
throughout this thesis, always bodies forth formal or structural implications. So in the 
work of Henry Green, an apparently conservative novelist of the pre- and immediately 
post-war era, the thematic engagement with chance, which amounted to a delineation of 
what it is to live under the rigours of randomness, through a depiction of characters 
living under a fog of uncertainty while statistical bombs wended their way toward them 
through the limiting strictures of probability, eventually seeped into a post-existential 
and finally self-defeating preoccupation with a desire to free the novel’s characters from 
the control of their creator. After his expansive masterpieces of the nineteen-forties, he 
increasingly, and, eventually, solely relied on dialogue as a means of recording, without 
explaining, his characters.
Rudolph Amheim, in his essay ‘Accident and Necessity in A rt’, has linked
chance, when dealt with as subject matter, to the growth of realism:
accident always refers to relation, and when we call a 
relationship accidental, we express our belief that it did not 
come through a direct cause and effect connection between 
the parties concerned. The stylized Byzantine features are 
more closely controlled by the primary concept of man than 
is the Rembrandt figure, which shows the intrusion of 
extraneous, individual encounters. The difference may be 
expressed also in the language of the statistician by saying 
that with increased realism, the solution offered by the artist 
becomes a less probable one.8
Am heim ’s analysis, then, suggests that the inclusion of accidental relationships in the 
representation of a scene enhances realism, just as unlikelihood enhances the ability of 
art to convince. Similarly, Harriet Watts, in her book on chance and Dada, notes that in 
art accidental relations are often depicted by means of the crowd scene -  again, 
emphasising that where the pictorial emphasis is on the accidental nature of how the 
elements of the artwork have been drawn together, there exists a greater realism than in 
a more stylized, over-determined composition.9 An increasing amount of chance-as-
8 Rudolph Amheim, Towards-a Psychology o f Art (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972), 167.
9 Watts, Chance: A Per.s/tectine on Dada, 2.
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subject-matter in the novels of the writers I have studied, therefore, could be linked to a 
particular strand of realism that was in the ascendant -  one that sought to represent life 
with a minimal amount of authorial intervention. This is certainly true of Green, and it 
is also true of the novels of B. S. Johnson. My contention is that, eventually, chance-as- 
subject-matter inevitably bursts through the inbuilt limitations of its own representation, 
and engages directly with the form of the work, as a serious engagement with chance 
must confront the paradoxical nature of its representation in a determined form. The 
formal engagement of aleatorically experimental fiction is therefore an oblique 
commentary on chance’s uniquely uncomfortable relationship to the literary forms that 
seek to contain it -  experimentation is, and has been all along, the logical conclusion of 
chance-as-subject matter. This formal engagement with what I term ‘pure’ chance is, I 
suggest, a direct response to the specific challenge mounted by the incompatibility of 
chance with narrative.10
This chapter seeks to contextualise the interplay between the avant-garde and 
chance in the cultural history of the late fifties and sixties, and then to analyse as a case 
study the British novelist who perhaps engaged most seriously with the ramifications of 
pure chance and its compository potential -  B. S. Johnson. The chapter will examine the 
extent to which the art and literature of the period radically undermined the notion that, 
as Bernard Bergonzi had it, ‘Art must essentially be the impression of form on flux’,11 
and, rather, strengthened the alternative vision of post-war literature. Helmut 
Heissenbuttel encapsulated this alternative view of the relation between literature and 
chance, or between the form and the flux, when he commented that: ‘Chance is a
10 Lelaiid Monk’s excellent work Standard Deviations follows a similar line of argument to mine up until this point; 
he argues that ‘chance a/ways lakes on a necessarily fateful quality once it is represented in narrative’ (2), and that ‘it 
is in the nature of narrative to render chance as fate so that “what hap|)cns” in a story becomes indistinguishable 
from the more evaluative “what was meant to happen”’ -  a point on which we agree. However he goes on lo suggest 
that ‘I am not...interested in describing anything like “pure” chance in the novel or celebrating moments of 
“radical” “subversive” “freedom”’ (8). As such his examination ends with Joyce, who Monk believes reached the 
limits of how far chance could l>c assimilated into narrative: ‘chance always gpts read as fate, and this inevitability is 
characteristic o(7///r narrative’ (Monk, Standard Deviations, 10.).
11 Bergonzi, The Situation of the Novel, 210.
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favourite weapon of the twentieth century against the seduction to always the same kind 
of sentences.’12
Chance in the literature of the fifties and sixties.
The notion that chance was the dominant mode of the era, as the disperser or
destroyer of the attraction to ‘always the same kind of sentences’ meant that, by
implication, chance was the key to the increasing predominance of formal
experimentation. This experimentation manifested itself as a reinvigorated awareness of
other cultures: as Stuart Laing notes, during the sixties there existed ‘a new openness to
European and American influences, a reawakened interest in novels’ formal
properties’.13 As such this section is a necessarily incomplete attempt to convey the
astonishing breadth of engagement with ideas concerning chance among writers of the
period, and an attempt to show that this specific engagement often took the shape of an
anxiety about how best to represent the random in an essentially non-random form. The
American post-war generation of novelists were, in the sixties, beginning to reach the
peak of their powers: Pynchon, Vonnegut, Barth, Bellow, but there remained, equally, a
strain of literature in Britain and Ireland more concerned with the continental legacy of
Existentialism and with an anxiety about how this should be translated into a formal
questioning of the determinism that a novelistic structure requires. Emblematic of this
was Beckett’s assertion, quoted above, that:
What I am saying does not mean that there will henceforth be 
no form in art. It only means that there will be new form, and 
that this form will be of such a type that it admits the chaos 
and does not try to say that the chaos is really something 
else....To find a form that accommodates the mess, that is 
the task of the artist now.14
12 Quoted in Watts, Chance: A Pers/X'cnre on Dada, 3.
13 Laing, "Society and Literature 1945-1970,"  252.
14 Driver, "Beckett by the Madeleine," 23.
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The explosion of aleatorical art in the fifties and sixties constituted a mass, almost 
collective attempt to find a form that would ‘accommodate the mess’. B. S. Johnson -  
who used this specific quote from Beckett to justify his radical and indeed notorious 
‘novel in a box,’ The Unfortunates (1969) -  was perhaps typical in this sense. Almost 
certainly influenced both by Dada, and by the French writer Marc Saporta’s 1963 
experiment with random order (but with pages rather than chapters) Numero / , 15 as well 
as by Samuel Beckett who was at this point writing in French, Johnson’s major work 
was a hybrid of continental and early twentieth-century influences. Alan Burn’s ‘cut­
up’ compository innovation in Babel, also of 1969, bore a close relation to William 
Burroughs’ similar ‘cut-ups’ in America in the early sixties, where sections of prose 
were dismembered and reassembled to recreate better the randomness and 
fragmentation of perception. As Burroughs describes the method in terms of its relation 
to art:
The cut-up is actually closer to the facts of perception than 
representational painting. Take a walk down a city street and 
put down what you have just seen on canvas. You have seen 
a person cut in two by a car, bits and pieces of street signs 
and advertisements, reflections from shop windows -  a 
montage of fragments. Writing is still confined to the 
representational straitjacket of the novel...consciousness is a 
cut up. Every time you walk down the street or look out of 
the window, your stream of consciousness is cut by random 
factors.16
As Douglas Patey has argued, formal fragmentation need not impinge on the reader’s 
ability to make sense of the whole. He comments that ‘the individual episode may as 
reading paradigm of penetration embody all the patterns of signification of the longer 
work in which it appears, itself and associative sequence of episodes. Each episode 
stands in relation rather of synecdoche rather than metonymy to the work in which it
15 Marc Saporta, Com/jasirionNo. I, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1963).
16 Quoted in ‘William Burroughs and Language’, in Robert A. Lee, ed., The Beat Generation Writers- (Ann Arbor, 
MI: 1996), 99.
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appears...’17 Patey quotes the critic Isaac D ’Israeli as saying ‘A well-chosen anecdote
frequently reveals a character, more happily than an elaborate delineation; as a glance
of lightening will sometimes discover what had escaped us in a full light’.18 Bernard
Bergonzi’s expressed the contrasting, sceptical view of the use of cut-ups to induce an
experience of randomness, which he described as ‘the desperate expedient of William
Burroughs’ “fold-in” technique, an attempt to achieve by random
m eans...atem porality’.19 In fact a great deal of aleatory art is still dismissed by critics
today, even by theorists of chance. Leland Monk notes the examples of Julio Cortazar’s
Hopscotch (1966), William Burroughs’ cut-ups and Chance the gardener in Jerzy
Kosinski’s Being There (1970), but goes on to comment that:
incorporating chance elements into the creative activity 
certainly problematizes the agency and intentionality of the 
creator; it does so, however, by the imposition of another 
kind of narrative, the story of the work as process. The music 
or the text that is composed on aleatory principles does not 
anymore represent chance simply because it is the result of 
chance.20
I suspect that it does. If narrative itself is what has elided chance with fate, then 
narrative’s disruption is subversive of that suppression. The alternative ‘kind of 
narrative’, the story of the ‘work as process’, quite simply does not fulfil the same 
function as teleological narrative. As such, in terms of the representation of chance, it 
does not pose the same manner of problem. There are, nevertheless, other kinds of 
problems which the new innovations in the history of the representation of chance did 
pose -  namely, how to combine aleatorical methods or structural elements with the 
universal need for a coherent narrative?
Doris Lessing’s The Golden Notebook (1962) achieved a tension between form
and order by allowing the ‘chaos’ in her protagonist’s life to dictate the terms of its own
17 Douglas Lane Patey, Prolxihility and Literary' Form: Philosophic Theory' and Literary' Practice in the Augustan 
Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 246.
18 In Ibid, 247.
19 Bergonzi, The Situation o f the No eel, 27.
20 Monk, Standard Deviations, 147.
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arrangement. Anna Wulf writes her life into four separate notebooks, each of which has 
a different purpose and which together make up the meta-narrative of The Golden 
Notebook. The function of the notebooks is explicitly described by Wulf, Lessing’s 
protagonist, as a means of controlling the unpredictable and chaotic nature of reality. 
When asked what is in her notebooks, Anna’s reply is succinct: “ ‘Why the four 
notebooks? What would happen if you had one big book without all those divisions and 
brackets and special writing.” “I’ve told you, chaos” ’.21 This autistic ordering of 
experience into artificial categories is, we are led to conclude, a method of dissembling, 
of avoiding reality. As Earnshaw notes, Anna ‘needs to compartmentalise facets of her 
life into manageable portions to provide some sort of order, and thus avoid her own 
disintegration.’22 Tom, her best friend’s teenaged son, points out to Anna: ‘“If things are 
a chaos, then that’s what they are. I don’t think there’s a pattern anywhere -  you are just 
making patterns, out of cowardice’” .23 This chaos that must be so carefully calibrated by 
Anna is perhaps a product of her wartime experiences, which seem to induce visions of 
infinite hazard, and yet also of freedom, in a passage that could be a direct echo of 
Henry Green’s description of the war in Caught'. ‘And the intoxication, as I knew even 
then, was the recklessness of infinite possibility, of danger, the secret ugly frightening 
pulse of war itself, of the death we all wanted, for each other and for ourselves’.24 In 
The Right to an Answer (1960), Anthony Burgess made essentially the same point, more 
pessimistically, from an entrenched and fearful conservative position: ‘the post-war 
English m ess...that’s made by having too much freedom ....the great democratic mess 
in which there’s no hierarchy, no scale of values, everything’s as good -  and therefore 
as bad -  as everything else.’25 This can be seen as an appeal against the anarchic,
21 Doris Lessing, The Co/den No/eljool: (London: Michael Joseph, 1962), 272.
22‘Novcl Voices’, Steven Earnshaw, "Literature and Culture in Modem Britain, Volume Three: 1956 -  1999," ed. 
Clive Bloom and Cary Day (London: Longman, 2000), 58.
2-1 Lessing, The Golden Notebook, 27.3.
2Mbid., 16.3.
2'’ Quoted in Neil Nehring, Flowers in the Dustbin: Culture, Anarchy and Postwar England (Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press, 1993), 244.
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redistributive powers of chance, where wealth and advantage was no longer 
predetermined but allocated haphazardly, and a hankering after the comforts of social 
determinism. Kingsley Amis, in Lucky Jim (1954), had declared that luck, that 
seemingly frivolous totem of a positive encounter with chance, was now, in fact, the 
only social force.26
John Fowles’s The French Lieutenant’s Woman (1969) similarly addressed this 
very point through its inculcation of what Patricia Waugh calls the novel’s ‘doctrine of 
hazard’.27 Fowles uses mid-twentieth century conceptions of existential freedom and 
chance to suggest that the decline of God in our society is a projection of a deeper 
human need to outgrow ‘mystery’, and the form of the novel echoes his prescriptive 
advocacy of a painful uncertainty as the path to freedom by having an alternate ending. 
This attempts to convey openness of outcome by mirroring the way we experience it; 
unexpectedly, even if one has read the book before. As such, The French Lieutenant’s 
Woman represents one o f the most literal-minded examples of the novels of the nineteen 
sixties to deal with the determinism inherent in the idea of a plotted story, though not 
one without its own tensions.28
The critical landscape, for the most part, responded to some of the same 
philosophical and literary anxieties surrounding a retreat of order, hierarchy and the 
other comforts provided by the certainties of determinism. Raymond Williams, amongst 
others, argued for a democratisation of culture based on its ordinariness, concentrating
26 Kingsley Amis, .Lucky Jim. London: Penguin, 1954. Quoted in Ibid., 190.
27 Patricia Waugh, Harvest o f the Sixties: British Literature and Its Background 1960-1990 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 75.
28 Although not entirely successfully according to Waugh: ’the existentialist Fowles saw the need to repudiate God 
as an illusory projection of human desire for comfort and certainty. Only without such illusions may we embrace the 
painful condition of freedom which alone confers full human responsibility....Appropriately, the novel is an 
existential labyrinth with no final te/os or significance....Fowlcs’s ethical position, however, creates aesthetic 
difficulties. If your message is the goodness of mystery, contingency, and the need to avoid lxdicf in redemptive 
orders, it would seem inconsistent to lx>w to an aesthetic requirement that moral paradoxes be resolved and 
hermeneutic endings neatly tied up. However the ojxni-endedness of The Magus seems obfuscatory to a pointless 
degree. Fowles’s non-doctrinaire doctrine of mystery creates an aesthetic and ethical abyss: in relativizing every 
frame and |x>sition offered, it undermines even as it emlxxlics the authority of its own ethics of hazard...’ Ibid. This 
view of the fragmentary and contingent as a fig-leaf for a underlying order and meaning again serves to emphasise the 
tendency to connect randomness with its op[X)site, or as Beckett had it, as quoted alx>vc: the impulse that will ‘try to 
say that the chaos is really something else’, a tendency which, incidentally, will later find a porent scientific metaphor 
in Chaos Theory.
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on The Movement -  writers like Philip Larkin, Kingsley Amis and John Wain. 
According to Gary Day: ‘The achievement of the Movement was to confer a sense of 
cultural worth on the ordinary things of life. The meaning of culture was no longer quite 
so strongly identified with the sort of ‘high’ culture that was characteristic of Modernist 
art’.29 It was ‘the expression of welfare capitalism’ according to Day that instigated this 
‘ordinariness’.30 The effect of this democratization on the idea of chance was two-fold, 
and contradictory. On the one hand, chance is the great democratizer -  there is nothing 
more subversive of deterministic power structures. On the other hand, as Norbert 
W iener interestingly notes, chance, when understood as probability, its democratic, 
rational form, can actually lessen the likelihood of new ideas: ‘ [I]t is possible to 
interpret the information carried by the message as essentially the negative of its 
entropy, and the negative algorithm of its probability. That is, the more probable the 
message, the less information it gives. Cliches, for example, are less illuminating than 
great poem s’.31 And as Eamshaw points out, the avant-garde remained impervious to 
W illiams’s conception of democratisation anyway: ‘A number of writers continued this 
tradition [the m odernists’ avant-garde streak] in Britain....However, as with the 
Dadaists and Surrealists, the more avowedly ‘experimental’ writers produced work 
regardless of whether there was an audience for it or not’.32 Chance’s split loyalties to 
two intertwined and almost inseparable impulses continued: to realism and to the aim of 
representing the fabric of life democratically and without selection on one hand; and the 
obscurantist avant-garde that denies those aspects of art that actually appeal to a mass 
audience -  storytelling, form and order, on the other.
29 Gary Day, introduction to Clive Bloom and Cary Day, eds., Literature and Culture in Modern Britain, Volume 
Three: 1956-1999 (London: Longman, 2000), 13.
30 Ibid.
!l Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics- and Society (London: Lyre & S[x>ttiswoode, 
1954), 21. Probability’s relation to the novel would rake up another thesis, but two excellent studies that deal with it 
s[x*cilieally are Patcy, Pmlxibility and Li ten try' Form: Philosophic Theory' and Uterary' Practice in the Augustan 
Age. and Robert Newsom, A U lely Story': Pmlxibility and Play in Fiction (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University 
Press, 19B8).
12 Larnshaw, " Literature and Culture in Modem Britain, Volume Three: 1956 -  1999," 63.
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The prevalence of literature replete with chance, and with examinations of its
implications was thus wide-ranging. That this engagement with chance necessitates a
movement toward aleatorical innovation is perhaps what signals its own failure -  a truly
random reading experience would very likely not be worth having, and chance will
always be secondary to the demands of narrative. Nevertheless, and contrary to Leland
M onk’s view of the failure of aleatorical art in finally representing chance, the attempts
to introduce aleatorical elements into the novel, poetry and art have achieved no small
task: namely, the recreation of the human experience of disorder and the unexpected.
And is it not eventually, perhaps, a failure of the texture of all reality to be absorbed
into its mimetic recreation? W. H. Auden, in his essay ‘The Poet and the City’ (1963),
draws attention to the disjunction between art and life. A life could never be anything
like a poem, he posits, since it would be:
a nightmare of horror for, given the historical reality of actual 
men, such a society could only come into being through 
selective breeding, extermination of the physically and 
mentally unfit, absolute obedience to its Director.33
Auden’s emphasis on the disorder of life, and the mutilation necessary to transform it 
into art, reminds us once again of the power of chance to subvert artistic intention. In 
this sense the elision of accidental phenomena with an increased level of realism is 
entirely accurate -  if the novel must attempt to teach us how we live, then true 
randomness is perhaps the element that is able to show us that aspect of life that is so 
often ignored by literature: that we live randomly, fitfully, amongst the disorder.
One of the formative notions that predominated in the art, music and literature 
of the sixties, particularly, was bricolage. Claude Levi-Strauss’s The Savage Mind, 
which established the term as part of the critical vocabulary, was first published (as La 
Pensee Sauvage) in 1962 and was translated into English in 1966. Jessica Maynard 
defines bricolage as:
W. H. Auden, J!w Dyer's H a n d Fal)cr, 1963), 248.
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an ad hoc making-do, a cobbling together, an ingenuity in the 
face of the resources readily to hand. At the heart of the 
word, and the activity, is the sense of deviation, a 
redistribution of energy, an unpredictable swerve away from 
the normal course of things, and also, it should not be 
forgotten, a sense of constraint or circumscription....The 
successful hricoleur responds with a certain measure of guile 
to the contingencies of what is available.34
Bricolage, then, combines chance selection with control -  the building blocks, 
originally randomly chosen, are subsequently assembled according to the choices of the 
artist. The differing emphasis in the concept of bricolage adds another layer to our 
understanding of chance, as the constraints placed on the artist/author by their passivity 
in the process of selection necessitate a greater creativity. Artistic guile and 
imagination, then, appear as the fruits of constraint. In this sense chance does the 
opposite of undermining the author; rather, chance enters the scene as an active and 
inspiring collaborative partner. This is an understanding of the function of 
compositional chance that the Dadaists were very familiar with, and one that has always 
been at the heart of ‘pure chance’: compositional chance is not merely destructive of the 
idea of artistic form, but is also actively capable of inspiring creativity.
British art’s reliance on chance in the fifties and sixties was also in large part 
due to its being in thrall to American post-war abstract artists. Amongst these, perhaps 
the most significant was Robert Rauschenberg, who published his ‘manifesto’ ‘Random 
Order’35 in the art periodical Location in 1963. This manifesto consisted of a mixture of 
fragmented poetic observations and images, strung together in careless random fashion. 
Rauschenberg’s interest in random phenomena and his utilisation of them in his work
34 Jessica Maynard, "British Poetry 1956-1999,"  in Uterature and Culture in Modern Britain, Volume Three: 
1956-1999, ed. Cary Day and Clive Bloom (London: Longman, 2000), 32. Similarly, Daniel Albright in his book 
Modernism and Music delines ‘|X)stmodernism’ as a loose collection of tendencies. Two of these are bricolage and 
randomness. Bricolage: ‘the jury-rigging of art, the assembling of the art object, in a denatured and desecrated 
fashion, in order to expose the purely arbitrary nature of the signs that ail artists, past and present, employ’ (Daniel 
Albright, m\„ Modernism and Music: An Antho/og)'of Sources (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 12.) 
His definition of randomness is equally ap|x>site for my purposes, describing it as he does as: ‘a technique for 
dcpersonali/.ingthe artist, for demonstrating the transcendental anonymity of the work ofart. If artistic decisions are 
governed by the rolling of dice, then the artwork is lilierated from human rcsixnisibility’ (Albright, ed., Modernism 
and Music: An Anthology o f Sources, 13.)
!> Rolx:rt Rauschenlxng, "Random Order," Ijxa/ion, no. 1 (1963).
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was in part fed by an intense connection with John Cage,36 whose work, albeit in a 
different field, was exploring similar ideas, and whose profound connection with chance 
can indeed be seen as emblematic of the sixties generation of aleatorists.37 Cage, who 
composed the first extended composition determined by purely chance procedures, 
Music o f Changes (1951), was a clear inheritor of the tendency inculcated by the 
Dadaists, and Cage’s radical act of aleatorical engagement can be read as a starting 
point of the definitive rebirth of aleatorical art.38 1951 stands as a break from late 
modernism as well as from the stultifying immediate post-war austerity, and also as a 
re-welcoming of those disordered, iconoclastic aspects of the Dadaists’ work that 
sustain such a close association with chance and randomness. This reaction against the 
artwork as discrete, created object -  a missive from its creator -  in part welcomed 
chance events as collaborator and also let natural phenomena stand as art, no matter 
how disordered or messy. This subversive move away was characterised here by British 
artist Victor Burgin: ‘Modernism stood for order...everything in its proper place, doing 
its duty fulfilling its preordained role in patriarchal culture.’39 In contrast, the ‘neo- 
Dadaists’40 of the fifties and sixties relied on the idea of bearing witness to chance 
happenings and accidental collisions, observing the resulting form, or anti-form, and 
allowing what it appears to represent to speak for the artist; or constraining the artist’s 
options by means of letting chance select the building blocks of the artwork. The 
predominant themes of this approach to art could thus be categorised as an undermining 
of artistic authority, humility in the face of nature and its ability to create beauty, and an
36 For more on their relationship see Brandon W. Joseph, Random Order Robert Rauschenberg and die Neo-Avant- 
Garde (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).
37 Other example of the musical world’s engagement with other artistic spheres: ‘The third movement of Luciano 
Berio’s Sinfonia (1969) ‘paraphrases the sermon to the fishes in Mahler’s Second Symphony (1895), [and] treats it 
as a masie stream in which swim strips of text by Samuel Beckett’.
38 Although rebirth is |>erhaps misleading, as certain Dadaists were still producing original work, indeed, Duchamp 
himself was part of the group to which art historians attach the epithet ‘neo-Dada’.
39 Victor Burgin, "The Absence of Presence," in The End of Art Theory' -  Criticism and Postmodernity (London: 
Macmillan, 1986), 47.
W) Brandon Joseph, in his authoritative work on Robert Rauschenburg, defines the nco-Dadaists as overlapping 
loosely with, or including, those artists at the syni|>osium for the exhibition The Art of Assemblage at the Museum of 
Modem Art in New York in 1961. Amongst these were Robert Rauschenberg, Roger Shattuck, Richard 
Huelsenlteck, and Marcel Duchamp. (Joseph, Random Order Robert Rauschenberg and the Neo-Amnt-Carde.)
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interest in silence, ignorance, and nothingness. Chance, for Cage, was a means of access
to the chaos that surrounds us, a technique to dampen down the distractions of noise and
form. As he wrote in ‘Experimental Music’:
And what is the purpose of writing music? One is, of course, 
not dealing with purposes but dealing with sounds. Or the 
answer must take the form of a paradox: a purposeful 
purposelessness or a purposeful play. This play, however, is 
the affirmation of life -  not an attempt to bring order out of 
chaos nor to suggest improvements in creation, but simply a 
way of waking up to the very life we are living, which is so 
excellent when one gets one’s mind and one’s desires out its 
way and lets it act of its own accord.41
The ontological status of accidental phenomena was thus important to Cage: his 
utilisation of chance as compository element is a collaborative technique, but one that 
aspires to a mode of being. As he commented, ‘the idea of relation...being absent, 
any thing... may happen. A “mistake” is beside the point, for once anything happens it 
authentically is’.42 Silence, then, is intimately connected to the accidental -  anything 
may happen, during it, or equally may not. Similarly being itself is not necessary: 
rather, anything that ‘is’ is automatically a product of chance.
This humility in the face of the natural world and the unwillingness to distort it 
for artistic purposes evinced by Cage was one of the predominant modes of engagement 
with chance amongst the neo-Dadaists on both sides of the Atlantic. To this end some 
expressed an attraction to a movement away from form all together. David Masters 
quotes the minimalist Carl Andre, ‘I don’t want the detail of a structure to be 
interesting, you know, beautiful effects and so forth. This doesn’t interest me at all. I 
want the material in its clearest form .’43 Rauschenberg produced a series of ‘dirt 
paintings’, one of which he dedicated to Cage. Cage commented on it: ‘the message is 
conveyed by dirt, which, mixed with an adhesive, sticks to itself and to the compass
11 John Cage, "lixperimenial Music," \w Silence: lectures and Writings (Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press, 
1% 1), 12 .
42 Quoted in Joseph, Random Order Ro/jert Ramchenberg and the Neo-A vant-Carde, 47.
43 Quoted in the catalogue for his exhibition of sculpture at the Whitccha|)cl art gallery, London, 1978. David 
Masters, "British Art," in Literature and Culture in Modern Britain, Vo/ntne Three: 1950-1999, ed. Cary Day and 
Clive Bloom (London: Longman, 2000), 214.
140
upon which he places it. Crumbling and responding to changes in the weather, the dirt
unceasingly does my thinking’.44 Masters relates a talismanic episode in Britain that
echoes this in its radical advocacy of random technique.
The British abstract artist Robyn Denny (b. 1930) was a 
student at the Royal College of Art in 1957 when he and 
some friends had a confrontation with their tutor John 
Minton. Denny had begun to produce large boards on which 
pain and bitumen had been dropped, dribbled, smeared and 
finally set alight. When shown at the college’s ‘Sketch Club’
Minton had satirised and ridiculed the work. To him it was 
meaningless and irrelevant. ‘Why’, he said, ‘you could call it 
anything.’45
This tendency towards the unadorned and inartificial elevated to the status of art
because of the nature either o f its presentation or our observation, reminds us of the
Dadaist Hans Richter’s ‘collaboration with nature’ which was overtly a necessary
condition for the operation of chance:
It is the erotic pleasure of an unknown g ift...
But to follow this surprise -  sensation with an alert mind, 
with instinctive feeling, inspiration, help and direction 
That makes of ‘chance’ a creation of yours ... in 
collaboration with nature 
That is what Arp meant:
‘When you follow chance you create real life.’46
Two differing and seemingly dislocated conceptions of chance thus co-existed. Firstly, 
chance was understood as emptiness and silence, a means of allowing the artist or writer 
far to abdicate control. This is perhaps best exemplified by Cage’s silent work and 
Rauschenberg’s white paintings, and also finds expression as a willingness to co-exist
with mess and accident, in the case of the artistic co-option of the natural world. The
44 ‘On Robert Rauschenberg, Artist, and His Work,’ Metro (Milan), May 1961. Reprinted in Silence: Lecture* and 
Writing.r (Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), 99. The association between the natural world -  
Ix;tween dirt, inud, and rock -  and chance coiu)X)siiion continued, as Masters relates: ‘Richard Long was another 
artist interested in exploring the idea o f sculpture which was not dependent on a conventional notion of artistic skill. 
His art works were often ephemeral and o|>cn to the vagaries of time where the weather or another person might 
change what he has created. His A Line in Ireland, 1974, is just that. It consists of a low-lying row of rocks pulled 
together from the bleak and craggy surroundings to form a line. The landscape asserts its own sense of order into 
which Long has subtly intervened’ (Ibid., 215.).
45 Ibid., 204.
46 Hans Richter, llans Richter, ed. Clcve dray (New York: Holt, Rhinchart and Winston, 1971), 9R.
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second sense is chance-as-composition, an active transformation of the random into
artistic substance, as seen in the idea of bricolage and the aleatorical writers of the
sixties, and which was mirrored on the continent by writers such as those of the Oulipo
group. The marginalia around the piece of art, or the blank canvas upon which it would
be created, were suddenly held to be as interesting as the art itself. Similarly, there was
a revival of what is, as Hans Richter had it, the crucial mixing of human choice with
chance. It is this mixing that makes it ‘a personal matter’, thus bringing back the
impress of the individual self of the artist into the artistic process:
Randomness, chance, of course! It is the experience and 
sensation of our age, but it occurred to me that, because of 
this fact, the problem and necessity arises to integrate it into 
our everyday experience ... to interpret the possible meaning 
of this disorder, randomness, chaos, cosmos or whatever you 
want to call it....Chance is not a thing of itself. As Cocteau 
said in his most beautiful film Orphee, ‘Everyone has his 
own death.’ So is chance a personal matter. An arrangement 
without cause is, as Jung calls it -  Chance -  but it is still the 
individual, the author, who accepts this offering at the 
moment. So chance can be offered to you a hundred times, 
and you don’t make anything of it. And then, another time, it 
clicks.47
This versatility that lies at the heart of chance springs from this curious absence -  when 
you examine it as a discrete phenomena, it disappears. It is, in a way that will prove 
metaphorically close to the scientific principle of uncertainty, nothing but what we 
observe it to be: as Richter states above, ‘it can be offered to you a hundred times, and 
you don’t make anything of it’. This elusiveness serves effectively to reveal the 
ambiguity at the heart of much of our experience, and to our falsely certain views about 
the distinction between art and life, chance holds up a mirror that reveals the crumbling 
of all certainty.
This understanding of chance as capable of an agency of its own, was 
complemented by a literary period uniquely willing to explore ‘pure chance’ -  as the 
evident limitations to chance’s representation so often forced the chance-inclined author
47 Ibid., 108.
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or artist (or composer) into formal dead-ends or novelistic paralysis. This examination 
has so far served to show how a result of this has been chance’s subsequent alliance 
with the experimental: letting chance play a part in the composition of the artwork 
being one method of genuinely acknowledging it. It is no coincidence that the most 
significant aleatorically experimental works were novels; as David Lodge has remarked, 
the novel, ‘of all literary genres, is the one most firmly fixed in the Gutenberg galaxy. It 
is the characteristic literary product of the printing press’,48 and as such, had perhaps the 
most determinism in it to shake out.
Chance, Typography and Experimentaion in the Novels of B. S. 
Johnson.
B. S. Johnson, the man described by his recent biographer Jonathan Coe as ‘the 
one man avant-garde of the nineteen sixties,’49 was a self-consciously radical novelist. 
Writing in the nineteen sixties and early seventies, Johnson saw himself as the inheritor 
of the avant-garde tradition, and was unique in the decade, and indeed in his generation 
of post-war novelists, for the extent of his formal experimentation. As such I would like 
to examine his work as the most literal, and experimentally radical, example of the 
period’s attraction to the aleatorical, although this attraction remained, much like B.S. 
Johnson’s novels, a largely avant-garde concern. His formal techniques ranged from the 
playfully allusive -  he borrowed Laurence Sterne’s black page from Tristram Shandy50 
to stand for death in his first novel Travelling People (1963) -  to the alienatingly 
uncompromising in their radicalism, such as his 1969 novel The Unfortunates, which
4(5 David Lodge, Utngnage o f Fiction: Essay'.s• in Criticism and Vcrixt! Analysis' o f the English Novel (London: 
Routiedge and Kegan Paul, 1979), 38.
49 Coe, Ukea Fiery' Elephant: The B. S. Johnson Story'.
,0 Sterne was in fact, one of Johnson’s holy triumvirate of the only authors he believed to be exemplary; the other two 
were Joyce and Beckett.
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was cut into pieces that his readers were encouraged to shuffle like a pack of cards 
before reading.
He had his crosses to bear as a result of this unapologetic formal 
experimentation: a national newspaper returned a review copy of his first novel, 
Travelling People, complaining that it must be a faulty copy because its pages were 
black; the Australian Customs seized Albert Angelo (1964), which has a hole cut 
through several pages, convinced that obscenities had been excised, and refused to 
release it until Johnson had told them what they were; and his 1966 novel Trawl, a 
collection of reminiscences conducted almost entirely in interior monologue, was 
found, by a fuming Johnson, in the angling section of his local bookseller.51 Johnson’s 
fundamental contrariness, for which he suffered these humiliations, stemmed from his 
dissatisfaction with the state of the novel in its post-war incarnation. He felt that his 
fellow novelists, writers such as Kingsley Amis and William Cooper, were all endlessly 
rewriting the ‘nineteenth-century narrative novel’, which after the innovations of Joyce 
and Beckett and the war was ‘exhausted, clapped out’.52
Johnson’s formal experimentation could be described as a sort of typographical
sensationalism, but was distinguished in every instance by his conviction that each
represented a wholly justifiable and necessary response to a particular problem he had
perceived. He wrote in Albert Angelo that:
a page is an area on which I may place any signs I consider to 
communicate most nearly what I have to convey: therefore I 
employ, within the pocket of my publisher and the patience 
of my printer, typographical techniques beyond the arbitrary 
and constricting limits of the conventional novel. To dismiss 
such techniques as gimmicks, or to refuse to take them 
seriously, is crassly to miss the point.53
51 As recounted in the introduction to “Aren’t You Rather Young to he Writing Your Memoirs?” (13. S. Johnson, 
"Aren't You Rather Young to Be Writing Your Memoirs?," Review o f Conienijx)rar\r Fiction 5, no. 2 (1985): 13.) 
This essay, originally written in 1973, stands as Johnson’s most extensive and concise exposition of his artistic 
philosophy.
32 I hid.: 5.
f,i B. S. Johnson, "Alitert Angelo," in (London: Picador, 2004).
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Johnson’s concern with typography, or with the use of type or other graphical signs as
visual rather than purely semiotic devices, is mirrored by his eagerness to use other
extra-textual devices, whether these involve making physical changes to the book’s
format as described, or the importing of visual depictions of aspects of the text into the
pages of the book. These forays beyond the ‘arbitrary and constricting limits’ of the
novel always have their genesis in Johnson’s unswayable conviction that these devices
were solutions and responses to specific literary problems:
Where I depart from convention, it is because the convention 
has failed, is inadequate for conveying what I have to 
say....So for every device I have used there is a literary
rationale and a technical justification; anyone who cannot
accept this has simply not understood the problem which had 
to be solved.54
It was, I contend, chance, contingency and randomness that constitutes the major 
‘problem which had to be solved’ for Johnson, and it was his preoccupation with their 
formal representation that called forth the visual innovation in his oeuvre. One of the 
ways in which chance can be confronted is typography, as it is the novel’s very 
conventions, its ‘boundness,’ that prevents it from being able to represent this aspect of 
life; so typographic innovation and technological experiments designed to circumvent 
the linearity of the reading experience can thus stand as attempts to visually enact 
chance on the page.
Johnson firmly situated himself amongst the avant-garde tradition in his 
attempts to represent the unrepresentable. This, to Johnson’s mind, was randomness. 
L ife’s essential chaos, as he saw it, was the truth that needed to be conveyed in fiction, 
and his awareness of the disjunction between narrative and chance gave Johnson a 
desire to free the novel from its constraints so that it could represent the randomness of 
reality. In Fat Man on a Beach, the film broadcast three weeks before his death, at his 
own hand, at the age of forty, Johnson states:
',4 Johnson, "Aren't You Rather Young to Be Writing Your Memoirs?," 8.
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[life is| really all chaos....I cannot prove it is chaos any more 
than anyone else can prove there is a pattern, or there is some 
sort of deity, even if it is all chaos, then let’s celebrate the 
chaos. Let’s celebrate the accidental. Does that make us any 
worse off? Are we any the worse off? There is still love; 
there is still humour.55
With his typical rhetorical volubility, this statement’s central exhortation, to ‘celebrate 
the accidental,’ represents a direct impetus for Johnson’s typographical and visual 
outbursts. This is apparent not only in the aspects of his oeuvre where randomness is
overtly alluded to, but can be seen as an implicit motivation for much of the
experimentation in Johnson’s novels; his desire to circumvent the predictability inherent
in the conventions and unspoken assumptions about the nature of the book is itself a
response to this specific anxiety about chance’s representability.
The first Johnson text I am going to examine is his second novel Albert Angelo, 
the story of a young architect who works as a supply teacher in order to pay his rent and 
fund his real career. The novel repeatedly uses visual aspects of the text as analogues 
for, or shortcuts to, the aetiological aspects of reading. When Albert finds a fortune­
teller’s card in the street. Johnson tells us grumpily ‘it is further from the truth to
describe it than simply to reproduce it’,56 and both sides of the pamphlet advertising the 
services of the fortune-teller, Madame Mae, therefore appear on a double spread. The 
first is headlined ‘Are You Unlucky?’ and the second, ‘Do You Wish To Know?’.57 
This second teasing question alludes to Johnson’s frequent disavowal of the reader’s 
desire to know what happens next, what he calls ‘that vulgar curiosity’ that impels the 
reader forwards, which he associates with the Victorian novel and the conservative 
fiction of his peers. It is worth quoting Johnson’s description of this novelistic impulse 
in full:
In any case, surely it must be a confession of failure on the 
part of any novelist to rely on that primitive, vulgar and idle
55 B. S. Johnson, "Fat Man on a Beach," in Beyond die Words: Eleven Writers in Search o f a New Fiction, ed. Giles
(Jordon (London: Hutchinson, 1975).
Johnson, "Aren'tYou Rat her Young to Be Writing Your Memoirs?," 10. 
r" Johnson, " Albert Angelo," 120-1.
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curiosity of the reader to know ‘what happens next’ however 
banal or hackneyed it may be, to hold his interest? Can he not 
face the fact that it is his choice of words, his style, which 
ought to keep the reader reading? Have such novelists no 
pride? The drunk who tells you the story of his troubles in a 
pub relies on the same curiosity.58
Johnson’s contempt for the narrative suspense that inspires the curiosity of the reader 
subverts the meaning of the ‘Do You Wish To Know’ of Madame M ae’s card. It now 
assumes a taunting air, satirising the intentions of the reader, as well as turning the 
conventions of the book itself into a metaphor for the mystical discourse of divination. 
Of course, wishing to know what happens next in life, as well as in narrative, is a
suppression and denial of chance. Perhaps making the point that this denunciation of 
narrative suspense cannot be made forcefully enough in writing, Johnson crucially 
chooses again to represent his commentary visually, and once more the resort or retreat 
to the extra-textual becomes firmly linked in the reader’s mind with the avoidance of, or 
ironizing of, linear predictability.
At the end of Albert Angelo, in a section marked ‘disintegration’, the narrative 
breaks down irreparably. Johnson whips away the thin curtain between the author and 
his protagonist, and admits that ‘telling stories really is telling lies’.59 He later echoes 
this statement in the introductory essay to Aren't You Rather Young To Be Writing Your 
Memoirs?
Life does not tell stories. Life is chaotic, fluid, random; it 
leaves myriads of ends untied, untidily. Writers can extract a 
story from life only by strict, close selection, and this must 
mean falsification.60
This fundamentalist fealty to the truth acknowledges overtly that chance and 
randomness, synonymous with chaos in Johnson’s terminology, are inimical to fiction. 
Truth and chance thus become allied, as the act of fictionalising life means that it 
truncates this one important component of that life: the messy, random, contingent part.
58 Johnson, "Aren'tYou Rather Young to Be Writing Your Memoirs?," 5 -6 .
59 Johnson, "Alltert Angelo," 167.
60 Johnson, "Aren't You Rather Young to Be Writing Your Memoirs?," 5.
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Albert Angelo represents Johnson’s first serious attempt to circumvent this narrative 
determinism, and the disintegration of the narrative therefore comes to stand for 
uncertainty made textual.
Further evidence for Johnson’s linking of the desirability of narrative 
indeterminacy with the points of the text that cannot be expressed adequately by 
narrative conventions comes on page 149 of Albert Angelo, perhaps the most interesting 
physical change to the book’s format for my purposes. Johnson has cut a hole through 
the paper so that the reader is given a peek, literally, at what is going to happen in the 
future of the book. What is going to happen in the future, it seems, is violent death: a 
murder seems to take place in the page that is yet to come, though we are not told 
whose. The hole in the page effectively cancels the reliable solidity of the book, whilst 
inevitably making us look anew at that very thing: the novel’s status as an ‘object’. As 
Nicholas Tredell has pointed out, the hole also gives material form to prolepsis.61 In the 
materialisation of the idea of foreknowledge we can detect a further commentary on the 
unrepresentability of randomness: the narrative assumes an anticipatory purpose that 
would seek to elude the narrative unpredictability wrought by chance -  in other words, 
it is merely a different way of inducing suspense in the reader. But Johnson playfully 
subverts this. Again making the oblique commentary that as we do not know what will 
happen next in life, so we shouldn’t in books; our desire to know what comes next, fed 
by this sensational glimpse, is thwarted when we reach the page glimpsed through the 
hole and the death is properly contextualised. The death described is not that of any 
character in the novel, but the stabbing of Christopher Marlowe in 1593; thus a death 
we assumed to be happening in the future in fact has already happened in an extraneous, 
distant past.
61 Tredell argues that the hole in the page represents, eventually, a false prolepsis: ‘an arousing in a narrative, by 
selective or distorted anticipation, of reader expectations that are subsequently, to a greater or lesser extent, 
disconlinned’ (Nicholas Tredell, "The Truths of Lying: Alltcrt Angelo," Review ofCoiuemporan' Fiction 5, no. 2 
(1985): 67.)
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Trawl, Johnson’s third novel, consists of a loosely grouped series of 
reminiscences made while he spent three weeks as the passenger on a deep-sea trawler. 
He hopes that the isolation, and indeed the act of trawling itself will, in a gauchely 
literal interpretation of his central metaphor, ‘shoot the narrow trawl of my mind into 
the vasty sea of my past.’62 To this end he recounts episodes from his life, from his oft- 
thwarted romantic history to his childhood as a wartime refugee, all interspersed with 
his life on the boat.
The typographical variance is defiantly odd in Trawl. Johnson uses dots in the 
middle of the line at different spacings (3 em, 6 em, and 9 em) to indicate that the 
narrator is reflecting, remembering, or commenting on his own thoughts and 
descriptions. Short sentences in groups interconnected by means of dots replace 
paragraphs, and he seems to use different varieties of dots, in the centre of the line, to 
mean different things. Interestingly, his anxieties about chance seem to call forth a 
category entirely of their own: two dots, with three em spaces in between. When 
describing the uncertainty of his wartime experience, he says: ‘someone gave me a map 
of the Ruhr marked with bombing targets into which I stuck little flags with bombs 
pictured on them: at random. • • ’.63 In fact these dots appear quite often in between
random recollections; they are less flowing and more distanced than ellipses, and it is 
easy to assume that Johnson was trying to introduce a way to represent the arbitrariness 
of the mind -  although the specificity of this typographical oddity makes it tempting to 
read the resonance between chance and typography here as unconscious, like a visual 
manifestation of a deeper anxiety.
Either way, the examples start to pile up: ‘perhaps I delude myself: perhaps I 
am what I would always have been. • • \ 64 And later: ‘perhaps there were American
aircrew in that audience that night who would die in the air the next— • • ah, that is
62 B. S. Johnson, "Trawl," in Omnibus- (London: Picador, 2004), 9.
63 Ibid., 49.
64 Ibid., 72.
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fanciful, smacks of fictional speculation. • • \ 65 Similarly, the two dots occur when
Johnson discusses the possibility of causes for any of his recollections. When he 
remembers Mrs. Davies, who took him in, he muses: ‘though she must have felt a need 
out of her own lack of children: but having found a motive, a reason, so what? • ’,66 
and later, as he tries to evade finding reasons for why things in his life happened the 
way that they did: ‘Compensating—though, again, what use are bloody reasons? • • \ 67 
and again, as Johnson muses on causality: ‘ • • What use are analyses, reasons,
causes?’,68 and then goes on to dismiss its validity: ‘all I am left with are just things, 
happenings: things as they are, happenings as they have happened and go on happening 
through the unreliable filter of my memory’.69
In this oddly oblique way, Trawl reveals a resonance between its formal oddity
and experimentation, and its thematic concerns of causality and chance. In a similar
marrying of formal interests with his thematic subject matter, Johnson again tests the
boundaries of prolepsis, the literary and narrative equivalent of foreknowledge. Near the
end of the novel, Johnson as narrator tells us:
I peer at this entrail, watch its life beating away, interested 
and disgusted yet moved: and think of several different 
omens this particular sacrificial object could portend. • • 70
Omens, of course, repel chance and guard against the contingent. Here, that distinction 
means that the augury of bird’s entrails has been transmuted into a secular, literary 
forecast; no longer a way to divine the gods’ will, but, rather, a primarily narrative 
device. The hoped-for anticipatory effect of ‘several different om ens’ that Johnson 
could think of is for the reader’s benefit, to instil that ‘vulgar curiosity’ that he 
supposedly abhors, and to invoke the mystery that he has condemned as spurious.
65 Ibid., 81.
66 Ibid., 82.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid., 94.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid., 134.
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The Unfortunates is Johnson’s most radical attempt to literalise the relation
between his manipulation of the material fact of the book, and his thematic
understanding of chance. The material format of The Unfortunates is, overtly, a direct
response to the problem of randomness and the book. As Johnson described it,
the main technical problem with The Unfortunates was the 
randomness of the material. That is, the 
memories...interwove in a completely random manner, 
without chronology. This is the way the mind works, my 
mind anyway.71
He comes to the realisation that ‘this randomness was directly in conflict with the 
technological fact of the bound book: for the bound book imposes an order, a fixed page 
order, on the material’.72 This suggested that his solution needed to reverse the process: 
he needed to impose the randomness of the material on the form. The Unfortunates’ 
pages were therefore arranged into twenty-seven chapters of varying lengths, which 
were unbound, and arranged in a box so that the reader could read them in any order he 
chose, or in the order that chance presented them to him. The first and last sections were 
labelled as such, after a skirmish with his publisher, to give the reader some orientation 
and to limn a rough time frame. In between, the chapters are simultaneous, in the sense 
that they are temporal at all: as Johan Thielemans has commented, ‘[the loose chapters] 
are an exercise in what film language calls “parallel montage’” .73 The relationship 
between aleatorical composition and linear time was under scrutiny elsewhere in the 
period. Marshall McLuhan criticised ‘the unconditional adoption of chronological 
development, linear plots, a regular graph of the emotions, the way each episode tended 
towards an end’. New ideas about randomness also impacted on our concept of time and 
linearity: Alain Robbe-Grillet commented: ‘why should we try to reconstitute the time 
that belongs to clocks in a tale that is only concerned with human time? Isn’t it wiser to
71 Johnson, "Aren't You Rather Young to Be Writing Your Memoirs 10-11.
72 Ib id . :  11.
Johan Thielemans, "Albert Atmdo or B. S. Johnson's Paradigm of Truth," Review ofCon/e/n/xmm' Fiction?*, no. 
2 (1985): 85.
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think of our own memory, which is never chronological?’.74 Echoing this sentiment, 
Johnson wanted to get around the sequentiality that pagination necessitates and the 
inescapable sense that there is a temporal order to events in any novel: however 
episodic or fragmented your prose, it is always read in the same order, the order that the 
author has chosen. Johnson wanted to let chance take dual responsibility, at least -  to 
actively participate in the experience and thus reduce his agency. This, he believed, 
would recreate the randomness of reality, and crucially, of memory. The Unfortunates is 
thus aleatorical in the most fundamental sense. It stands as perhaps the most serious 
attempt, at least in Britain, to engage with the problem of the representation of chance 
in the novel in the twentieth century.75
It is this tension in The Unfortunates between randomness and narrative that, as
well as earning the book its deserved fame, has also been the main source of frustration
for its critics. Johnson wanted The Unfortunates to truly engage with pure randomness,
and yet he was not always successful, according to the majority of his critics, in keeping
narrative in abeyance. As Coe has pointed out, his scheme was vulnerable to
accusations of compromise: ‘even then, a longish, twelve page section, for instance,
would impose its own narrative sequence’, and the inescapable result of this, Coe
argues, is that ‘any attempt at conveying randomness would be suspended for a good
span of reading tim e.’76 David Lodge has commented with perspicuity that:
The random flow of sensation and association in the
narrator’s mind is imitated by the words, clauses and
sentences within each section—a stream-of-consciousness 
exercise in the manner of Joyce. The randomness only affects 
the narrative presentation of this consciousness in time. It 
makes explicit the almost infinite choice a writer has in 
representing a particular sequence of events by refusing to 
commit itself to any one choice. Such is the nature of the
'4 Alain Roblie-Crillet, Snapshots unil Towards a New Novel, trails. Barbara Wright (London: Cakler & Boyars, 
J 965), p. 63.
Johnson would have lieen aware of both William Burroughs’ ex|)eriinents with ‘cut-up’, and the Oulipo group in 
France’s interest in randomness under constraint. He certainly would have been familiar with the Dadaists’ earlier 
aleatorical poetry, and with Samuel Beckett’s 1969 prose-[x>cm Ijessnexs. Mare Saporta’s Co/n/jos/t/o/i One had 
worked on a similar principle as The Unfortunates, although it is not clear whether Johnson was aware of this novel 
as it was never published in English.
'6 Jonathan doe. Introduction to B. S. Johnson, The Unfortunates (London: Picador, 1999), x.
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human mind, however, that, working with the key of the 
marked first section, we mentally rearrange the events of the 
book in their chronological order as we read; and the puzzle 
or game element thus introduced into the reading experience 
has the effect (ironically, in view of the author’s declared 
intentions, but also advantageously in my opinion) of the 
putting the painful, personal, ‘real’ experience of the book at 
an aesthetic distance.77
Johnson’s solution, for Lodge, is therefore unsuccessful in the terms he has set himself, 
although he concedes that in The Unfortunates he may eventually have achieved 
something entirely different. Other critics, including Frank Kermode, have pounced on 
the concession to his publisher that resulted in the labelling of the first and last sections, 
seeing it as a blatant and eventually fatal weakening of his project.78 The tension is the 
familiar one between a randomness whose terms are originally chosen by the author, 
and the chance selection where the randomness is a product of a non-random initial 
premise. As we saw in the general discussion, reservations about the extent of 
randomness have always accompanied aleatorical art. The tension is inbuilt, as John 
Cage points out in Silence; ‘chance ought to be very controlled’.79 Rosemarie Waldrop 
in her discussion of chance in Against Language? typically discusses the compromises 
inherent in the concept of chance selection: ‘chance selection is nearly a contradiction 
in term s...it is selection at several removes, but still selection. It can be called chance 
only in relation to meaning, to logical continuity.’80 It is undeniable that narrative can 
never co-exist with absolute fealty to the concept of pure chance. As I have suggested 
throughout, though, it is in the intermingling of the two that genuine chance can be 
spotted. Also, while it is true that, in a strictly formal sense, Johnson’s concessions 
reduced the randomness of the reading experience, it is also true that seeing as 
Johnson’s loyalty is always, rigorously, to the ‘truth’ of any experience or 
representation of the workings of the mind, it doesn’t eventually matter that much.
7‘ David Lodge, "The Novelist at tlie Crossroads," Crifica/Quarterly 2, no. 2 (1969): 114.
,n Frank Kermode, "Retripotcnt," I j u k I o i i  Review o f Books, 5 August 2004.
79 Cage, "Ex|)eriincntal Music," 106.
m Rosemarie Waldrop, Against Umyuage?(The Hague: Mouton, 1971), 64.
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Memories and recollection of experience do not return to us in a linear, tightly plotted, 
traditionally novelistic way; but neither do they come to us as entirely disjointed 
flashes, or individual images. It is common enough to remember whole events and with 
them their significance, but not to remember these discrete entities in the correct, 
chronological order. Memories are not necessarily analogous to single words or even 
single sentences, but they are often episodic, and fragmented: much like the sections of 
The Unfortunates.
The subject of these memories is Johnson’s close friend Tony Tillinghurst, and
his illness and eventual death from cancer. Memories of Tony started coming to
Johnson when he found himself back in Nottingham, the city that was the main site of
their friendship, to report on a football match for The Observer. The newspaper report
o f this match was reproduced on the inside of the box, lying underneath the loose sheets
and individually bound memorials to Tony. The report is subtitled ‘Wasted chances’ -
the chance an obvious allusion to the randomness that he is commenting on, and wasted
both in the sense of loss for his friend’s early death and for the physical state of cancer
that he catalogues so assiduously, as well as missed goal opportunities. The language,
too, mirrors the preoccupations of the novel: it is a ‘lucky match’ for one player, again,
his iu ck  continues’, he describes ‘chances’ missed and so on. The prose that makes up
the bulk of the novel is evocative and sparse, which adds to the atemporality of the
middle sections and emphasises the melancholic, elegiac quality of the memories:
he had such a great mind for detail, it crowded his mind like 
documents in the Public Records Office, there, a good image, 
perhaps easy, but it was even something like as efficient, 
tidy, his mind, not as mine is, random, the circuit-breakers 
falling at hazard, tripped equally by association and non­
association.81
81 Johnson, The I Inform nates, ‘first’, 3. The individual chapters will he identified hy their first two words.
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This description of the mind as a circuit board, with ‘hazard’ reminding us equally of 
contingency and of danger, is a neat replica of Johnson’s mind as a conduit for the 
lightning-quick randomness o f memory.
And yet there is only so far that this reading gets us. Johnson himself stated 
explicitly that he wanted to recreate the randomness of experience, and of memory, and 
to let the novel itself stand as an expression of these. But I would like to suggest that the 
randomness is more concretely expressed, not in this straightforward metaphor, but in 
Johnson’s total refusal to let one happening be an explanation for another, and the 
implicit criticism of the traditional novel’s limitations that comes from the rendering in 
physical form of this refusal. The literal ripping apart of necessarily closely related 
memories in The Unfortunates serves not just as a protest against the technological 
determinism of the book, or as a tangible metaphor for the cruelness and irrevocability 
of chance and cancer, but as a subversion of cause and effect that radically alters the 
supposed predictability of the reading experience. Contingency is thus denied: the 
memories do not necessitate each other, but pile on top of each other, each one sprung 
from nothing but its own need to be remembered. This broadens the possibilities of the 
operation of chance in the novel, and the theme of randomness that we are rather 
clumsily directed towards by the book’s physical format is suddenly experienced by the 
reader as a visceral and powerful reality. Terrible and unlikely things happen, and they 
have no reason to do so. Events, and memories, are thus chaogenous, or as the narrator 
says, tripped equally by association or non-association.
For Johnson in The Unfortunates, the ultimately chaogenous event was death. 
In a world ruled by uncertainty, where accident is the only meaningful agent, the 
inevitability of decay, dying, and death assumes the significance of the only 
determinism; and yet its inexplicability remains absolute. As it is expressed in the 
novel, the inevitability of death is nevertheless related to chance as it represents the 
ultimate defiance of causal explanations: ‘That this thing could just come from
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nowhere...I still do not understand’.82 ‘This thing’, of course, is specifically cancer, a 
word that, as Nicholas Tredell points out, is itself absent from the text.83 The 
Unfortunates speaks eloquently of the overwhelming unfairness of luck: the cancer 
appears for no reason, grows uncontrollably and in an unpredictable manner, and 
assumes the terrifying power of the truly random: that which has no cause and answers 
to no explanations. Johnson writes of ‘the explosive, runaway, zealous, monstrous cells 
of the tumour’84, and it is here that his conception of chance as an ultimately terrifying 
universal force finds its fullest and best expression.
However, also present in the description of Tony’s illness is Johnson’s
characteristic contrary impulse. At the same time as the illness is drawn as the ultimate
expression of randomness, it is also shown to be mystical, mysterious, shrouded in
failure. The implied ‘fault’ would necessarily deny the cancer’s status as the ultimate
expression of bad luck, or ill fortune, and transmute it into part of the discourse of
divine (or otherwise) punishment; either way, the spectre of agency is introduced to the
chaos. To return to Kavanagh’s history of chance and the novel, I would like to briefly
remember his description of chance’s potential significance, a quote that found
resonance with the novels of Samuel Beckett and, I believe, similarly illuminates the
best work of his acolyte over twenty years later:
against a vision of the world as a potentially finite series of 
knovvable and ultimately controllable determinisms, chance 
implied a resolutely tragic vision. To recognize chance was, 
more than anything else, to recognize our inability to reason 
toward and become part of any natural order.85
Chance as a ‘resolutely tragic vision’ is, as much as it was for Beckett, exactly right for 
The Unfortunates. Peopled as it is with the unlucky, the novel is suffused with the idea 
that the presence of bad luck represents some kind of essential failure. Whether this
82 Ibid., Tor rccupcrarion’, 2.
83 Nicholas Tredell, "Telling Life, Telling Death: The Unfortunates." Review of Contetnporan' Fiction 5, no. 2 
(1985): 39.
84 Johnson, The (Informnates, ‘just as’, 8.
85 Kavanagh, Enlightetneni and the Shadows-of Chance, 4.
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failure is personal, or is evocative of a wider failure of modernity to allow explanations 
for events, the admittance of chance here calls into being a fundamental, and moving, 
vulnerability. After Tony’s cremation, as the narrator looks back, he sees ‘a straight 
column rising from the chimney of the crematorium, it went straight upwards, as far as 
smoke can ever be said to move in a straight line, into the haze, the sky, it was too neat, 
but it was, it was’.86 It is tempting to read this as an epiphanic revelation of the 
pleasures of linearity, or to understand Tony’s column of smoke as a parallel line to the 
narrative one which Johnson has performed so acrobatically to avoid. As he would 
object, probably apoplectically, ‘life is not like that’; although, perhaps if we are in the 
realm of the truly random, sometimes it is: sometimes life, in all its messy arbitrariness, 
occasionally produces a pure narrative line.
I nevertheless hesitate to conclude my reading of Johnson’s approach to chance, 
and the aleatorically experimental tendency of this period in general, on such a note. 
Johnson often seems to inspire a wistful critique, one that wishes he was another sort of 
writer, and his novels are often read as expressing an unconscious desire for those 
aspects of the novel that he has publicly renounced, just as aleatorical art is easily 
dismissed by the highlighting of its inevitable compromises with narrative. I would like, 
rather, to emphasise a corollary, and motivation, of Johnson’s radicalism that has been 
understated by his critics, and a corollary that applies to all aleatorical art: that what 
underlies it is a serious attempt to represent chance in the only way that is genuinely, 
mimetically possible: by letting it formally participate in the construction of the 
narrative. His desire to represent the contingent, accidental, and random aspects of life 
with fealty to the impossibility of their representation in narrative, and the subsequent 
calling forth of extra-narrative devices to serve this end, therefore represents a logical 
progression from recognising the aspects of chance that are inimical to narrative. 
Johnson’s endeavours with conventional printing boundaries, typography and image,
86 Johnson, The IJiiJbriunaies, ‘we were’, 1.
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thus emerge as literary strategies capable of delivering an implicit, but unmistakeable, 
critique of the novel’s specific limitations, namely, its inability in its conventional 
incarnation to recreate the reality of the human experience of chance. Above all, 
Johnson, just like the Dadaists, acknowledged that, although pattern and order is 
necessary for human perception and understanding, too much stultifies, and if the 
substance of art could be stripped of conventional order, our perception could be 
freshened and reinvigorated.
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C h a p t e r  F iv e
‘The incom prehensible operation o f  grace’: M ess, 
C ontingency, and the Exam ple o f  Iris Murdoch.
For Green, Johnson and Beckett, a pretension towards omniscience and 
omnipotence was the worst writerly sin. They all shared the view that the impulse to 
impose one’s idea of form too rigidly inevitably results in a suppression of narrative’s 
ability to represent the loose ends of life. The result of an engagement with the 
philosophical implications of chance is, as we have seen, subversive of the idea of the 
novel as a vessel for meaning and value. Narrative’s inability to be assimilated to 
chance, and chance’s resistance to its own representation, have induced writers such as 
Beckett and B. S. Johnson to formulate a kind of poetics of chance; an introduction of 
formlessness into form. As Adam Phillips describes it: ‘we might want to imagine a 
poetics of mess, whose topic is the practice, in modernity’s name, of a degree of 
“formlessness”: the invention of complicities with and figures for contingency’.1 
Johnson represented the purely artistic engagement with chance; his work illustrates his 
belief that a verisimilitudinous retelling of the randomness of our everyday experience 
is a sufficient end in itself. In terms of its contribution to the novelistic discussion of 
chance this is a subversive and interesting, but also an ultimately futile, artistic cul de 
sac. Two decades earlier Henry Green’s work, in a very different way, had been 
stymied by this same paradox, and his desire to avoid a false over-determination in his 
fiction eventually led to stalemate as he struggled with the problem of literary free will. 
A desire to look upon chaotic and formless muddle or mess, to examine its effects on 
the human psyche, and even to introduce it as a formal principle into literature, is shared
1 Quoted ill David Trotter. Cooling with Mnd: The Idea o f Mew in Nineteenth-Century' Art and Fiction (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 31.
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by all the authors I have so far discussed. A particular strain of British fiction since the 
war had been preoccupied by the implications of overweening authorial power, and for 
many novelists this was intimately connected with the problem of chance. Insofar as an 
engagement with contingency and, by implication, chance, necessitates and is a result of 
a formal awareness of the novel’s limitations, an awareness of chance was characteristic 
of the time.
Iris Murdoch is firmly in this camp. Murdoch was perhaps the post-war novelist 
who thought the most deeply about contingency (which for her purposes meant a state 
of being determined by chance) and its implications for the novel form, and she was 
certainly the post-war novelist who showed the greatest desire to do it justice in both 
philosophical and artistic terms; as such, she confronted these problems time and time 
again in her novels, as her biographer Peter Conradi notes: ‘the ability to learn openness 
to contingency is a virtue her philosophy and fiction alike are famous for 
commending’.2 Uniquely, and crucially for this study, she also drew parallels between 
contingency and goodness, that I believe represent an entirely new development in how 
chance was viewed in the twentieth century. David Trotter, in Cooking With Mud: Mess 
in the Literature o f the Nineteenth-Century, coins the term ‘mess-theory’ in connection 
with depictions of contingency in nineteenth-century literature and painting. But while 
Trotter distinguishes between illusion-sustaining and illusion-destroying mess, between 
good and bad messes, for Murdoch mess is, almost without exception, good. Muddle, 
and an ability to bear it, as her characters often illustrate, defines a person: resistance to 
muddle, which is expressed throughout her novels in a variety of ways, is consistently 
shown to be destructive. An affinity with mess, or with aspects of the natural world (the 
paradigm of formlessness), or with the accidental, is consistently shown to be a path to 
the elusive good. Murdoch thus introduces a radically new kind of ethical dimension to 
the discussion. Chance in the novel no longer purely describes to us how we do live; it
2 Peter J. Conradi, lri.s-Murdoch: A Ufe (London: HaqjerGollins, 2001), 279.
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now, however partially and falteringly, demonstrates to us how we should live, and 
instructs us how this may be possible.
Chance’s presence in the novel has always been indicative of a tension between 
the need to represent it as an inevitable aspect of life, and the novel’s inherent reliance 
on form, and thus its profound resistance to the contingent. Whether in making us 
question our ideas about meaning, or about novelistic authority, or about the 
truthfulness of art, chance’s subversive power remained intact. Murdoch’s obsession 
with the contingent, and her discussion of an ethical dimension of contingency and its 
implications for the novel form, spans her entire career but is at its most attentive and 
philosophically complex in the 1970s. Her novels of this period accept that our 
confrontation of the contingent nature of things generates an element of genuine fear, an 
heir of the existential horror which is seen as a natural reaction to chance’s power to 
subvert and render meaningless the belief that there exists value and purpose in the 
universe. Rather than transmuting this fear into a nihilistic embrace of the horror of 
contingency, or even to a Sartrean relish and delight in chance’s ability to inspire an 
awestruck horror, she instead prescribes acknowledging chance’s power as undeniable 
and non-negotiable, and then submitting to it. Goodness, she contends, gives up the 
search for meaning; it coexists with meaninglessness, is illusionless, and thus brave. In 
this ‘giving-up’ she transmutes an apprehension of chance into an ethical good -  into an 
opportunity for a secular version of grace.
This shift from chance being seen as an ethically neutral concept in post- 
existential thought, to a position in which contingency is seen as a new component of 
how to be good, is not merely a philosophical change but a literary one. If, at points in 
chance’s assimilation to narrative, we can still hear an echo of chance’s age old, pre­
twentieth century negative connotations, Murdoch’s proposal of an acceptance of the 
contingent as good worked as a distinct literary prescription that would allow 
contingency into the novel without going to the experimental, reader-unfriendly
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extremes of B. S. Johnson. In this chapter I aim to look at the discussion of contingency 
in Iris Murdoch’s philosophy and fiction, and analyse its contribution to -  and effect on 
-  the wider discussion of chance that has formed the basis of this study. As the chapter 
progresses I will have more to say on this subject of Murdoch’s insistent and systematic 
allying of contingency with goodness, but first I need to look at the term contingency in 
more detail, both in Murdoch’s work and in context.
As a philosophical idea, contingency was fashionable in the post-existentialist 
British circles of the sixties and seventies. That events are contingent means that they 
are profoundly subject to the vagaries of chance; it also implies something of the future 
element -  if the future is contingent, we do not yet know what it consists of. It can 
perhaps be best understood as an interpretation of reality as dependent on something
else, as provisional, and tied up in a multi-faceted, dense system of cause and effect.
Uncertainty, and an embrace of the impossibility of determinism in our lives, is always 
somewhat turned towards the future event -  it is anticipatory of what has not yet 
happened. Adam Phillips describes contingency as follows, emphasising its closeness to 
chance:
It can be called luck, fortune, accident, coincidence, and is 
sometimes experienced and described as a kind of non-
intentional or random agency. There is actually nothing
behind it making it happen -  though we can personalize it by 
projection -  and its presence, in and of itself, says nothing 
about our power. It neither diminishes nor enlarges us, 
though we can use it to do both.3
That it ‘neither diminishes nor enlarges us’ is emblematic of the mid twentieth-century 
view of chance, as I have explored it. Chance, and therefore contingency, is morally and 
ethically neutral; it has been absorbed into the sterile environs of scientific and 
mathematical discourse. Though ‘we can use it to do both’, contingency, within the 
bounds of its own operations, is amoral.
3 Adam Phillips, On Flirtation (London: Faber & Faber, 1994), 20.
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The anticipatory quality of contingency also means it is connected intimately, if 
often subconsciously, to the erotic. As Phillips suggests, it is an essentially flirtatious 
state:4 as a mode of being uncommitted to any one course of action, the contingent is 
always ready and able to change course depending on a number or combination of 
random coincidences. If we take Phillips’s point about flirtation, contingency means 
never quite shutting off any possibility: it means never, really, for once and for all, 
saying no. An openness to contingency, and a readiness to respond to its manifold 
suggestions, is analogous to living in a state of constant, ever-present possibility. As a 
corollary to this, an acceptance of the contingent means seeing the world through a 
prism of protective, distancing scepticism, a scepticism that is a refusal to commit to, or 
to believe in, any one thing -  the scepticism of the terminal flirt.
The obverse of limitless, eroticised possibility, however, is muddle and mess, 
the confusion that comes with accepting ignorance about the future. David Trotter 
argues that mess is in fact the footprint of contingency, its vital sign, and posits that 
mess, as an idea and as a literary trope, both sustains and destroys illusion. Messes 
destroy illusion because they ‘subtly corrode the idea of yourself that you have prepared 
for the world’s inspection’.5 They can also, however, sustain an illusion; he uses the 
example of Fred Vincy’s muddy trousers in Middlemarch (1871) making him happily 
realise he is cut out for working the fields. Trotter clearly demarcates ‘mess’ as a 
product of chance: ‘the association [sustained by the idea of mess] which will for the 
most part concern me here...is the association with chance’;6 and ‘this much is clear: in 
a manner free from determinisms of all kinds, “messes just happen’” .7 In fact, their very 
lack of any meaningful agency helps us to develop a mature equanimity, limned as
4 ’IF|lirtation is among oilier tilings a way of acknowledging the contingency of our lives -  their sheer 
unpredictability, how accident-prone we are -  without at the same time turning this uncertainty into a new kind of 
inastcr-plot. Flirtation confirms the connection between excitement and uncertainty, and how we make uncertainty 
possible by making it exciting’ Ibid., xii.
Trotter, Cooking with Mud, 2.
6 Ibid., 9.
7 Ibid., 2.
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disillusionment, with which to face the events of the world: ‘the sharpness in the
disillusionment they induce is the knowledge it brings of contingency. Chance, rather
than shortcoming or lapse, is narcissism’s worst enemy.’8 The negativity of
‘disillusionment’ here is balanced by the reward that this disillusionment brings: an
undercutting of narcissism, and a sober, reflective ability to see the world as it really is.
Knowledge of contingency, then, invokes a sort of sceptical wisdom. As Trotter puts it:
But the meanings and values thus ascribed [to messj are ones 
which envisage the very limit o f meaning and value itself.
The version o f their own habit they most fiercely resist, both 
in descriptions o f experience in general, and in descriptions 
o f the history o f  culture in particular, is the most widespread 
and deeply felt o f  all: a determinism hell-bent on the 
excavation o f cause from effect. Determinism, while it may 
demand a prodigious expenditure o f energy and intelligence 
(indeed, precisely because it demands all o f that), is the easy  
option: the choice we make without knowing we have made 
it. It gives us plenty to do, as human beings and as cultural 
historians, and the doing (the excavation) has a meaning and 
a value o f and for itself, whatever its outcome. Determinism  
is never not productive, and we should be grateful for the 
bounty it brings. But the hardest thing o f all to think about is 
chance, which denies the very form and purpose o f thought 
itself.9
This addresses the very problem that I have identified throughout this study. Chance is 
the hardest thing of all to ‘think about’, and more so for novelists, who are engaged in a 
process that would seek to contain or deny chance. As David Gordon says: ‘the novel, 
because it includes so much of what would be counted contingent in other forms, allows 
us to see how our dreams of significance are mocked.’10 For Trotter, this difficulty is 
assuaged, at least partly, by artists’ metaphorization of chance and contingency into 
mess: for mess, as literal muddle, or as the depiction of states of disorder or chaos, 
works as a transformation of contingency into a novelistic mode. Or as he puts it: 
‘writers and artists think with mess as well as about it’.11
a Ibid.
9 Ibid., 10.
10 David J. ( lordon, Iris Murdoch's Fables- ()/'IJ/i.se////ig{Co\um\)h, MO.: University of Missouri Press, 1.995), 93.
11 Trotter, Cooking with Mud, 8.
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Trotter goes on to say there is much fertile ground for mess theory in the 
twentieth century, although it is not within the scope of his study. In fact he specifically 
mentions Iris Murdoch as the exemplar of mess-friendly twentieth-century writers, and 
quotes from her 1959 essay ‘The Sublime and the Beautiful Revisited’ her serious 
affection for ‘whatever is contingent, messy, boundless, infinitely particular’. 12 
Although I do not have scope here to take the baton proffered and offer a ‘mess-theory’ 
reading of Murdoch, nevertheless, mess and its associated ideas may offer us an 
instructive way in to looking at her creative and literary use of contingency. Her 
depictions of mess, in other words, can show us the creative uses to which contingency 
is put.
The implications of contingency, and thus mess, in the novel are wide-reaching,
sometimes contradictory, and can be positive or negative; mess can be a creative and
interesting maelstrom; equally it can, as a signifier of chaos in its purest form, function
as the source of horror, violence, and confusion. In ‘The Sublime and the Beautiful
Revisited’ Iris Murdoch famously concluded her essay with the following passage:
[w le may turn at last to what finally differentiates art from 
life, the question o f form. Form is the temptation o f love and 
its peril, whether in art or life: to round o ff a situation, to sum 
up a character. But the difference is that art has got to have 
form, whereas life need not. And any artist both dreads and 
longs for the approach o f necessity, the moment at which 
form irrevocably crystallizes. There is a temptation for any 
novelist, and one to which, if  I am right, modern novelists 
yield too readily, to imagine that the problem o f a novel is 
solved and the difficulties overcome as soon as a form in the 
sense o f  a satisfactory myth has been evolved. But that is 
only the beginning. There is then the much more difficult 
battle to prevent that form from becoming rigid, by the free 
expansion against it o f individual characters. Here above all, 
the contingency o f the characters must be respected.
Contingency must be respected because it is the essence o f  
personality. And here is where it becomes so important to 
remember that the novel is written in words, to remember 
that ‘eloquence o f suggestion and rhythm’ o f which James 
spoke. A novel must be a house fit for free characters to live
12 Iris Murdoch, "The Sublime and the Beautiful Revisited," in Existentialists and Mystics- Writings on Philosophy 
andUterntnre, ed. Peter Conradi (London: Chatio & Windus, 1992), 274.
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in; and to com bine form with a respect for reality with all its 
odd contingent ways is the highest art o f prose. 13
Form, then, at least in its ‘crystallised’ aspect, is the enemy of contingency. The fact
that life is contingent, messy, unpredictable, is familiarly difficult to comprehend,14 and
Murdoch limns it as antithetical to the artistic impulse -  the temptation to create form,
narrative, myth, story. Murdoch’s preoccupation with contingency did not, however,
lead her to ever more alienating forms of experimentation, nor to a state where she was
afraid to impose a narrative shape on her characters at all; instead she found a way to
balance these ideas in harmony. Partly this came from her philosophical engagement
with the same ideas that sustained the best of her novels; partly because of the
realisation that while ‘novels have got to have form ’, this form must be challenged and
pushed against by contingency itself:
What is feared [by the proponents o f  Romanticism] is 
history, real beings, and real change, whatever is contingent, 
m essy, boundless, infinitely particular, and endlessly still to 
be explained; what is desired is the timeless non-discursive 
whole which has its significance completely contained in 
itself...the symbol is known intuitively to be self-contained: 
it is a making sensible o f the idea of individuality under the 
form o f necessity, its contingency purged away .15
Nevertheless it is the artist’s greatest responsibility to try and represent contingency, or 
a version of contingency that is compatible with form, truthfully, as to do otherwise is 
to lie -  indeed the reassuring lies of art damage our very reality: ‘our sense of form, 
which is an aspect of our desire for consolation, can be a danger to our sense of reality
as a rich receding background.’16 Contingency is necessary as a weapon with which the
novelist can do battle against the temptation of form, which has its equivalent in life, as 
above, which she describes in The Sublime and the Beautiful Revisited as ‘necessity’:
13 Ibid., 285-6 .
14 ‘But the hardest thing of all to think about is chance, which denies the very form and puqwjse of thought itself 
(Trotter, Cooling with Mud, 10.) Also, ‘few concepts are as alien to human thought as the notion of pure chance -  
the idea that events have no identifiable cause and no particular meaning’ Reith, The Age o f Chance: Gambling in 
Western Culture.
,J Murdoch, "The Sublime and the Beautiful Revisited," 274.
16 Iris Murdoch, "Against Dryness," Encounter, no. 88 (1961): 20.
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contingency is its enemy, for it is chance, and it therefore resists artificial pattern.
Murdoch imagines a tussle between contingency and form in which neither dominates,
but both are held in a harmonious balance: ‘the literary work itself is not in the grip of
necessity -  how soon we sense this in the cases where it is. The great novelist is not
afraid of the contingent; yet his acceptance of the contingent does not land him in
banality’.17 This is achieved primarily through character: ‘the individuals portrayed in
the [great] novels are free, independent of their author, and not merely puppets in the
exteriorisation of closely locked psychological conflict of his own’.18 As Elizabeth
Dipple has it in her 1982 critical study of Murdoch:
let us note that she again uses the word ‘accidental’ to try to 
convey the quality o f structure, o f autonomy o f character and 
action she aims to produce by removing her will from the 
scen e...sh e specifically applies the word ‘love’ -  the love o f  
a creative mind concentrating on something outside o f itself 
and its own satisfactions. This attribute o f love allows 
random and ‘accidental’ behaviour in complex, constantly 
surprising characters. 19
Richard Rorty similarly emphasises the importance of the contingent self in what he 
calls self-creation -  the process of coming to know oneself. He describes a tension 
between:
an effort to achieve self-creation by the recognition o f  
contingency and an effort to achieve universality by the 
transcendence o f contingency. The same tension has 
pervaded philosophy since H egel’s time, and particularly 
since Nietzsche. The important philosophers o f our own  
century are those who have tried to follow  through on the 
Romantic poets by breaking with Plato and seeing freedom  
as a recognition o f contingency.20
Contingency, then, is clearly opposed to universal truth. It is what we are left with after 
the breakdown of the grand narratives, and the failure of the search for truth. It allows 
for a multiplicity o f truths, of subjective interpretations of the same thing, to co-exist. 
The individual, for Murdoch as for Rorty, must strive to recognise his own essential
17 Murdoch, "The Sublime and the Beautiful Revisited," 271.
18 Ibid.
19 Elizabeth Dipple, Iris Murdoch: WorkfortheSpirii (London: Methuen, 1982), 40.
20 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 25 -6 .
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contingency, and this task is, as we have seen, a matter of ethical self-awareness. Given 
that this is how people are, the recreation of this contingent self in the novel is a 
practical matter of literary verisimilitude, as well as of evoking an edifying vision of a 
particular mode of being and its possible consequences. M urdoch’s idea of character 
became a constant struggle to recreate a measure of the true contingency that resides in 
each individual. As quoted above, Murdoch says: ‘There is then the...battle to prevent 
that form from becoming rigid, by the free expansion against it of individual characters. 
Here above all, the contingency of the characters must be respected. Contingency must 
be respected because it is the essence o f personality ' .21 The ‘contingency’ of the 
characters stands for a verisimilitudinous representation of the true nature of human 
beings as unpredictable and unknowable, each capable of random and contradictory 
acts. This ‘essence of personality’ is the aspect of humans most unimaginable by a 
creator figure, as it refutes the determinism necessary to predict its actions in novelistic 
form. So character, alongside contingency, subverts and contradicts ‘form ’ when it is 
threatening to overwhelm the work, as form corresponds to pattern, to the lies or to the 
narratization of the self that is always, eventually, a dishonest imposition.
Murdoch’s understanding of contingency was much influenced, later 
negatively, by her flirtation with Existentialism. She is able to say in fully Sartrean 
mode in 1953: ‘Man lives amongst a world of things alien [and] senselessly 
contingent’,22 and her sense of contingency always fully incorporated the existentialist 
understanding of it as that chaotic aspect of reality from which we recoil. Although the 
Sartrean view of the self takes the knowledge that we live in a chancy universe as a 
priori, so as to show how we are free to act, to Murdoch’s mind it consistently 
underestimates the forces of causality and chance that reduce the individual’s choices. 
However, she came to criticise Existentialism for this simplification, as Peter Conradi 
points out:
21 Emphasis mine. Murdoch, "The Sublime and the Beautiful Revisited," 285.
22 Iris Murdoch, Sartre, Romantic Rationalist (New York: Viking, 1987), 10.
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For Murdoch the faults o f liberalism are to a large extent the 
faults o f Existentialism. Both oppose, too simply, an innocent 
self to a guilty society, an inheritance they share from 
Romanticism. For her the question is posed not in terms o f  
the m ischievous default o f history to make us secure and 
happy, but in terms o f our own deep unacknowledged 
unfreedom and irrationality, our complicity in ‘life-m yths’ 
we unknowingly construct and live by, and our deep 
defencelessness, which we wrap up in various ways, to 
history, chance, and contingency .23
For Murdoch, then, our complicity, our lack of innocence, is key. The self is the site of 
a sort of passive unfreeness, which can only be defeated by attention to the good. We 
are not free, as the existentialists would have us believe, because, although in reality we 
are ruled by chance, we are unwilling to accept this; for this reason we lie to ourselves 
and tell stories about ourselves that are mere products of egoism. Contingency, for Iris 
Murdoch, in a clear echo of the literary philosophy of Henry Green, is the abstract 
condition of the random universe, but is also the most private and particular site of the 
self. In ‘Against Dryness’, she says she imagines her characters as ‘substantial, 
impenetrable, individual, indefinable and valuable’, and adds that the character is ‘free 
and separate...related to a rich and complicated world from which as a moral being he 
has much to learn’.24 This is where the unknowability and privacy of individuals 
resides, as, of course, real people are unpredictable and contain vast, dark, areas of 
motivation that we, as onlookers, can never entirely comprehend.
In a further parallel to Green, and to Bakhtin, whom Conradi tells us Murdoch 
read enthusiastically in 1942,25 this takes on theological overtones, and indeed Murdoch 
took seriously the responsibility that accompanies the author/creator metaphor that I 
examined in the previous chapter, believing, as Gordon points out, that ‘persons should 
not be coerced’.26 To Harold Hobson she said ‘God, if He exists, is good because He
2;! Peter Conradi, Iris Murdoch: The Saint and the Arris/ (London: Macmillan, 1986), 17.
21 Murdoch, "Against Dryness," 16,18.
2j Conradi, his Murdoch: A Life, 529.
26 Gordon, Iris Murdoch's Fables ofIJnsei/i/ig, 76.
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delights in the existence of something other than Himself’.27 In fact, the imagining of 
another discrete human being is the definition of ethical good, as it breaks through 
human egoism and solipsism that are the primary instruments for evil in the world. This 
ethical dimension to the novelist’s art corresponds to the literary good, happily: as 
Murdoch stated:
One isn’t good enough at creating character. One starts o ff -  
at least I start o ff -  hoping every time that...a lot o f people 
who are not me are going to com e into existence in some 
wonderful way. Yet often it turns out in the end that 
something about the structure o f the work itself, the myth as 
it were o f the work, has drawn all these people into a sort o f  
spiral, or into a kind of form which is ultimately the form of  
one’s own mind .28
Murdoch wants to write like a realist, but her brand of realism is a sceptical, self­
questioning one -  one that strives to evoke the messy nature of reality while 
acknowledging its own role in the possible defeat of the same. But this approach also 
mounts a challenge to other, more continental post-war ideas about ‘character’, 
especially the structuralist idea that defines traditional literary representations of 
persons as particular, independent, and with a clearly defined ‘self’ that remains 
consistent from one moment to the next as unworkable, even as undesirable, and instead 
sees the self merely as a site for competing social determinisms. In fact in Britain a 
reading or reaction to certain existential ideas could be defined in terms of this 
difference -  for Henry Green, and later for Iris Murdoch, the freedom of the self was 
contested but the particularity, and contingency, of the self was not. A passive 
acceptance of chance and contingency, rather than an emphasis on will, choice and 
agency, came to define the way existentialist thought had filtered down from 
continental philosophy to the British novel. Indeed, Murdoch’s affinity with the 
indeterminate, the messy, and the formless in her work, I suggest, is a key component of
27 Harold Hobson, "Lunch with Iris Murdoch," The Sunday Times, March 1962, p. 28.
28 Frank Kermode, "House of Ficiion: Interviews with Seven English Novelists," Partisan Review, no. 3 (1963): 
63-4 .
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her ability to think, as Trotter would have it, with contingency rather than just to think 
about it.
Does Murdoch, in her thinking with contingency, allow mess and contingency 
to sustain the associations of flirtation and scepticism suggested by Phillips? Or does 
she argue that the ‘contingent self’ is uniquely modern, a la Rorty? Whilst keeping 
these ideas in mind, I would also like to suggest that she insistently figures certain types 
of person, or certain modes of experience, as affiliated with, or somehow uniquely able 
to bear, mess and muddle. Her ingenious, neat characters, those who adopt the artist’s 
desire to direct action and who hate contingency, are always men, for instance, from 
which we may extrapolate that femininity is perhaps better equipped to deal with a 
messy reality, or even that it is inherently aligned with the same. A femininity, which 
manifests itself as mess, shows us more about the male subject’s inability to perceive 
the good about mess, and thus his inability to perceive good at all. The feminine itself, 
then, is something akin to what Trotter identifies as ‘good mess’ (although I should 
stress again that for him this never quite encompasses the ethical dimension that it 
acquires in Murdoch -  ‘good’ for Trotter means ‘positive’; for Murdoch it means the 
Good). In looking at these questions, the Murdochian novels that are most relevant to us 
here and which contain the most insistent explorations of the themes that are relevant to 
our study of contingency are The Sea, the Sea (1978), and The Black Prince (1973). 
Before getting to those, however, I would like briefly to discuss two earlier novels that 
foreshadowed M urdoch’s later exploration of these ideas.
In A Fairly Honourable Defeat (1970), Murdoch uses the distinction between 
different sorts of messes, and the differing aptitudes of her characters to live with mess, 
as instructive of the difference between goodness and evil. In fact, ‘muddle’ becomes 
indicative of an exemplary state of being. Evil, for Murdoch, is the result of the exertion 
of one’s ego to the detriment of others -  it flourishes through not truly seeing that other 
people exist. Amongst her primary characters we find Morgan, a self-absorbed,
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superficially charming egotist, easily seduced by her own idea of herself as forever at 
the centre of some emotional drama. After leaving her husband, the saintly Tallis, 
Morgan embarks on an affair with the older, powerful and mysterious Julius, but is then 
dumped by him. She seeks solace with her happily married sister Hilda, and her 
husband (nice, if slightly pompous) Rupert, and their teenaged son.
Julius, with whom Morgan is hoping to prolong their petering-out affair, is the
central instrument of plots in the novel. He is charming, dangerous, and seemingly
impervious to egotistic displays of emotion. Throughout the novel he is closely
associated with the word ‘ingenious’, and it is this quality of directing action that is his
primary function in the novel. He is elegant, and his clothes are described with relish. In
fact, he is reminiscent of the figure of Joyce’s God in A Portrait o f  the Artist as a Young
Man (1916); indifferent, paring his fingernails in the face of the human misery he
creates.29 This creative impulse finds its expression in his setting up of plots in his circle
to expose the shams of human vanity and love as being no more than extended creations
of individual egos. He achieves this by taking on, as a sort of amusement, the task of
proving his point, which throughout has been that people are no more than mere
‘puppets.’ Rupert complains: “‘You make human beings sound like puppets.’” Julius
replies “‘But they are puppets, Rupert. And we didn’t need modem psychology to tell
us that.’” 30 These ‘puppets,’ Julius believes, are controlled by the competing forces of
contingency and human ego:
‘human beings are roughly constructed entities full o f  
indeterminacies and vaguenesses and empty spaces. Driven 
along by their own private needs they latch blindly on to each 
other, then pull away, then clutch again. Their little sadisms 
and their little masochisms are surface phenomena. Anyone 
will do to play the roles. They never really see each other at 
all. ’31
29 T he artist, like the God of the creation, remains witliin or behind or beyond or above his handiwork, invisible, 
relined out of existence, indilferent, paring his fingernails.’ James Joyce, Portrait o f the Artist as a Young Man 
(London: Penguin, 1992), 215.
30 Iris Murdoch, /! Fairly Honourable Defeat (London: Vintage, 2001), 216.
:!l Ibid., 224.
172
Julius’s counterpoint in the novel is Tallis, one of the most straightforwardly ‘good’ 
characters in the whole of M urdoch’s oeuvre. Tallis is insistently allied with mess and 
clutter, his flat is ‘littered with filthy junk’,32 and this is refracted through the 
perceptions of the other characters; as Hilda says ‘Wherever Tallis is there’s always a 
muddle! Then she thought, this is unjust. Wherever there is muddle, there Tallis is’.33 In 
fact, Tallis is a paradigmatic Murdochian ‘saint’, a figure that recurs throughout her 
novels.34 In The Sovereignty o f Good (1970), Murdoch’s emblematic ‘Saint’ figure is 
shown to be good because he can apprehend formlessness without desiring to impose 
form on to it, as Gordon says; ‘it is his ability to bear the mess rather than be subjected 
to it that distinguishes him’.35 He is, in this way, egoless, and this contrasts to what 
Murdoch described as the ‘existential’ hero of much contemporary literature.36
Julius’s mode of existence thus critiques human existence in firmly Murdochian 
mode, and is proved right. Here she disseminates Morgan and Peter’s mutual delusions: 
“ ‘Happiness is free innocent love. It’s so different to almost everything else I’ve been 
up to almost all my life. The rest remains, tangled, awful, the decisions to be made, the 
pain to be caused and suffered, the unpredictable edicts of the gods, the machine. But 
this is outside the machine. This is felicity, blessing, luck, sheer wonderful utterly 
deserved luck. It can come to me after all. Oh goodV,,37 Morgan’s egoism inhibits her 
ability to understand chance -  ‘sheer wonderful utterly deserved luck,’ where the 
‘deserved’ undercuts the randomness of the luck -  but in his artistry Julius of course 
makes the same mistake, writ large; he too elides the external world with his own ego in
32 Ibid., 20.
33 Ibid., 178.
34 For more on Murdoch’s recourse ro the figure of the saint, and his relation in her work to the idea of the artist, see 
Conradi, Iris Murdoch: The Saint and die Artist.
3j Cordon, Iris Murdoch's Fables ofIJn.se/fing, 36.
36 See Iris Murdoch, "Existentialists and Mystics," in Essays and Poetm Presented to Lord David Cecil, ed. W. W. 
Robson (London: Constable, 1970). Murdoch decries the predominance of the ‘existentialist’ hero of much 
contein|M)rary fiction as ‘the lonely brave man, deliant without optimism, proud without pretension, always an 
exposer of shams, whose mode of being is a deep criticism of society. He is an adventurer. He is godless. He thinks 
of himself as free. He may have faults, he may be self-assertive or even violent, but he has sincerity and courage, and 
for this we forgive him...he might do anything’ (Murdoch, "Existentialists and Mystics," 18.)
37 Murdoch,A  Fairly Honourable Defeat, 184-5.
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refusing to recognise that other human beings each have their own real existence. For 
him they are puppets, and so he is unable to quantify the consequences of his 
mistreatment of them. In fact, the feeling that contingency itself has somehow punished 
the small world of characters for Julius’ meddling is hard to escape. These meta­
narrative concerns are the most problematic, and the most radical, aspect of the book: as 
Gordon notes, ‘the most fascinating thing about [the novel] may be the complicity 
between its villain and its author’;38 and the idea that Julius is a guilt-free proxy for 
achieving the sort of novelistic plotting that Murdoch tries to resist is an arresting 
analogy.
I would like to argue against this supposition, which I think is too neat, and 
which eventually refuses to pay Murdoch the compliment of taking her at her word. I do 
not think she was attracted to what she was critiquing, though she was clearly aware of 
the human susceptibility to power. I believe this can be seen through the clear 
distinction not just between good and evil in the novel, but between Julius’s self­
descriptions as an ‘artist’ and Murdoch’s own narrative descriptions of him, which are 
consistently as ‘ingenious’ or cunning. His artistry, in other words, does not amount to 
art. Murdoch wrote in The Sovereignty o f Good that ‘the only genuine way to be good is 
to be good “for nothing” in the midst of a scene where every “natural” thing, including 
one’s own mind is subject to chance, that is, to necessity.’39 A few years earlier, in The 
Time o f the Angels (1966), Murdoch had foreshadowed this insight when she wrote: 
‘there is only chance and the terror of chance...all altruism feeds the fat ego....People 
will endlessly conceal from themselves that good is only good if one is good for  
nothing'.40 Being good for nothing certainly implies a passive, permissive attitude, but it 
also goes further -  to be good for nothing is to be unable, in some profound way, to 
exert one’s will at all. A passivity and equanimity in the face of the true, chaotic nature
38 Cordon, Iris Murdoch .V Fables oflhiselfing, 431.
'9 Murdoch, The Sovereignty ofGood. 63.
w Iris Murdoch, The Time o f the Angels- (Londo n: Vintage, 2003), 163-65. Emphasis mine.
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of things could thus equally be interpreted as a paralysed inability to act in the presence 
of the same. Through her depiction of Tallis’s perception, Murdoch interestingly 
explores this conception of good, and its ability to exist in the world: ‘the accident was 
deeply the product of its circumstances. Tallis did not try to unravel these nor did he 
speculate about the guilt of any person, not even about his own. He grieved blankly 
over something which seemed, in its disastrous compound of human failure, muddle 
and sheer chance, so like what it was all like.’41
In stark contrast to this, Julius denies the possibility of being ‘for nothing’. 
Everything must have meaning, and mess must be viewed as matter waiting to be 
ordered by a directing consciousness. As he says to Tallis: ‘As things are, what does 
your life amount to? I suppose it’s always like that, but it does pain me. After all, I am 
an artist. This is just a mess’.42 The word ‘mess’ here, as elsewhere, acts as a talisman of 
contingency; as Gordon points out, it is ‘the salient quality of the world around us when 
perceived by a selfless consciousness’.43 Julius’s rejection of it is decisive -  as the 
supreme ego in the novel his novelistic desire to plot, and thus to subvert contingency, 
is felt with immediacy as a kind of evil. Indeed this ‘evil’ is shown to be productive, 
and yet ultimately uncontrollable, even by an ego as authoritative as Julius’s: it ends in 
the foreseen consequence of the breakdown of Hilda and Rupert’s marriage, but also in 
the unforeseen consequence of Rupert’s death by suicide, and it fails in bringing about 
the end of Axel and Simon’s relationship. That this quality of ingenuity is destructive of 
Tallis’s goodness, and of his mess, which are inseparable, is instructive. Ingenuity is 
tantamount to devising and analysing situations to one’s advantage, an epistemological 
category -  those that are ingenious use the contingency of the world around them 
creatively; they transform mess into an ordered and sequential interpretation of reality. 
The fact that this is signalled to us through his choice of the word ‘artist’ is also further
41 Murdoch,. / Fairly Honourable Defeat, 409.
42 Ibid., 422.
43 Cordon, //-/*'Murdoch's Fables-qflJmr/ftng, 65.
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evidence for Julius as Murdochian proxy. And yet I think that Murdoch makes a clear 
distinction between the artist that Julius thinks he is and Murdoch’s own art. In as much 
as A Fairly Honourable Defeat explores the operation of evil and the desire to impose 
form on reality, one could assume an affiliation between Murdoch’s view of her own 
aesthetic task and this evil. However, we see straight away that evil is not merely the 
misuse of power, but also the creative impulse separated from art. As Gordon says, 
‘Murdoch characteristically finds the danger of egoism not in the crudest human 
expressions but in what are generally considered the highest -  religion, love, and art’,44 
and he argues that Julius is identified as a metaphorical novelist -  indeed, that he is 
identified with Murdoch’s own impulse to form, throughout. However an artist, 
Murdoch stresses, must respect his characters’ consciousnesses. Her insistent use of the 
word ‘ingenuity’ in connection to Julius stands for the temptation to shape, without 
creating real free characters, which, in an echo of Henry Green, is her aspiration. In 
other words, those that are ‘ingenious’ attempt form, but crucially without the respect 
for separate consciousnesses that would, as if through a process akin to alchemy, 
transform the resulting manipulated reality into art.
What A Fairly Honourable Defeat eventually leaves us with is an imprint of the 
ethical dimension of contingency, an area that Murdoch will creatively expand upon 
later in her career. Tallis’s saintliness and his sanguinity about mess, both literal and 
metaphysical, are the same thing. His ability to bear the horror of contingency amounts 
to a refusal to impose his ego on the world in a way that would underestimate the reality 
of others’ existence. Murdoch described this urge in existential terms in ‘The Sublime 
and the Beautiful Revisited’: ‘According to Sartre, a desire for our lives to have the 
form and clarity of something necessary, and not accidental, is a fundamental human 
urge’.45 So Tallis’s goodness can be seen to be somehow inhuman, as a desire for 
neatness and form is human. And yet, our attraction to chaos, seen as a constant urge to
“  Ibid., 9.
4j Murdoch, "The Sublime and the Beautiful Revisited," 269.
176
revert to a primevally messy state, is also human. We could thus be said to be 
constantly in conflict over the two, and in this sense again Murdoch’s writing takes on a 
prescriptive hue.
An Accidental Man (1971) develops this position interestingly by examining the
implication of a contingency that has become alienated from the idea of goodness. The
novel takes as its anti hero a man whose frequent accidents have become obscured from
their causes; for whom the very idea of the ‘accidental’ has stopped being about luck
and has become a sort of determinism. Valerie Cunningham’s 2003 introduction to the
Vintage edition emphasises the complex ‘accidentalism’ of the novel. As Cunningham
points out, this is shocking in its iconoclasm towards Murdoch’s own sacred theme:
shocking not least because being “accidental”, making do 
with the accidentalism of the world, with what Iris Murdoch 
continually hailed as the “contingency” o f life, is normally 
for her the essence o f the moral, o f moral thinking and moral 
action and crucial to a novel’s being what she thought a 
novel should be, namely an agent o f the good. Personal 
good ness...com es through accepting and coping with, not 
seeking to evade or adjust, the muddle and mess o f the world 
in all its rebarbative detail, its confusing particularity.46
This aspect of goodness (the acceptance of the contingent), which we saw in A Fairly 
Honourable Defeat, is only present subtextually in An Accidental Man; contingency 
functions as both unknowable and somehow suspect -  the shadow of determinism is 
ever-present throughout the novel. As Frank Baldanza points out, in An Accidental 
Man, structurally, ‘chance takes over the function of Julius in the preceding novel’.47 
Chance and accidents batter down on the characters until they all mistrust the very idea 
of agency; until, indeed, it becomes apparent that ‘bad luck is a sort of wickedness in 
some people’.48 Or as Phillips would put it, until they have taken the iu ck  out of 
accidents’.49 Unusually for a Murdoch novel, there is no-one who is uncomplicatedly
46 Valeric Cunningham, ‘Introductory Essay’, in Iris Murdoch, An Accidental Man (London: Vintage, 2003), vii— 
viii.
47 Frank Baldanza, Iris' Murdoch (New York: Twayne, 1974), 64.
Ia Murdoch,.!//AccidentalMan, 11.
49 Phillips, On Flirtation, 13.
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‘good’, no-one who suffers for their sins, and no-one who has any sort of spiritual 
breakthrough -  this could be read as a commentary on the idea of the meting out of 
novelistic justice as deterministic, or as a further illustration of the ethical ambiguity of 
the accidental.
Austin Gibson Grey is the accidental man, a wicked, selfish destroyer whose 
deeds are seemingly accidental but also the product of a monstrous ego, trailing the 
messy debris of human relationships and, interestingly, lots and lots of death behind 
him. Austin, who is described as ‘always doing things he didn’t mean or want to do’,50 
is an example of how those who superficially give themselves up to contingency 
passively, in a crude satire of the saint figure, are perhaps the greatest egoists of all, for 
they expect other people to clean up in the wake of their abdication of responsibility. As 
we have seen, M urdoch’s conception of the Good was twofold -  her perception of 
goodness and contingency rest on character in a way that must respect the absolute 
particularity of persons as we saw above. Goodness for the novelist, then, is essentially 
the same as goodness in life -  the realisation that other people’s centres of 
consciousness are as legitimate as one’s own. The suppression of the worst excesses of 
one’s ego, or as Gordon has it, the ‘unselfing’ process, is thus vital.51 In ‘The Sublime 
and the Beautiful Revisited’, Murdoch wrote: ‘Virtue is not essentially or immediately 
concerned with choosing between actions or rules or reasons, nor with stripping the 
personality for a leap. It is concerned with really apprehending that other people exist. 
This too is what freedom really is’.52 Some of the dense particularities of this 
formulation are teased out in An Accidental Man. The effort to perform ethically aware 
acts, for instance, is an abiding theme, and the problems of ‘really apprehending that 
other people exist’ are demonstrated amply in a novel peopled with ego-bound, blind,
>0 Murdoch ,An Accidental Man, 25.
,l The argument of Cordon’s excellent Fables o f Unselfing could be summed up as follows: ‘the central moral 
imperative other work is the imperative of unsclling, the overcoming of self-centredness that prevents us from 
loving others as separate existences... Solipsism is for her our moral burden, as unsclling is our moral task’(Cordon, 
Iris Murdoch's Fables ofUnselfing, p. 7.)
',2 Murdoch. "The Sublime and the Beautiful Revisited," 284.
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selfish, wasters. How to reconcile these two aspects of goodness -  if we really 
understand that people exist we must intervene to help save them from chance itself -  is 
perhaps the primary lesson of the novel: a lesson that remains ultimately unlearned, but 
a lesson nonetheless.
Accidents, from the farcical to the lethal, permeate the narrative. As 
Cunningham says, ‘and all these terrible real accidents are shadowed by possible 
accidents, by questions about accident and accidentality...and these people do seem 
predestined to awful fates, if only by their novelist’.53 The paradox of M urdoch’s belief 
in contingency as a literary good and her supreme, almost dictatorial authorial control 
remains unresolved in the novel. Indeed, if the idea of the ‘accident’, which should be 
the purest sort of contingent event, has become an ‘awful fate’, what possible 
relationship could that bear to the contingent? Does Murdoch invest ‘accidentalism’, the 
idea that events have no identifiable cause, and are not in any real way dependent on 
any other aspect of our reality -  with a determinism of its own? Trotter comments on 
accidents as follows: ‘Freud, as Phillips says, wanted to take the luck out of accident. 
According to him, accidents at once gratify and disown forbidden desires. To put it 
another way, they connect us to the person we might have been, the person we still 
might be. What looks like chance is actually a hidden necessity, a life demanding to be 
lived’.54 As Garth, A ustin’s son, suddenly realises one day:
53 Introduction to Murdoch, yin Accidental Man, xi.
34 Trotter, Cooking with Mud’ 11. Freud’s fullest discussion of chance and his attitude to it is in The 
Psycho/xttho/ogy o f Even'day Life (1901, first published in English in 1914), in which he describes the 
psychonanlyst’s aims as clearly opposed to su})erstition: ‘I believe in external (real) chance, it is true, but not in 
internal (psychical) accidental events. With the superstitious person it is the other way around. He knows nothing of 
the motivation of his chance actions and parapraxes and believes in psychical accidental events; and, on the other 
hand, he has a tendency to ascibe to external chance happenings a meaning which will become manifest in real 
events, and to regard such chance events as a means of expressing something that is hidden from him in the external 
world’ (Sigmund Freud, The Psycho/xttho/ogy of Even'day Life, ed. James Strachey in collalx)ration with Anna 
Freud (London: Bcnn, 1966), 2 57 -8 .) Trotter’s analysis evidently connects contingency back to its association 
with the future element discussed above. The idea of possible lives unlived is, in fact, later explored by Murdoch in 
The Sea, the Sea: ‘What a queer gamble our existence is. We decide to do A instead of B and then the two roads 
diverge utterly and may lead in the end to heaven and to hell. Only later one sees how much and how awfully the fates 
differ. Yet what were the reasons for the choice? They may have been forgotten. Did one know what one was 
choosing? Certainly not. There arc such chasms of miglit-havc-bccns in any human life’ (Murdoch, The Sea, the Sea, 
85.)
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[t|he contingent details o f choice disturbed him. Everything 
that was offered him was too particular, too hole and corner 
and accidental, not significant enough, though at the same 
time he realised with dazzling clarity that all decent things 
that human beings do are hole and corner.55
‘Hole and corner’, ‘accidental’ -  this is the revelation of the meaninglessness and 
insignificance of one’s own life. The novel constantly equivocates between an 
interpretation of ‘accidentalism’ as pure randomness and an interpretation of it as 
imbued with determinism, and in construction after construction Murdoch elides the 
two or denies that they are opposed at all: ‘Of course Austin had not really done this 
“on purpose”. It had all been, like so many other things in the story, accidental....The 
stage had been set by whatever deep mythological forces control the destinies of men’;56 
‘[t]here were connections, but could they work in his life? Because a child could step 
into the road and die there was a certain way in which it was necessary to live. The 
connections were there, a secret logic in the world as relentlessly necessary as a 
mathematical system.’ He continues: ‘[p]erhaps for God it was a mathematical system, 
the magnetism of whose necessity touching the here and now was felt as emotion, was 
felt as passion. He had recognised, at times, that touch and trembled at its awful 
certainty, being sure that he could not now be otherwise contented. It was an eternal 
doom. These deaths were merely signs, accidental signs even’.57
The association of necessity with passion in the mind of Garth here is an
obscene parody of the revelation that is associated with apprehension of the Good, but
later on in the mind of the agnostic and tortured Charlotte a truthful and consolation-
free recognition of the true chaos o f the world is perhaps a sign of madness:
Why should she kill herself in a fit o f envy, and then again 
why should she not? It was all one. Whether this despair 
made it easier or harder to act, whether it would finally carry 
her off, mere chance would decide. She had always been the 
slave o f  chance, let it kill her if it would by a random stroke,
She would not die gladly, but then she had not loved gladly
Murdoch,/!// Accidental Man, 137.
56 Ibid., 438.
57 Ibid., 187.
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either. Her swansong would be made o f words smashed into 
nonsense against a cracked world, exploding with it into the 
chaos upon which everything rested and out of which it was 
made.58
This is not a submission to contingency, like Tallis’s, that is necessary for an 
understanding of the good. This is a perversion of the interconnectedness of cause and 
effect into the terrifying reverse aspect of chance -  that which makes a ‘nonsense’ of 
language and is the chaos of anarchy. It permeates the description of the death of 
Austin’s troubled wife Dorina: ‘the thing was pure chance and yet weighted with a 
significance of horror which he could not bear to contemplate’.59 The word ‘horror’ here 
seems specifically Sartrean -  the horror at the contingency of the universe, which is the 
proper human reaction to formlessness -  but in Murdoch, that horror must be 
transmuted into a sort of grace. That the transformation into this state of grace, which is 
an apprehension of the Good, has failed to occur in the novel at all, can be read as 
M urdoch’s disgust at the susceptibility of humans to the consolatory power of turning 
away from that horror instead of accepting it. In The Metaphysics o f Morals (1992) she 
wrote: ‘[the novel contains] the invincible variety, contingency and scarcely 
communicable frightfulness of life’.60 This is akin to what Sartre would call nausea: the 
horror provoked by an awareness of contingency. In The Black Prince, she would write 
that life ‘is horrible, without metaphysical sense, wrecked by chance, pain and the close 
prospect of death.’61
It is clear that alertness to accident has here become transformed into the 
obverse of the characteristic Murdochian awareness of the contingent. In any case, as 
Phillips points out, ‘accidents’ always tend to be bad: ‘that our lives might simply be a 
series or collection of coincidences seems peculiarly unacceptable (though it could, of 
course, be comforting). Indeed, the word ‘accident’ usually signifies something going
58 Ibid., 261.
59 Ibid., 317.
60 Iris Murdoch, Metaphysics-as a Guide to Morals (Loudon: Chatto & Windus, 1992), 96.
61 Iris Murdoch. TheBlacl Prince (London: Penguin, 1975), 73.
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wrong’.62 So in this sense, An Accidental Man is an examination of the relationship 
between the accidental (negative) and the contingent (positive), in a world where, sadly, 
the contingent is found wanting.
The Black Prince, the Erotics of Mess and Causality.
The Black Prince is generally considered to be, along with The Sea, the Sea, 
one of M urdoch’s very finest novels. It is the story of Bradley Pearson, a 58 year old, 
ascetic writer, whose degree of success, in both his life and his literary career, has been 
minimal. He is divorced, and lives alone, unencumbered by either literary productivity 
or a functional social life. He spends much of his time trying to remain detached from 
the mess and dirt of other people’s human relationships, which he views with distaste. 
Bradley’s friend and rival, Arnold Baffin, is a successful writer whose life is the reverse 
of Bradley’s -  his family life is unimaginable; chaotic, but a source of joy, and his 
literary profligacy inspires a similar mixture of envy and disgust from Bradley. The 
narrative that Murdoch constructs around these two contradictory figures revolves 
around the human desire to extinguish contingency and the temptation to impose form 
on one’s life. Bradley, indeed, is firmly in the tradition of the Murdochian male ascetic. 
He fears contingency, trains for him representing ‘object lessons in the foul contingency 
of life’.63 The proximity of this contingency-denial to a kind of neurosis is exemplified 
by Bradley, and I would like to suggest that in The Black Prince Murdoch consistently 
allies resistance to, or fear of, contingency to madness of various types. This further 
impresses upon us M urdoch’s belief that the opposite state must be attained, one that 
can recognise muddle and mess as part of the natural process of being and as part of the 
process that will lead us to the good.
62 Phillips, On FUr/afion, 17.
63 Murdoch, The Black Prince, 66.
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As in most Murdoch novels, love is transformative, if transitory. Bradley falls
in love with Julian Baffin, Arnold’s daughter, and runs away with her briefly, but then
she changes her mind and returns to her parents. It is an affair with disastrous
consequences, eventually culminating in the death of Arnold. The novel opens with
Bradley being called upon to enter the dark, unknowable confines of this family life
when Arnold asks him to come over as he thinks he may have killed his wife. Bradley
arrives to find an alive, but humiliated and distraught, Rachel in bed. His description of
her is worth quoting in full.
There was a dark reddish bruise under one eye and the eye  
was narrowed, though this was hard to see because the 
eyelids o f both eyes were so grossly red and swollen with 
weeping. Her upper lip was also swollen on one side. There 
were traces o f blood on her neck and on her dress. Her hair 
was tangled and looked darker as if wet; perhaps it was 
literally wet with the flow o f her tears. She was panting now, 
almost gasping. She had undone the front o f her dress and I 
could see some white lace o f her brassiere and a plump pallor 
o f flesh below ....I got a whiff o f alcohol from her panting 
breath. She knelt upon her dress and I heard it tear. Then she 
half ran half fell across the room to the disordered bed, where 
she flopped on her back, tugging at the bed-clothes, 
ineffectually because she was half lying on them, then 
covering her face with both hands and crying in an appalling 
wailing manner, lying with her feet wide apart in a graceless 
self-absorption o f grief.64
Rachel’s humanity, her very physical being, inspires disgust and horror in the neurotic 
and fastidious Bradley. Her injuries are perceived aesthetically as slights upon 
Bradley’s sight. Mingled with this horror is an unmistakeable eroticism, perceptible in 
the relish with which Bradley describes what disgusts him: ‘her hair was tangled and 
looked darker as if wet; perhaps it was literally wet with the flow of her tears. She was 
panting now, almost gasping. She had undone the front of her dress and I could see 
some white lace of her brassiere and a plump pallor of flesh below’; but it is the 
eroticism of the rank misogynist, of the man for whom hatred and desire are 
inextricable.
64 Ibid., 34-5 .
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In fact, the eroticisation of mess is a primary theme of The Black Prince, 
suggesting that Bradley’s asceticism is perhaps related to repressed sexual desire. The 
question of repression is addressed in the text itself, by Bradley’s continual return to 
Freudian tropes such as his fixation with London’s Post Office Tower, as he admires its 
clean lines and forceful, phallic imprint on the sky. We are led by the text to 
contemplate the possibility that Bradley is in fact a repressed homosexual, and that his 
distaste for the feminine is connected to his falling in love with a boyish girl (with a 
boy’s name) and experiencing a sexual epiphany that overrides his previous impotence 
when he sees her dressed as a Shakespearean prince. That male desire is affiliated with 
artistry, with the imposition onto the debauched and louche idea of the feminine a form, 
is the clear subtext.
Male sexuality throughout the novel is in fact complicit with the desire to
extinguish a more natural, messy state of being. In a parallel to the Rachel scene,
Bradley is later called upon to deal with another middle-aged woman in dire straits who
also lies in bed prostrate but who is similarly incapable of evoking pathos in Bradley.
His sister, Priscilla, has turned up at Bradley’s house after leaving her husband on
suspicion of an infidelity that is later confirmed in the narrative:
I did not know what to do, I felt fear and disgust at the idea 
of ‘mental breakdown’, the semi-deliberate refusal to go on 
organising one’s life which is regarded with such tolerance 
these days. I peered into the room. Priscilla was lying in a 
sort of abandoned attitude on her side, having half kicked o ff  
her bedclothes. Her mouth was wet and wide open. A plump 
stockinged leg stuck rather awkwardly out o f the bed.65
The ‘fear and disgust’ is a clear echo of the scene in Rachel’s bedroom, where objects
and flesh alike evoke horror:
The room has the rather sinister tedium which some 
bedrooms have, a sort o f weary banality which is a reminder 
of death. A dressing table can be a terrible thing....The plate 
glass ‘table’ surface was dusty and covered with cosmetic 
tubes and bottles and balls o f hair. The chest o f drawers had 
all its drawers gaping, spewing pink underwear and shoulder
65 Ibid., 75.
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straps. The bed was chaotic, violent, the green artificial silk 
coverlet swooping down on one side and the sheets and 
blankets creased up into a messy mass, like an old face. 
There was a warm, embarrassing smell o f sweat and face 
powder. The whole room breathed the flat horror of genuine 
mortality, dull and spiritless and final. I do not know why I 
thought so promptly and prophetically o f death...I felt the 
soft warmth of the brown stockinged foot. A pungent sour 
odour joined the vapid smell o f the room. I wiped my hands 
on my trousers.
In fact objects, here, have become metonymically inextricable from the true subject of
this description -  Rachel. She is present merely in her accoutrements and a pervasive
smell, and, finally, a ‘brown stockinged foot’, which is corpse-like in its immobility.
Trotter identifies objects as having an affinity and complicity with contingency itself:
Messes often involve a mutually defining collision between a 
person and an object: a man knocks over a vase, a woman 
touches a freshly painted gate. Since they promise a meaning 
and a value that has little to do with conscious or 
unconscious intent, such encounters might be thought to 
provoke one o f modern philosophy’s most enduring 
fantasies: that suspension o f the mind’s search for
significance would som ehow make possible an account o f  
the way the body inhabits the world.67
Objects are inherently chancy as they are distinct from any human intent, and thus our 
communion with them can tell us much about our existence in a contingent reality. 
Murdoch herself certainly felt an affinity with the inanimate, as she commented to 
Harry Weinberger: ‘How nice objects are -  I’m glad we live in a thingy world’.68 For 
Bradley, that we live in a ‘thingy’ world is an occasion for fear and disgust, and the 
erotic possibilities afforded by the spectacle have been reduced to the ‘embarrassing’ 
intimacy of what he is witnessing. And yet the submerged possibility that the violent 
chaos of the scene could be transmuted from one that evokes mortality to one that 
contains the suggestion of eroticism, is present. This eroticism depends on the scene’s 
essential unpredictability; its chaos. Trotter makes explicit the tripartite affiliation 
between chance, sex and death.
66 Ibid., 38-9.
67 Trotter, Cooking with Mud\ 14-15.
68 Quoted in Conradi, Iris Murdoch: si Life, 588.
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Chance is potentially the matrix and occasion both o f desire 
and of death. On the one hand it has, as the Dadaist Hans 
Richter explained, a certain sensuous appeal, the “erotic 
pleasure” of an “unknown gift”, of limitless possibility; on 
the other, it may bring about, in an especially poignant way, 
the end not only o f all possibility, but of all thinking about 
possibility. Chance presides over ultimate determination: 
over events in the face o f which, when they come, we are 
helpless; over an effect whose cause we can barely 
conceive....Illusion-destroying mess, actual or represented, 
enables us to understand contingency as the matrix and 
occasion o f an exemplary death: not the death which happens 
as the outcome o f an identifiable sequence o f cause and 
effect, but the death which need not have happened at all, the 
death which is pure death.69
This is an extension of Phillips’s useful description of uncertainty as erotic: ‘disfiguring 
the difference between innocence and experience, intent and opportunity, flirtation does 
not make a virtue of instability, but a pleasure. It eroticizes the contingency of our lives 
by turning doubt -  or ambiguity -  into suspense’.70 It is the scene’s messiness, and its 
contingency, that brings to Bradley’s mind both the suppressed sexual associations and 
his sudden apprehension of death. The mess itself is the cause and the effect: it is 
contingency at its rawest. The possibility of death itself is eroticised as the ultimately 
gratuitous act -  a flirtation with death becoming merely one further embrace of 
possibility.
The Black Prince is also a novel mired in the tension between causality and 
chance, and between the differing ideas of the self as a possible site determined by the 
operation of both. If we are helpless in the face of external events, and our essential self, 
and the reasons for that self’s disfigurement, can be traced back through our behaviour 
and thereby explained, then this is both an elaboration of the self as a construction of 
causes beyond our control and a denial of the same. If every ‘accident’ or ‘coincidence’ 
can be explained away, if everyone is who they are for a set of ultimately explicable 
reasons, has the self not become an over-determined way to deny contingency? Gordon
69 Trotter, Cooking with Mud, 9.
/0 Phillips, On F/ination, xxiii.
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has argued for M urdoch’s view of causality as a departure from any previous 
understanding of aetiology:
She is postulating a system of “moral” or “spiritual” causality 
based on the cosm ological forces o f Chance and Necessity, a 
system that may be identified with God understood as a 
power that impinges on human consciousness but that cannot 
be identified with human will or choice .71
His is a sophisticated analysis but one that places too great an emphasis on necessity. 
Murdoch did not believe that necessity was a cosmological force. Indeed, in Murdoch’s 
novels, a belief in necessity, or in any sort of compelling force that stands outside 
character, is usually a sign of madness, and for this reason I would argue that Gordon 
overstates his case when he claims that ‘Chance and Necessity, then, are equally aspects 
of the Good’.72 Other critics have noticed Murdoch’s treatment of cause and effect but 
interpreted it rather differently. Dipple, for example, emphasises the interaction of 
causality and contingency: ‘her novels attempt the talk of discriminating, of showing 
how the tenure of certain ideas affect behaviour, how cause and effect operate, what 
power chance has’,73 and ‘the causality of Bradley Pearson’s punishment in losing 
Julian is part of the larger pattern of cause and effect which governs this book’.74 Patrick 
Swinden goes further, and underplays the role of causality, suggesting that Murdoch 
‘does not believe that motive and consequence, cause and effect, are as firmly 
connected with each other as they have usually been represented in fiction’, and ‘the 
network is gradually revealed (to the reader as well as the character) to be an artificial 
environment. It is unreal, and its unreality tends to diminish the character’s sense of his 
own reality as well as that of other people.’75 This reading, however, wrongly 
necessitates the sort of distinction between contingency and cause and effect that 
Murdoch is at pains to elide. Contingency, in The Black Prince, is cause and effect -
71 Gordon, Iris- Murdoch s Fables o f IInsejh/g, 97.
72 Ibid., 105.
,;! Di pple, Iris Murdoch: Work/or the Spirit, 39.
74 Ibid., 125.
Patrick Swinden, Unofficial Selves: Character in the Novel from Dickens to the Present Day (Macmillan: 1973), 
235-6.
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one makes things explicable and the other makes things inexplicable, but both are
implicated in the ‘dense mesh of interconnections’76 that the good feel constitutes being,
and both subvert Bradley’s attempt at directing others’ lives as art: as Gordon points
out, ‘truly good art shows us the defeat of human wishes by contingency’.77 He goes on
to suggest that Murdoch’s novels work as an elaboration of a specific theory of
causality. Detectable in her work, he argues:
is a creatively reactive argument against psychoanalysis and 
against the idea that ‘character’ and its ‘deep’ conflicts 
determine our fate. She would show that, to a greater extent 
than we know or say, Chance and Necessity rule our 
destinies, that we are absurd creatures rather than 
protagonists who struggle against destiny with tragic 
seriousness. Such an argument is hardly congruent with a 
humanistic philosophy, but practice is less extreme than 
theory, in part because the novelist’s obligation to invest 
human characters with the understanding o f these truths, to 
dramatise the wisdom o f self-responsibility even if the 
content o f that wisdom is the recognition o f one’s limits in 
the scheme o f things. Then, too, some o f her novels, pitched 
in a more genial key, lean towards the generous-humane 
rather than the severe-ascetic end o f the tragic-comic 
spectrum. These novels smile at human vanity and at our 
moral pretension in thinking ourselves free choosers and 
masters o f destiny, showing as they do that choice and 
responsibility remain important in an extended view o f  
human values.78
The Black Prince, though, shows a more subtle engagement with Freudian psychology 
than a characterization of the psychoanalytic approach as deterministic and opposed to 
the meta-psychological agency of chance would allow. Bradley’s elaboration of certain 
Freudian tropes are certainly emphasised -  the obsession with the Post Office Tower, 
his neuroses, his homoerotic competitiveness with Arnold, and the fact that his 
sexuality is only unleashed in the novel when he sees Julian dressed as Prince Hal. The 
Freudian interpretations of these aspects of Bradley’s behaviour, however, are given to 
Francis Marlowe, consistently shown to be an egocentric, repellent character, and thus, 
I suggest, are simultaneously dismissed by Murdoch. Marlowe’s personal
76 Murdoch, The Black Prince, 125.
77 Cordon,Iris Murdoch's Fables o f IJnsel/ina, 105.
78 Ibid., 97.
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sensationalism and desire for gossip elaborate his Freudian readings of Bradley’s 
behaviour as superficial and titillating surface correspondences that serve to diminish 
whoever puts them forward as explanations for human behaviour. Marlowe is a 
buffoon, whose inability to understand people or their real motivations at all is a source 
of comedy and pathos throughout the novel, and which reveals itself in his monologic 
postscript as a set of misreadings so severe as to edge into evil.79
In fact, we intuit, the reality of people is so complex and contradictory and
particular that all versions of a person can be simultaneously true, and that to limit one’s
characterization of another to one aspect of their character is to misunderstand
everything about the person. The bastardised version of Freud represented by Marlowe
is a straw man argument, knocked down easily, to reveal a more profound allusion to
psychoanalytical ideas in terms of causality. As Phillips comments, ‘acknowledgement
of the contingency of the self -  and the contingent self that lives this acknowledgement
-  need not be exclusively a disillusioning or depressive experience, because somewhere
one has never had illusions about it; in adult life it is contesting one’s contingency that
is productive of disabling illusion.’80 Although, as Phillips points out, the Freudian slip
‘is the accident that is meant to happen’,81 Freud’s attachment to chance complicates
and shields this formulation from any easy determinism, or, as Phillips formulates it, ‘It
may not be that all accidents are meaningful, but that meaning is made out of
accidents’.82 Freud indeed, was no determinist. As he wrote in 1910:
If one considers chance to be unworthy o f determining our 
fate, it is simply a relapse into the pious view o f the universe 
which Leonardo himself was on his way to overcoming when 
he wrote that the sun does not m ove....w e are all too ready to 
forget that in fact everything to do with our life is chance, 
from our origin out o f the meeting of spermatozoon and 
ovum onwards....W e all still show too little respect for 
Nature which (in the obscure words o f Leonardo which recall
'9 For Murdoch, ‘misreadings’ are an exertion ofyour ego onto the neutral and blameless truthful messy information 
that the world is actually offering you. One’s perception, when distorted by ego, is capable of knocking perception 
askew; and this, she suggests, is how evil manifests itself: as a refusal to truthfully accept the world for what it is.
80 Phillips, On f  lirtation, 20.
81 Ibid., 9.
82 Ibid., 11.
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Hamlet’s lines) “ is full o f countless causes ( ‘ragioni’) that 
never enter experience.” Everyone o f us human beings 
corresponds to one o f the countless experiments in which 
these “ragioni” o f nature force their way into experience.83
The ragioni represent not the explicability of cause and effect, but the inexplicability. 
That causality can be antithetical to the superficial desire to know why one thing 
happened over another thing belies the easy characterization of it offered by Marlowe. 
Richard Rorty traces this paradigmatic change that sees the self as contingent back to 
Nietzsche, who scorned the notion of some universal truth, and instead ‘saw self- 
knowledge as self-creation. The process of coming to know oneself, confronting one’s 
contingency, tracking one’s causes home, is identical with the process of inventing a 
new language’.84 He goes on: ‘only poets, Nietzsche suspected, can truly appreciate 
contingency. The rest of us are doomed to remain philosophers, to insist there is only 
one true lading-list, one true description of the human situation, one universal context of 
our lives. We are doomed to spend our conscious lives trying to escape from 
contingency rather than, like the strong poet, acknowledging and appropriating 
contingency’.85 Because of Freud’s detailed explanations of things, ‘he leaves us with a 
self which is a tissue of contingencies’.86
Murdoch’s elaboration of causality in the novel emphasises the contingent self
and endows it with ethical value. The good have an awareness of the contingency of
events that can transform the operation of chance into grace, while the wicked
unthinkingly ignore the ‘dense mesh of interconnectedness’ and thus their ability to
comprehend the world of chance, or reality, is severely limited:
A serious kiss can alter the world and should not be allowed  
to take place simply because the scene w ill be disfigured 
without it. These considerations will no doubt seem to the 
young unutterably prudish and fussy. But precisely because 
they are young they cannot see how all things have their
83 Freud, Standard Edition (S.E.), XJ, 137, quoted in Rorty, Comingrncy Irony, ana'Solidarity, 31.
84 Ibid., 27.
85 Ibid., 28.
86 Ibid., 32.
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consequences. (This thing had consequences, including some 
very unexpected ones.) There are no spare unrecorded 
encapsulated moments in which we can behave ‘anyhow’ and 
then expect life to resume where we left off. The wicked 
regard time as discontinuous, the wicked dull their sense o f  
natural causality. The good feel being as a total dense mesh 
of tiny interconnection. My lightest whim can affect the 
whole future. Because I smoke a cigarette and smile over an 
unworthy thought another man may die in torment...the past 
must be justly judged. Whatever marvels may have sprung 
out of one’s faults through the incomprehensible operation o f  
grace. O felix culpa! does not excuse anything.87
Murdoch’s understanding of contingency does not rest on the idea that reality is 
provisional; but rather that it is essentially dependent. One event, one chance 
occurrence, is merely the product of a ‘dense mesh of interconnections’. Thus reality is 
apprehended as a vast sea of contingency, comprehensible to us only in tiny portions. 
As we saw in the first chapter, causality has long been understood and assimilated in 
opposition to chance, as it allowed in Newtonian physics for the idea of determinism, 
but in the twentieth century causality has been distinguished by its sense of being cut 
off from these old mechanistic cause and effect ideas. Events have not become 
randomised, but causality allows for and embraces the random. Causality is therefore a 
way of both acknowledging that chance is worthy of determining our fate, and, for 
Bradley, another path away from the ‘good muddle’ and into paranoia. ‘Everything is 
connected’ cannot be understood as a rational response to aetiology -  the butterfly 
effect, in other words, is no way to live one’s life. Bradley’s ‘embrace’ of contingency, 
then, where he believes that ‘my slightest whim can . . . ’ is an illusion. The pathos of 
these messy Murdoch novels, indeed, is that no one ever learns -  and even if they do, 
they forget again.
87 Murdoch, The Black Prince, 124-5.
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Contingency as the Good -The Sea, the Sea
Charles Arrowby, the male first person narrator of The Sea, the Sea, tells us 
early on, ‘I hate mess', thus establishing himself as another masculine denier of 
contingency.1 However he is more attractive than Bradley, and more complex than 
Julius. Through him, Murdoch investigates the exercise of power and its relationship to 
contingency and the good. Charles’ power is partly that of the artist, and partly that of 
the charismatic male manipulator. The narrative, more so than any other Murdoch 
novel, meditates on the connection between the abuse of power and ‘form ’. ’Lies, lies, 
almost all art is lies. Hell itself turns to favour and to prettiness. Muck...All art 
disfigures life, misrepresents it’.2 This is reminiscent of Murdoch’s formulation that 
‘form is the great temptation of art, because it threatens to become an end or stopping 
point in itself, rather than serving to illuminate that reality which always exceeds our 
descriptions of it.’3 For Murdoch, we know that the dangers of form extend to life: 
‘Form is the great consolation of love, but also its great temptation.’4 Charles is perhaps 
the personification of the impulse or temptation to form, not as an ‘artist’, as we saw 
with Julius, but, rather, he tries to create a narrative of his life by the exercise of 
manipulative power. The coincidence of his meeting his first love again, in the tiny 
village where he has come to retire, is recast as fate: ‘I mean what incredible luck to 
meet her again like that, it’s the hand of destiny’.5 And this extends to his view of all 
coincidence: ‘“I don’t understand you, you’re babbling. Why did he come here?” “I 
don’t know, it was an accident, it was a chance “Funny sort of chance. My God, 
you’re clever, it’s the one bloody thing that would torment me more than anything
1 Murdoch, The Sea, the Sea, 38.
2 Ibid., 164.
'Murdoch, "Against Dryness," 20.
4 Iris Murdoch, "The Sublime and the Good," Chicago Review 13, no. 3 ( 1959): 55.
■' Murdoch, The Sea, the Sea, 177.
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else’.6 He doesn’t believe in chance, because chance is what would work against and 
undo his tenuous control of the world.
Charles’ hatred of mess and muddle defines him. After Hartley runs away from 
him, and Charles fears she is lost on the rocks, he follows her: ‘it was extremely 
difficult to keep any pace over the rocks since they were so unpredictable and devoid of 
reason. Their senselessness had never so much impressed me. I kept trying to get near 
to the edge of the sea but the rocks kept defeating me, not by malign interest but by 
sheer m uddle’.7 Titus, Hartley’s son, echoes Bradley in an ominous foreshadowing of 
his eventual swallowing by the primary symbol of ‘muddle’ in the novel, the sea: “ ‘I 
left home so as not to be bothered by muddles like that, I hate muddles, and I’ve had 
them all my life with those two, muddle, muddle, muddle. They’re not bad people 
really, they’ve just got no sense of how to live a human life’” .8 The instructive, ethically 
prescriptive aspect of M urdoch’s prose is thus ironized heavily. In contrast to these 
men, Hartley, in her quotidian, feminine, unassuming sanity recognises muddle as her 
metier: ‘“of course it’s a muddle, but it’s my muddle, i t’s where I live and what I am. I 
can’t run out of it and leave it all behind all jagged and loose like a broken shell.’” 9
Throughout the book, Charles’s attempts to master the world -  his exercise of 
power in all spheres of his life, his corrupt and egotistical manipulation and control of 
others -  is consistently contrasted with the ‘mess’ of the natural world and specifically 
of the sea. Charles’ cousin James, who is a Buddhist -  and therefore, in Murdoch’s 
schema, is at least trying to understand things -  tellingly admires the sea.10 He says to 
Charles ju st after Hartley has been trying to get him to let her leave, “ ‘Charles, just look
6 Ibid., 195.
7 Ibid., 234.
8 Ibid., 376. Emphasis mine.
9 Ibid., 302.
10 The setting up of James as Charles’s opposite number in how they react to and use contingency and muddle is 
clear: “ I’m disappointed in you,’ I said to James. ‘I didn’t ever think you’d do anything mean or treacherous, I didn’t 
ever believe you’d pur yourself in this sort of squalid muddle. It’s a kind of ordinary sly human smpidity which I was 
foolish enough to imagine you didn’t suffer from. You’ve behaved like ordinary people do who can’t imagine 
consequences.”
IJamesI “ Do not see it so. What hapjxmed was accidental and forgivable. Just stop driving yourself mad with 
jealousy” (Ibid., 409-10.)
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at the force of that water, isn’t it fantastic, isn’t it terrifying?’” 11 Charles, in contrast, 
while he is shown to be attracted to the sea’s formlessness, projects his own neuroses 
onto it in the form of a sea monster which functions as a metaphor for the sea’s 
terrifying power because he cannot truly apprehend it -  though his artistic descriptions 
of its formlessness imply otherwise. Charles is eventually pushed into the ‘cauldron’: ‘I 
actually saw, in the diffused midsummer darkness-light, the creamy curling waves just 
below me, and the particular spiral of their movement in the confined space. Then I was 
in the water whose intense cold surprised me with a separate shock, and I made the 
instinctive swimmer’s movement of trying to right myself; but my body was aware that 
no swimming could take place in that vortex’.12 The vortex in its destructive chaos, 
rebuffs all attempts to swim. In fact, the manner of the description of the ‘cauldron’ 
fulfils a similar function to Murdoch’s use of fog in earlier novels. As Conradi says, 
‘fogs feature in Iris’s novels as a concrete metaphor for obfuscation, or a bewitchment 
o f the intelligence’.13 Throughout the novel swimming has functioned as an expression 
of Charles’ individuality, and of his individual exercise of power, which he imposes on 
the sea. Swimming is an act of will that creatively transforms vast chaotic areas of 
matter into purpose and directed movement; that it is eternally frustrated is Murdoch’s 
elaboration of the ability of the contingency of reality to eventually undermine man’s 
follies.
In the postscript to the novel, Murdoch describes this impulse of Charles’s, in a
manner that could stand as a final description of this paradox at the heart of all of her
most important novels:
That is no doubt how the story ought to end, with the seals 
and the stars, explanation, resignation, reconciliation, 
everything picked up into some radiant bland ambiguous 
higher significance, in calm of mind, all passion spent.
However life, unlike art, has an irritating way o f  bumping 
and limping on, undoing conversions, casting doubt on
11 Ibid., 330.
12 Ibid., 363.
13 Conradi Jm  Mnnloc/i:A Life, 351.
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solutions, and generally illustrating the impossibility o f  
living happily or virtuously ever after....! might take this 
opportunity to tie up a few loose ends, only of course loose 
ends can never be properly tied, one is always producing new  
ones. Tim e, like the sea, undoes all knots. Judgments on 
people are never final, they emerge from summings up which 
at once suggest the need o f a reconsideration. Human 
arrangements are nothing but loose ends and hazy reckoning, 
whatever art may pretend otherwise in order to console us.14
The sea that undoes all knots stands as a beautiful metaphor for Murdoch’s 
understanding of life. That we must continue to try and resist the temptations of 
consolation is her great lesson, whether it remains unlearnt or not. She advocates that 
we must try and bear the loose ends, without explaining them away by an oppressive 
obsession with causality, or imposing a dishonest artistic structure on top of them. As 
Peter Conradi says, ‘Her work abounds in iconoclasm, books left incomplete, tom-up, 
china or glass smashed’.15 Similarly in 1961 she called her work ‘an investigation that 
never ends, rather than a means of resolving anything.’16 In the end, her decisive allying 
of contingency, mess and chance with a prescriptive and instructive ethical philosophy 
-  this is how we should live -  is what saves chance from scientific neutrality or 
existential horror, or Beckettian ignorance. Contingency, in Murdoch’s work, represents 
openness to possibility, and a rejection of the scepticism that was the corollary of 
chance and uncertainty: rather, it is a way of being open to all things.
14 Murdoch, The Sea. the Sea, 477.
1 Conradi, Iris Murdoch: A Uj'e, 54 9.
16 Interview widi John Barrows, ‘Living Writers - 7 ’. John o’ London’s, 4 May 1961.Quoted in Ibid.
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C o n c l u s io n
In conclusion I would like to return briefly to an idea that has run, covertly, 
alongside this (and, I would argue, every) examination of chance, and which I touched 
upon in Chapter Three, above: the idea of freedom and its relation to the individual. 
Freedom’s relation to chance is at once straightforward and oblique; it is the condition 
for chance, it is its a priori, but it also bears a heavier conceptual burden: freedom is a 
political, social, and economic mode of experience as well as a metaphysical one. 
Nevertheless, the growth of chance in the mid-part of the twentieth century implicates 
the idea of freedom in various ways, and, I would argue, specifically reintroduces the 
cultural shadow left by the Second World War.
In Chapter Three, I sketched the linkage between the existentialist’s conception 
of freedom and possibility with our understanding of chance, and concluded that the 
post-existential idea of chance was infected with the pessimism of the post-war idea of 
possibility -  an idea that had become heavily ironized. The paradigmatic existentialist 
idea of freedom was one of literal constraint due to the experience of the war, as 
demonstrated by Sartre’s famous statement in a radio interview with the BBC in 1944 
that ‘we were never freer than under the Nazi occupation’; his point being that, during 
an occupation, every choice is endowed with, literally, life or death significance, and 
that this, at least, is one way to escape meaninglessness. The paradoxical association of 
oppression with freedom has resonance with the existential conception of possibility, 
and I limn the immediately post-war conception of possibility as a sort of ‘negative 
possibility,’ as expressed best in Beckett’s Watt. The idea of freedom, and of 
possibility, cut loose from wartime strictures became not a liberating idea, but a 
terrifying one. In suggesting this I follow Erich Fromm, whose The Fear o f Freedom 
(1942) was one of the most influential and powerful works of mid-twentieth century 
psychoanalytical philosophy. Fromm charts the distinction between ‘negative’ and
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‘p o sit iv e ’ freedom : the form er he d iagn oses as the w artim e reality , and the latter as a
p ossib le  state to w h ich  w e m ight aspire. He u ses the fall in Christian th eo lo g y  as the
point o f  b egin n ing  fo r  hum an freedom : ‘JManl acts against G od ’s com m and , he breaks
through the state o f  harm ony w ith  nature o f  w hich  he is a part w ithout transcending it. ’ 1
T his is ‘s in ’ from  the p ersp ective  o f  the Christian institution. A nd y et, p osits From m ,
‘from  the stan d p oin t o f  m an, this is the b egin n ing  o f  human freed o m .’ H ow ever,
‘freed om  fr o m ’, w e m ust understand, is not identical w ith  p o sitiv e  freed om , w hich
From m  ca lls  ‘freed om  to .’ ‘Freedom  fro m ’ is n ega tive  freed om , m erely ex isten ce
w ith ou t in stin ctiv e  determ ination  o f  actions. A s su ch , it is perhaps best understood as a
con d ition  o f  b ein g  hum an, to som e extent, and am ounts to the realisation  that o n e ’s
action s are w illed  and not m ere products o f  m ech an istic  system s. N egative  freed om , in
fact, em erges as barely freed om  at all; From m  d escrib es the m odem  individual as
p ath etica lly  in cap ab le  o f  m ean ingfu l ch o ice . H is sketch  o f  m odem  m an, h elp less and
unfree, am ou n ts to a rebuttal o f  the perhaps easy  assu m p tions about the em p ow ering
p otential o f  c h o ic e  that the ex isten tia lists  w ere m aking during the sam e period, and is
worth q u otin g  at length:
The threat of war has also added to the feeling of individual 
povverlessness. To be sure, there were wars in the nineteenth 
century too. But since the last the possibilities of destruction 
have increased so tremendously -  the range of people to be 
affected by war has grown to such an extent as to comprise
everybody without exception -  that the threat of war has
become a nightmare which, though it may not be conscious 
to many people before their nation is actually involved in the 
war, has overshadowed their lives and increased their feeling 
of fright and individual powerlessness....The “style” of the 
whole period corresponds to the picture I have sketched.
Vastness of cities in which the individual is lost, buildings 
that are as high as mountains, constant acoustic 
bombardment by the radio, big headlines changing three 
times a day and leaving one no choice to decide what is 
important, shows in which one hundred girls demonstrate 
their ability with clocklike precision to eliminate the 
individual and act like a powerful though smooth machine, 
the beating rhythm of jazz -  these and many other details are 
expressions of a constellation in which the individual is 
confronted by uncontrollable dimensions in comparison with 
which he is a small particle. All he can do is fail in step like a
1 Erich Eromin, The Fear o f Freedom (London: Routledge, 2001), 28.
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marching soldier or a worker on the endless belt. He can act; 
but the sense o f independence, significance, has gone.2
As a possible solution to this circumscribed and stymied existence, Fromm offers the 
following: ‘We believe there is a positive answer, that the process of growing freedom 
does not constitute a vicious circle, and that man can be free and not alone’.3 ‘Freedom 
to’ is thus the state to which we must aspire, where we are capable of spontaneous acts 
of true freedom. Fromm’s essay is an attempt to define this positive freedom and the 
ways in which it is stymied by modem life: by commercial, political, and economic 
systems to which the individual, automaton-like, feels he must submit. He continues: 
‘positive freedom consists in the spontaneous activity of the total, integrated 
personality’.4 Artists and small children, he suggests, have his essential quality of 
spontaneity, and it is what we must strive to achieve if we are to escape the automatised 
actions that come naturally to us in the face of the depersonalized conditions sketched 
above, and which, without our conscious assent, construct a psychic prison in which 
most people live their lives. Moreover, ‘Love is the foremost component of such 
spontaneity; not love as the dissolution of the self in another person, not love as the 
possession of another person, but love as spontaneous affirmation of others’.5
This is strikingly similar to Iris Murdoch’s prescriptive advocacy of love as a 
path to the Good. For both Fromm and Murdoch, ‘love’ is a mode of communion 
between individuals, not necessarily as in the all-consuming submersion of the self in 
another as is often implied in modern conceptions of romantic love, but a form of 
conducting one’s relationships to other individuals and the wider society. It consists of 
appreciating others’ individuality and thus maintaining each person’s contingency: that 
is, in respecting another person as an individual site of consciousness as valid as one’s 
own, rather than perceiving them dimly through the refracting lens of one’s own ego.
2 Ibid., 113.
Ibid., 222.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., 225.
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By loving in this way, Murdoch argued throughout her oeuvre, we could allow the 
contingency of character, or that unpredictable aspect of others that is not like 
ourselves, its full expression. In ‘The Sublime and the Beautiful Revisited’, Murdoch 
writes: ‘Virtue is not essentially or immediately concerned with choosing between 
actions or rules or reasons, nor with stripping the personality for a leap. It is concerned 
with really apprehending that other people exist. This too is what freedom really is’.6 
She expands on this idea in the essay ‘Against Dryness’, where she says that character 
should be thought of as ‘substantial, impenetrable, individual, indefinable and 
valuable’.7 The ideal character is ‘free and separate...related to a rich and complicated 
world from which as a moral being he has much to learn’.8 This is how contingency, the 
differentness of the world and others, can help us out of the trap of unfreedom; for evil 
for Murdoch is done when an individual tries to impose their own ego on the world 
surrounding them. Fromm’s vision of ‘spontaneity’, in this sense, does a similar job to 
M urdoch’s ‘contingency’ (and indeed the very word spontaneity comes from the Latin 
for free will).
As mentioned in Chapter Three, Leland Monk argues that Joyce’s Ulysses 
marks the cut-off point of chance’s representation in literature because it ‘rejoices in 
things that happen by chance’, and the resulting ‘undecidability of pleasure’ supersedes 
the authorial will and imposes its own agency on the text -  an agency that prioritizes the 
pleasurable aesthetic of the unpredictable over the aesthetic of authorial will and 
determination.9 Although Ulysses predates the historical period that I have been 
examining, the idea has a kinship with my central argument that undermines Monk’s 
claim that Joyce represents a watershed for chance. I have suggested that what 
happened throughout the period was a slow accommodating of the positive aspects of 
chance, resulting in Murdoch’s philosophical rehabilitation of chance under the rubric
6 Murdoch, "The Sublime and the Beautiful Revisited," 284.
7 Murdoch, "Against Dryness," 16.
8 Ibid.: 18.
9 Monk, Standard Deviations, 151,52.
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of contingency as the Good. Accepting chance as the controlling force in the universe 
endows the individual with an ability to see all events as ultimately forgivable: 
accidentality allows for a sort of grace. Monk’s principle of pleasure perhaps allows for 
the open-endedness of texts in the same way that the idea espoused by Murdoch and 
Fromm allows for the open-endedness of persons: form, is, after all, ‘the temptation of 
love and its peril’.10 To revel in a lack of form, and to let the pleasurable aesthetic of 
chance (erratic, whimsical, flirtatious) dominate, is thus instructive. The pleasure of 
chance was after all that identified by Bergler as ‘the one exceptional situation in life 
where the reality principle has no advantage over the pleasure principle. There blind 
chance rules’.11
Contingency, and its embracing of character, is thus perhaps the key concept in 
terms of getting us out of the dead end into which Johnson, and the branch of sixties’ 
experimental literature that he represents had backed us into; where chance was made to 
stand in for the idea of artistic authority. An appreciation of contingency allows for pure 
randomness. It tells us that the world makes no sense. But it also invites us to bear it, to 
live with it passively. Murdoch articulates and bodies forth this new optimism about 
contingency in her novels. If contingency can be allied with goodness, then the 
increasingly neurotic treatment of randomness, the fear of chance and its subversive 
capabilities, can perhaps be forced into quietude. Murdoch’s radicalism lies in her break 
with the centuries-old apprehension of chance’s negative ethical capability. Murdoch 
believes that mess and muddle is the natural state of the universe when it is perceived 
by a good, ego-less consciousness that does not seek to distort what it perceives. As a 
corollary to this, she believes that form is untruthful, a prop for the uncourageous and a 
sop to the ego-bound who need to believe that they have had a detectable impact on the 
mess of reality. In this ‘[thinking] with mess as well as about it’, as David Trotter has
10 Murdoch, "The Sublime and the Beautiful Revisited," 285.
11 Cited iu Kavanagh, Enliglueineni and ihe Shadows- o f Chance, 18. My emphasis.
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it,12 Murdoch tries to let the mess into her novels, allowing the contingency of the self 
in the form of character to subvert the necessary rigidity of literary form. As such, much 
of what we find in Murdoch is a rigorous formulation and working out of ideas we saw 
emerging in Green. That chance came to be, for Green, a mode of existing passively in 
the world, is systematised in Murdoch into the Good -  coexisting with contingency, or 
being ‘good for nothing’. In the Murdoch novels that explore her philosophical ideas 
about chance, it is eventually chance and contingency that prove redemptive. The 
submission to them, or the allowance of their potentially transformative natures, is what 
subverts the deathly pull of necessity in life and the deathless pull of form in art.
M urdoch’s transformation of chance into ‘positive’ chance is thus analogous to
Fromm’s prescriptive vision of positive freedom twenty years earlier. The formulation
of strategies for transforming chance’s operations in the text from a difficult, marginal,
unrepresentable ‘other’, has been a largely narratological task, but one that has
throughout its history sustained implications for wider ethical questions about society’s
attitude to determinism and uncertainty. Indeed, mastery over the facts of history has
always involved the suppression and undermining of uncertainty, as Monk notes:
of course, chance has been marginalized not simply because 
of some covert and pervasive metaphysical conspiracy but 
because it is by its very nature eccentric in relation to a 
central paradigm o f action and thought; chance inhabits the 
periphery o f whatever frame of povver-knovvledge is in place, 
simultaneously defining and transgressing the borders or 
limits that constitute that frame. 13
The transformation of chance from an aspect of experience that was marginalised in the 
novel into a textual trope analogous to positive freedom, and capable of delivering a 
stark rebuttal to any easy assumptions about deterministic aspects of narrative, is thus 
no small achievement; even if, as individuals, the authors I have discussed met with 
varying degrees of success, and are limited by varying degrees of obscurity from being
12Trotier, Cooking with Mud, 8.
13 Monk, Standard Deviations, 4 -5 .
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representative of a wider cultural shift towards the acceptance of the more recalcitrant 
aspects of chance.
The suggestion of an engagement between pure chance and narrative as a 
positive, text-enhancing mimetic boon is where I part company with many other critics 
of chance in the modern novel. Leland Monk argues persuasively that chance always 
becomes fate in narrative, that the steamroller power of a teleological narrative always 
results in chance’s yielding to the demands of the greater good of the novel’s causal 
desire. Possibly it does in terms of technical representation: chance is and remains 
unrepresentable in traditional narrative. But then pure chance in the novel, to my mind, 
is interesting less for its literal presence or absence in texts than for what it represents to 
the authors who align themselves with it, and for what it can tell us about their 
motivations and the wider cultural forces, philosophical shifts of meaning, and scientific 
ideas that inspire it. Writers who either attempt to represent it, or who, by highlighting 
their inability to do so communicate to us an oblique commentary on its subversive 
potential, are utilising Edmund Bergler’s understanding of chance as a ‘latent rebellion 
against logic, intelligence, moderation, morality, and renunciation’.14 This is a 
realisation that a recognition of chance contains the potential to disrupt the very form in 
which they are writing. Chance endows us, as readers, with the knowledge that its 
insolent, unruly power is capable of empowering texts to have a destructive faculty -  
an ability, albeit a partial and often subtextual one, to work against their own best 
interests and stated aims. When we think of Beckett’s nightmare reproduction of 
possibility in Watt, Murdoch, working to undo her own crystalline form; Green sitting 
pickled in his study for twenty years unable to write anything except dialogue for fear 
of interfering in his character’s freedom; and B. S. Johnson, dead by his own hand, aged 
42, convinced of his artistic failure to represent the truly random nature of reality -  all, 
in their treatment of chance, replicate this sense of artistic ambition, to incorporate the
14 Cited in Kavanagh.JLnlighiememand'theShadows-of Chance, 18.
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very aspects of the novel that are intractable: to attempt to accommodate chance into 
their work, however ceaselessly resistant.
In the serialized version of Joseph Conrad’s popular 1913 novel Chance, in a
passage deleted by the author before it was published as a novel, Conrad wrote:
For most people the pages o f life are ruled like the pages o f  a 
copybook headed with some sound moral maxim at the top.
They can turn them over with the certitude that the very 
catastrophes shall keep to the traced lines. And it is 
comforting, in a way, to one’s friends and even to one’s self 
to think that one’s very misfortunes, if any, will be o f  the 
foreseen type.15
Typographical order, for Conrad, becomes interchangeable with the determinism we 
appeal to in terms of our own personal teleologies. The organisation of our lives is thus 
inextricable from the organisation of their narrative equivalents: the pages of life are 
‘like the pages of a copybook’. Chance events become inevitably assimilated into fate; 
they become the narrative fabric of one’s life; once they happen, they are 
retrospectively recalibrated as ‘foreseen type’ (by what Leland Monk brilliantly calls 
the ‘narrative engines of recuperation’,16 and indeed, the impulse that straightens out the 
haphazard in narrative certainly resonates as an image of soothing, of smoothing, of 
making safe for the predictable movements of causal determinism). Once this sleight of 
hand has been achieved, the events of life assume the weight of ‘history’: how could it 
have been any other way? This is what we might call the ‘novelization’ of life, where 
we seek to impose a narrative on random events retrospectively, to attempt to make 
sense backwards of what, as lived forwards, is ceaselessly nonsensical.
Throughout this thesis, I have tried to isolate moments of literary history, 
centring on a particular historical period where these questions were pressing, where 
this inevitable assimilation has been resisted, subverted, or at least postponed. As such, 
I have been interested in novels and writers who refuse to acquiesce easily to this vision
15 Quoted in Monk, Standard Deviations, 84.
16 Ibid., 89.
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of the function of narrative, and rather, choose to embrace the disquieting, disruptive 
aspects of chance. In this process I have found a slow movement towards a 
reconciliation between chance and narrative, as evinced by all my authors’ attempts to 
represent chance, and finally as manifested in Iris Murdoch’s rehabilitation of chance in 
narrative as a philosophically sophisticated ethical prescription for us to achieve a state 
analogous to the ‘positive’ freedom limned by Fromm as our only escape during the 
war.
Iris Murdoch’s husband, the critic John Bayley, wrote in The Characters of 
Love (1960), that:
But the greatest English literature is not about the Human 
Condition. We might say that it is about ‘Nature’, a term 
which has no equivalent in the Franco-American critical 
vocabulary which is current today....It implies, above all, an 
absence of purpose, o f insistence, and o f individual insight; 
the portrayal o f Nature suggests an almost involuntary 
fidelity to what is constant in human types and human 
affairs; to the repetition o f birth and death, joy and sorrow; to 
the humours o f men and women and the peculiarities that are 
at once recognised as universal. It implies a lack o f  
pretension -  the author gets no particular credit for 
portraying it well. The Human Condition, on the other hand, 
implies a personal sense o f where life is significant, o f  where 
humanity suffers especially or feels intensively; o f unusual 
violence and unusual modes o f feeling; o f interesting 
development or o f illuminating decay. The subject matter 
may even be the same, but those who write about the Human 
Condition take an attitude towards it. 17
Bayley’s expression of a sympathy with ‘neutrality’ in writing in this passage, with an 
attempt to quell the author’s own attitude towards the world he is attempting to 
describe, finds allies in Murdoch, and with Green, in particular, but also in Johnson and 
Beckett. What they all have in common is an attempt to liberate the novel from the 
strictures that signify meaning. What is natural, unpredictable and contingent, character 
and the accidental nature of reality, must be allowed to flourish, as difficult as that is, 
and the temptation of allowing form to suffocate reality must be resisted.
17 John Bayley, The Characters o f Love: A Study in the Literature o f Personality (London: Constable, 1960), 2 6 8 -  
69.
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Any study of chance will, I believe, end up insinuating a defence of the 
superiority of reality over art. An understanding of the tensions and interplay between 
the random and the man-made necessarily inculcates a vision of chance as striving to 
undercut our grand schemes and inventions, and recognises its unique vantage, from 
which it is able to speak to us of the inadequacy of form, and the limits of art’s ability 
‘to see and to really represent’, in James’s characteristically neat formula, the human 
experience.
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